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owner or keeper of any dog or dogs shall neglect or refuse to pay the
tax thereon, to kill, or cause to be killed, every and all such dogs."'
I. INTRODUCTION

Civil tax penalties for inaccurate federal tax returns have been of
significant interest for the past decade. Practitioners, commentators,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or the Service), and Congress

debated numerous proposals imposing monetary sanctions on taxpayers who fail to file tax returns accurately reflecting their tax liability.2 The 1980s saw numerous controversial and innovative enactments
regarding such penalty provisions.3 The increased information about
and discussion of the level of taxpayer compliance also heightened
interest in the penalty debate. 4 As the decade came to a close, the
1. Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 157, § 5, 13 Stat. 193, 193.
2. Review of the Civil Penalty ProvisionsContainedin the InternalRevenue Code: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 House Hearings];Review of the Civil Penalty Provisions Contained in the Internal Revenue Code: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 House Hearings];
LR.S. PenaltyReform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on PrivateRetirement Plans and Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
22 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Senate Hearings]; STAFF OF JOINT COM. ON TAX'N, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 2528, Comm. Print 1988 (Improved Penalty Administration and
Compliance Tax Act of 1989) [hereinafter 1989 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET]; STAFF OF JOINT
COIL ON TAX'N, 100th Cong., 2hid Sess., DESCRIPTION OF TAX PENALTIES, Comm. Print
1988 hereinafter 1988 JOINT COMM[ITTEE PAMPHLET].

3. See infra text accompanying notes 169-212.
4. See Internal Revenue Service's 1988 Report on the "Tax Gap": Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-91
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tax penalty debate intensified, as groups such as bar associations, 5
the Service, 6 and eventually, Congress, 7 began to focus on and
reevaluate the entire penalty structure. Finally, the decade closed
with the passage of the Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act (IMPACT 1989 or 1989 Act), which generally restructured civil tax penalties in the Internal Revenue Code (Code), including

penalties for inaccurate returns. s
This tremendous expenditure of effort in rethinking civil tax penalties followed over one hundred years of shaping and reshaping the

civil tax penalty structure. 9 The first civil penalties to protect the
federal revenue appeared in the early days of the Republic. 10 These

(1988) (statement of Lawrence Gibbs, Commissioner of Internal Revenue); I.R.S., U.S. DEP'T
TREAS., INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS

FOR 1973-1992 (1988); Dorgan Task Force, Narrowing the $100 Billion Tax Gap, 37 TAx NOTES
(TAX ANALYSTS) 925, 928 (Nov. 30, 1987). The American Bar Association (ABA) conducted an
extensive study of compliance which began with the formation of a Commission on Taxpayer
Compliance and an Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance in 1983. See Income Tax
Compliance, 1983 ABA SEC. ON TAx., INVITATIONAL CONF. ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE
151-55 [hereinafter COMPLIANCE CONFERENCE REPORT]. For a subsequent update from 1983
in brief form, see Report of the Second Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance ABA Section of Taxation, 42 TAX LAW. 705 (1988). The Commission issued its recommendations,
built on the Conference and supported extensive research by the American Bar Foundation,
several years later. See Report and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW.
329, 329 (1988) [hereinafter ABA Compliance Commission Report]. In its report, the Commission
did not recommend changes in the penalty structure, preferring to wait for further data on the
penalties that had been enacted in the 1980s. Id. at 338. Instead, the Commission distinguished
noncompliance from legal tax avoidance. Id. at 339. It focused on noncompliance where the
correct manner of reporting on the return was relatively clear. Most tax issues can be readily
classed as either compliant or not and the uncertain issues in numbers and "their importance
relative to the size of the tax gap, is probably relatively small." Id.
5. NYSBA Section of Taxation on Civil Penalties,38 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 511
(Feb. 1, 1988) [hereinafter New York Bar Report]; 1988 A.B.A. SEC.ON TAx., PENALTIES TASK
FORCE REPORT [hereinafter ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT].
6. Executive Task Force, Commissioner's Penalty Study, Internal Revenue Service, Report
on Civil Tax Penalties (Feb. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Stark Report].
7. 1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 6; 1988 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 34;
1988 Sena~te Hearings, supra note 2, at 22; 1989 JOINT COMMITTEE PAIPHLET, supra note 2;
1988 JOINT COMITrEE PAMPHLET, supranote 2. See H.R. CONF.REP. No. 386, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 651-55 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1387-94 (1989).
8. Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7711,
103 Stat. 2388 (1989) (codified in part relevant to this article at I.R.C. §§ 6662-6664, 6694 (1991)
(unless otherwise stated, all references to the Internal Revenue Code will be to the 1986 Code,
as amended and in effect for 1991)).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 51, 63-80.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 56-62.
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penalties predated the introduction of the income tax.' The Civil War
saw the first appearance of an income tax and an accompanying primitive civil tax penalty for "false or fraudulent returns.' 2 Following the
second successful advent of an income tax in 1913, World War I occasioned the introduction of a negligence penalty.'1 Six decades of
14
relative calm followed before the flurry of activity in the 1980s.
To illustrate the basic outline of the penalty structure prior to the
reform activity, it may be helpful to compare and contrast two cases
that arose early in the 1980s. The strikingly different results in these
two cases reveal much about the civil tax penalty system during that
decade. Moreover, these cases provide a framework for an examination
of the penalties enacted later in the 1980s.
The first case, United States v. Posner,1 5 involved what the Service
claimed was an inflated charitable deduction and resulted in the imposition of numerous sanctions. In that case, a prominent financier allegedly conspired with his appraiser to overvalue real property he
donated to Miami Christian College.' 6 In its tax evasion case against
Mr. Posner, the government first presented evidence that Mr. Posner
intentionally caused the property to be greatly overvalued by shopping
for an appraisal to match his desired deduction. The government then
demonstrated that Mr. Posner took actions to conceal indications of
the true worth of the property from the government.' 7 Mr. Posner's

11. The Civil War tax acts introduced the first form of income taxation. See infra text
accompanying notes 70-78.
12. See Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 416 (1894); infra
text accompanying notes 79-80.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 98-121, 139-41 (income tax background and advent
of negligence penalty).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 122-38, 140-68.
15. 764 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
16. Id. at 1536.
17. Id. at 1536-37. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Posner's
appraiser of aiding and abetting Posner's tax evasion, the district court listed the evidence
against Posner: (1) an overvaluation of the property by about 400% of the figure the government
offered as the property's value as of the date of the gift; (2) an earlier aborted attempt by
Posner to give the land to another donee on the condition that the donee provide him with an
appraisal valuing the property at roughly 300% of its value as described above; (3) selection of
the engaged appraiser only after the aborted attempt just described; (4) filing of a lawsuit and
lis pendens against the donee college to prevent its sale of the property at roughly 25% of the
value claimed as a charitable deduction, and a settlement of the dispute including an agreement
not to sell the property for five years. United States v. Scharrer, 614 F. Supp. 234, 238-39
(S.D. Fla. 1985). The court concluded from this evidence that a jury could infer that Posner
was aware of the market value of the property and attempted to conceal its true value in an
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ultimate plea of no contest"' resulted in a variety of criminal sanctions. 19
Because his actions collateral to the return indicated an intent to
deceive, Mr. Posner was required to pay a substantial civil fraud
penalty. 2° The court imposed these penalties despite the fact that both
the fraud charges and penalties resulted from his resolution of an
21
uncertain issue for tax reporting purposes.
The second case, Estate of Spruill v. Commissioner,2 presented
a similar valuation discrepancy and consequent underreporting of tax.

attempt to evade taxes. Id. at 239. In addition, Posner failed to attach the appraisal or papers
relating to his acquisition of the property to his returns as required by Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1.
United States v. Posner, 594 F. Supp. 916, 918 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
A letter written by Posner's appraiser to the donee college concerning the value of the
property further supported the court's conclusion. Posner, 764 F.2d at 1536-37. The letter stated:
What we did was average the $1.5 million approximate figure with $2 million and
came up with an average price of $1,750,000. This price is probably unrealistic
inasmuch as it is being developed for tax purposes.
From a realistic market price I believe if we had to sell the property the amount
of $50,000 an acre would probably be it.
Id. at 1537. The court held the letter to be inadmissible against Posner as being not made in
the course of the conspiracy. Id. at 1538.
18. No-Contest Plea Made by Posner, N.Y. TIMiEs, Sept. 30, 1987, at Dl. An earlier
conviction on these charges was set aside because of juror misconduct. Id.
19. Jon Nordheimer, FinancierAvoids Jail in Deal to Aid Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
3, 1988, § 1, col. 1, at 1. The criminal sanction included a $3 million fine to be used to carry
out a plan he was to devise to aid the homeless, 5000 hours of community service, and an
additional fine of $75,000. Id.
20. Id. ($600,000 penalty on $1.2 million in taxes). The prosecuting attorneys had opposed
the no-contest plea because it did not, by itself, ensure that Posner would be bound in a later
civil proceeding on the issue of fraud. See No-Contest Plea Made by Posner, supra note 18, at
Di. A conviction of tax evasion would collaterally estop the taxpayer in a proceeding over the
civil fraud penalty, because the critical element under the criminal I.R.G. § 7201 ("attempts to
evade") has been equated to that under the civil I.R.C. § 6653(b) ('underpayment ... due to
fraud"). See Amos v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 50, 55 (1964), affd, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965).
However, a plea of no contest is not an admission of guilt and the taxpayer can challenge the
government's later assertion of a civil
fraud penalty in a deficiency contest; for that reason
prosecutors in tax cases routinely oppose such a plea. MARVIN J. GARBIS, PAULA M. JUNGHANS
& STEPHEN C. STRUNTZ, FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION
17.02, .22 (1985). See, e.g., Kisting
v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 264, 272 (8th Cir. 1962); Doggett v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 823,
826 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960); Mickler v. Fahs, 243 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir.
1957); Masters v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1093, 1098 (1956), affd, 243 F.2d 335, 338 (5th Cir.
1957); Nigra v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 1456, 1462 (1968); Godfrey v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M.
966, 974 (1968).
21. Posner's attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, claimed that "Mr. Posner's case was the
only instance in the 75-year history of the graduated Federal income tax in which a taxpayer
had been prosecuted for overstating the value of a charitable gift." Nordheimer, supra note 19,
§ 1, col. 1, at 1.
22. 88 T.C. 1197 (1987).
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The Spruill court, however, arrived at a markedly different result
from that in Posner.- In Spruill, the executors filed an estate tax
return in 1981 showing the value of a substantial parcel of real estate
that was less than 10% of the price at which it was sold one year
after the date of death, the valuation date.- The Tax Court ultimately
found the reported value to be roughly only 25% of the actual value
on the valuation date. Yet the court found no fraud.- The court held
that there was "not a syllable of testimony suggesting that there was
any connivance between" the executors, the appraiser and the
executors' other advisors. 26 Moreover, the evidence showed that the
executors relied completely and honestly on their advisers and fully
disclosed their position by attaching the appraisal to the return.? The
government brought no criminal charges against these executors? and
could assess no other tax penalties, since the negligence penalty did
not, until 1986, apply to underpayments of estate tax.2 In light of the
court's findings of fact regarding the executors' intent and their reliance on advisers, it is highly doubtful that the executors would have
been found culpable even of negligence. Under the court's ruling, the
estate should have reported a much higher value for the property and
initially paid substantially more tax, yet no penalties applied.
The pertinent differences between the two cases lay in the intent
and care of the taxpayers. Those differences determined the penalties

23. Id. at 1248.
24. Id. at 1213.
25. Id. at 1243.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1244-47.
28. Id. at 1246. The Service had recommended prosecution of the executors due to their
allegedly making a false statement on their estate tax return under I.R.C. § 7206(1). See id.
at 1241-42. The Service had also recommended prosecution of the executors' attorney and accountant for aiding and abetting and conspiracy under I.R.C. § 7206(2). Id. at 1246. After a conference
with the taxpayers' counsel, the attorneys with the Department of Justice informed the taxpayers
and the Service that they would not prosecute criminal charges. Id. In the civil case the Service
changed its theory and argued that, instead of conspiring with their advisors, the executors
withheld information from them relating to value and hence could not use reliance on their
advisors as a defense to the fraud charge. Id. The Tax Court stated:
This argument that the executors' return preparer and attorney were victims of

the executors' deceit hardly comes with good grace. . . . Now, in the wake of
damaged reputations, untold expense, and months of anguish, we are asked to
accept the view that [the executors] are the villains and that they misled the
professionals [including the appraiser] on the value of the [property].
Id.
29.

See I.R.C. § 6653(a) (1985) (repealed 1986).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss5/1

6

Winslow: Tax Penalties--"They Shoot Dogs, Don't They?"
TAX PENALTIES

appropriate in each case. The results appear fully supportable under
a fault-based system.
The reality is, however, that the requirement of fault poses some
difficulties for cases other than those like Spruill that involved true
innocents. To justify imposition of the fraud penalty a taxpayer usually
must leave a trail of incriminating evidence as was the case in Posner.30
Even so, the pieces of the puzzle often do not fall into place without
further assistance. Many of the celebrated tax fraud cases, such as

those involving Pete Rose 31 and Leona Helmsley,- appear born of
revelations from sources close to the taxpayer. The sources of information make these cases somewhat unusual since not all taxpayers motivate their friends, close associates or employees to betray them.
Proof of negligence can pose problems also. Highly doubtful positions may not be so clearly without merit that adopting those positions
constitutes negligence. Suspiciously large underreportings may be outside the scope of the negligence penalty because of some uncertainty
of fact or law. This possibility became very problematic in the mid to
late 1970s with the rise of tax shelters and tax protestors. 3
In response to some of these difficulties, Congress acted in the
1980s and added the so-called "no-fault" penalties.3 Under these penalties, valuation overstatements for income tax purposes,M valuation

30. See United States v. Scharrer, 614 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
31. Giamatti Denies Compromise in Pete Rose Case, L.A. TIMEs, June 30, 1989, § 3, at
5; Rose Put Gambling Above All According to 'Penthouse'Story, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 1989,
at 5C; Rose Bet on Reds and Watched Soto's Form, Accuser Tells Magazine, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
4, 1989, at AS; Michael York & Barton Gellman, Gambling Reports: Rose Was Threatened by
Bookie; Reds ManagerPortrayed as a Chronic Bettor, WASH. POST, June 27, 1989, at El.
32. See William Glaberson, Helmsley Controller Details "Cheat the Government" Plan,
N.Y. TimEs, July 2, 1989, at B3 (stating that a Helmsley employee described their accounting
system, stating "The only system we have around here is 'the Helmsley cheat the Government
system"'); Howard Kurtz, Abuzz About the Hotel Queen; Ex-Employee's Stinging Testimony
in the Trial of Leona Helmsley, WASH. POST, July 18, 1989, at D1 (stating that Helmsley
ordered a vice president to sign "phony invoices" while calling him an unprintable name); Maid
Testifies Helmsley Denied Paying Taxes, N.Y. TImES, July 12, 1989, at B2 (stating that
Helmsley told her housekeeper that "only the little people pay taxes"); Lee A. Sheppard, Let
Them Pay Taxes: Leona Helmsley on Trial, 44 TAx NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 497 (July 31,
1989) (stating that a spectator at trial stated, 'This trial is like one long guilty plea.").
33. See generally James S. Eustice, A Tax Shelter Bibliography, 28 TAX L. REV. 437
(1973) (noting that tax shelters are an issue of lively debate in the 1970s).
34. The contemporaneous descriptions by -the legislative staffs refer to these provisions as
"no-fault" penalties. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT CoMM. ON TAx'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
OF 1982, at 216 (1982).
35. I.R.C. § 6659 (1981) (repealed 1989).
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understatements for estate and gift tax purposes- and substantial
understatements for income tax purposes 37 triggered penalties, regardless of the taxpayer's state of mind. For example, after the advent
of these new penalties, the undervaluation in Spruill would have
triggered a penalty equal to 30% of the underpayment attributable to
that error unless the Service waived the penalty upon a showing of
reasonable basis and good faith.- Under the no-fault system as it then
existed, even those taxpayers who acted without negligence could be
penalized unless the Service applied the waiver provision.39 Consequently, a taxpayer had an incentive to adopt a return position
favorable to the government.
Congress also increased the impact of tax penalties in the 1980s
in two other ways. First, it allowed those newer penalties to be
"stacked" on or cumulated with the fault penalties.40 Second, it increased the penalty amounts, as discussed below. 41 Thus, Congress
moved strongly in the early 1980s to fortify the tax penalty structure.
But the penalty enactments in the early 1980s also provided the
potential for future problems. To a large extent, the problems with
the system of tax penalties, and hence the momentum for reform,
stemmed from the rather haphazard manner in which a large number
of penalties were added in the early 1980s. Because Congress had
added penalties on top of others rather than substituting stronger and
more focused and coordinated penalties, the tax bar exploited the
obvious opportunity by purporting to advocate reform and cleanup
while actually pushing for a reduction of penalties.
In contrast to the bar, the Service gave an admirable effort to
study full-blown reform of tax penalties. But its reluctance to pursue
aggressively a proper analytical framework unduly restricted its recommendations and the direction of the overall reform effort. Still,
with the entire system on the table for consideration, there was some
basis for hope of real progress.
Penalty reform in the late 1980s appeared headed for a fundamental
rethinking of the accuracy-related penalties, particularly the negli-

I.R.C. § 6660 (1984) (repealed 1989).
I.R.C. § 6661 (1982) (repealed 1989).
I.R.C. § 6660 (1984) (repealed 1989). See Spruill, 88 T.C. at 1243 n.45.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6659 (1986) (repealed 1989).
See infra text accompanying notes 209-12.
See infra text accompanying notes 136-37, 168, 210-12; see also COMPLIANCE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 227 ("The multiplicity and overlapping of penalties comes close
to bewildering most taxpayers and their advisors.").
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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gence penalty and the no-fault penalties.2 The final result, IMPACT
1989, was far less ambitious. IMPACT 1989 consolidated the negligence
and no-fault provisions43 and repaired some minor inconsistencies.
However, the revision was arguably a retreat from the penalty enactments of the early 1980s, as it, for example, eliminated stacking and
curtailed the Service's discretion to waive the "no-fault" penalties.44
From a broad perspective, IMPACT 1989 was a disappointment.
A casual observer, considering the long existence of civil tax penalties, might wonder why the subject required so much reconsideration
at this late date. Further, the observer may question why the extensive reconsideration has produced such unsatisfying results. The wavering about civil tax penalties and the dissatisfaction with the civil
tax penalty structure is due to numerous theoretical and practical
problems attendant to the lack of justification. The usual justifications
for penalties in general fail when used to justify tax penalties. Each
justification for penalties suffers some major infirmity or limitation
when imported to the tax system. For example, the enormous numbers
of returns and the weakness of the moral force against tax chiseling
create significant difficulties in applying either the deterrence or retribution justifications to the tax penalty area. These difficulties have
led to wide variations in experimentations and broad discomfort with
the tax penalty system in recent years.
The 1989 revisions provide a very good example of these difficulties.
In some minor or technical respects IMPACT 1989 improved upon the
system. However, in a larger sense, the penalty structure adopted in
the Act is no more satisfactory than its predecessors. IMPACT 1989
may well be even more frustrating to consider because it arose from
an organized and promising attempt at comprehensive reform. The
final product, while tidying up civil tax penalties for inaccurate returns,
does not represent a real reform of the system. In some significant
respects it simply pruned or cut back on the existing system.
Moreover, it failed to address perhaps the central issue regarding the
system: the normative standard appropriate for taking a position on
a tax return.
IMPACT 1989 resulted from a process that went astray. At the
earliest points, the proposers of the congressional legislation rejected

42.

See MICHAEL I. SALTZAIAN & BARBARA T. KAPLAN, CIVIL TAx PENALTIES RE1.02 (1990).

FORM: ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIES

48. I.R.C. §§ 6662-6664.
44. See Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§§ 6721-6722, 103 Stat. 2388, 2388-90 (1989) [hereinafter IMPACT 1989].
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a sufficiently broad use of theory in revising the civil tax penalty
structure. 45 The proposers, from the view taken in this article, failed
to appreciate weaknesses in their use of theory.46 Further, throughout
the process some forces operating within the bar appeared to work
more for client interests than for betterment of the tax system. 47 This
unfortunate state of affairs strongly suggests that a better civil tax
penalty structure could have been devised.
This article will discuss federal taxpayer penalties for underreporting taxable income or estate value in light of the new and significant
legislation in 1989.48 To lay the groundwork for suggestions, this article
will describe the penalty systems of the 1980s, and provide a sufficient
historical background to illuminate recurring problems with civil tax
penalties. It will then detail the limitations of theories that support
civil penalties in the tax system. The article will then point out the
particular flaws of the post-1989 structure. Finally, the article will
suggest some improvements to the post-1989 structure by drawing
broadly on diverse theories in order to establish a more solid foundation
than the 1989 Act established, and by treating tax chiselers with a
49
measured firmness that the 1989 Act lacked.
The recommendations take the form of a three-tiered system of
civil tax penalties. This tiered system would be distinct from the
existing system and others that have been suggested because its focus
is on a separate penalty justification for each tier. This focus shapes
each tier more adequately than broad approaches built around a central
penalty justification. This seems important in any attempt to design
an entire tax penalty system, since each penalty justification operates
within a limited range in the civil tax penalty context.50

45. See infra text accompanying notes 302-03, 396-406.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 302-03, 396-406.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 354-81.
48. Topics not covered are sometimes labeled tax penalties or sanctions. Such topics include
behavior modifiers such as the 1984 tax provisions relating to golden parachute payments. See
Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37
UCLA L. REV. 343, 343 (1989). They also include adverse tax consequences of taxpayer action,
such as a corporate level tax for use of the corporate form. See generally Commissioner v.
Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988) (holding that the corporation's practice of allowing shareholders
to obtain financing without violating usury laws did not require attribution of losses to the

corporation).
49.
50.

See infra text accompanying notes 420-520.
See infra text accompanying notes 241-353.
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II.

THE HISTORY AND LAW OF CIVIL TAx PENALTIES FOR
INACCURATE RETURNS

Understanding the history of tax penalties is necessary to evaluate
the recent reform effort. "IT]he growth of [tax] penalties is parallel
to and results directly from the growth in the income tax laws."51 The
growth of tax penalties also "parallels the growth and increasing complexity of transactions in the underlying economy. ''52 Several authorities provide either general overviews of tax penalty history or
detailed accounts of portions of the history recounted here.3 The present discussion will endeavor, particularly with respect to the early
history of tax penalties, to highlight some aspects in more detail than
is usual to draw out certain common themes relevant to tax penalties
in all eras. This exercise will demonstrate that the long search for
appropriate penalty rates and standards of conduct has had more to
do with the temper of the times and the need for revenue than with
theoretical concerns.
A. Early Penalties Protecting the Revenue
The United States became a nation through a revolution sparked
by a tax protest.5 Throughout the nation's history, Americans' aversion to taxes and the tax collector has long aroused resistance to taxes,
frequently resulting in tax cheating and occasionally open rebellion.M
In response to such opposition, Congress long has provided the internal
revenue laws with penalties directed at tax chiselers.
Federal internal taxes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
were generally 'indirect' taxes, 'excises' - taxes imposed upon an
event or the exercise of a right."6 One reason such taxes were used

1988 JOINT COMMITrEE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 14.
52. Id.

51.

53. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REPORT ON ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN TAX
COMPLIANCE 113 (1968); ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 18-24;

Michael Asimow, Civil Penaltiesfor Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns, 23 UCLA L.
REV. 637, 647 n.54 (1976).

54.

Robert J. Haws, A Brief History ofAmerican Resistance to Taxation, in COMPLIANCE

CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 113, 115; see JOHN P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-

THE AUTHORITY TO TAX 271-84 (1987). See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION (1953) (detailing the Stamp Act protest in American colonies).
55. Haws, supra note 54, at 113. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 represents an early colorful
example of this sort. Id. at 115.
56. Commissioner v. Estate of Leyman, 344 F.2d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated, 383
U.S. 832 (1966); see 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE R. LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION
TORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION -
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was their relatively clear constitutionality. The Constitution mandated
that "direct" taxes be apportioned across states on the basis of their
respective populations.- 7 Ad valorem penalties, which are a percentage
of the tax, did not exist.5 Sanctions in the form of fixed sums or
forfeiture of specified property sufficed as penalties for violations of
59
these early internal taxes.
Since they involved possible forfeiture of the specified goods at
issue, the highest early tax penalties were much harsher than current
penalties. Import taxes where the actor operated with a state of mind
approaching fraud were subject to these harsh penalties. 0 Where the

& GiFTs 1.1.2, at 1-4 (2d ed. 1989) ("Until the Civil War, customs
receipts were the backbone of the federal tax system.").
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless
OF INCOME, ESTATES

in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration"); id. § 2, cl. 3 ("direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the Several States . .. according to their respective Numbers"); see 1 BIrKER &

supra note 56,
1.1.2, at 1-5; RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED
4-7 (1954). Another explanation for the preference for indirect taxes on consumption
is that Americans' general aversion to taxes led to adoption of taxes least likely to create
resistance. See A.C. Miller, National Finance and the Income Tax, 3 J. POL. ECON. 255, 256-57
(1895).
58. Leyman, 344 F.2d at 767. "An ad valorem penalty... connotes an addition to the tax
based upon the full amount thereof; it is invariably expressed as a stated per centum of the
amount of the tax." JOSEPH J. KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1667 (1929).
59. See Leyman, 344 F.2d at 767, 767 n.13 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1791, §§ 27, 28, 32, ch.
15, 1 Stat. 199, 206-07; Act of July 24, 1813, §§ 2, 6, ch. 21, 3 Stat. 35-36; Act of Dec. 21, 1814,
§ 6, ch. 15, 3 Stat. 152, 155).
60. A federal act provided for a penalty of up to four times the value of imported goods
for failure to deliver the requisite manifest, and two times that figure for knowing concealment
and related actions to illegal importing. Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch. 58, 3 Stat. 781, 781-82; see
Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871) (applying the Act of Mar. 3, 1823);
see also REV. STAT. § 3099 (2d ed. 1878) (compiling the penalty against the master or importer
of four times merchandise value). In addition, a penalty of forfeiture of the imported goods
applied to the knowing use of false or fraudulent documents in the importation of goods. Act
of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 76, § 1, 12 Stat. 737, 737-38; see also REV. STAT. § 2864 (2d ed. 1878)
(codifying the 1863 Act); William L. Dickey, Survivals From More Primitive Times: Customs
Forfeitures in the Modern Commercial Setting Under Sections 592 and 618 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 691, 707-09 (1975) (tracing history of 1863 Act to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1592 (1970)). For a case applying this forfeiture provision, see Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 114 (1865). These provisions extended to actions that were not fraudulent, but apparently required some intent or negligence even when the statutory provisions seemed to drop
that requirement or were unclear. See id. at 144 ("guilty knowledge"); United States v. Ven-Fuel,
Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 757 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding negligence a proper basis for liability); United
States v. Wagner, 434 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1970) (upholding forfeiture where "claimant made
false statements in the entry papers ... without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such
statements"); United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 139 F. 961, 969-70 (8th Cir. 1905) (requiring at least "culpable negligence"), cert. denied, 201 U.S. 645 (1906). But cf. Dickey, supra, at
710 (noting that Wagner is one example of forfeiture despite importer's good faith).
LOKKEN,

STATES
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importer erred significantly in valuing the goods in question, a much
more modest import duty penalty, being a small fraction of the good's
value, might be applied. The error apparently did not constitute such
61
a severe threat to the government's rights.
These early penalties provided a rather crude background for the
modern tax penalty system. 62 However, they give us some perspective
from which to evaluate the early income tax penalties. In addition,
some of the themes such as penalty amounts and standards of care

recur in more recent times.
B.

Modern Income and Estate Tax Structure of Penalties Before
IMPACT 1989

The story of modern tax penalties begins with the Civil War tax
acts, which provided for income and estate taxes.6 Those acts contained the seed from which the current penalty structure grew.6 The
penalty provisions remained on the statute books for decades after
repeal of those acts.r During the World War I era, shortly following

61. One such import duty sanction remarkably foreshadowed some modern penalties: it
provided for a penalty of 20% of the goods' value if the importer erred by as much as 10% in
reporting their value. Act of July 30, 1846, ch. 74, § 8, 9 Stat. 42, 43-44. This is just one version
of this provision in the course of its evolution. For a description of this evolution throughout
the nineteenth century, see Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613-17 (1902). A mechanical
application of the relative amounts determined the liability for the additional duty or penalty
amount. See Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214, 221 (1893) (upon a determination of the
relative values the collector "as a matter of mere computation" had authority to impose the
additional duty). A dispute challenging the government's appraisal of the goods, and therefore
the penalty, would result in the tax collector selecting two merchants to value the property.
See Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263, 271-72 (1853). The government had a right to
such a penalty at that point, but the penalty was described as applying to cases of "carelessness,
ignorance, or mistake." Helwig, 188 U.S. at 612. The Secretary of the Treasury could remit
the penalty if the Secretary found that the penalty was incurred without fault. See id. at 607-08,
614, 616-17 (noting that Secretary remitted part of penalty when no finding of willful negligence
or fraud); Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat. 506, 506 (early remission provision); REV.
STAT. § 5292 (2d ed. 1878) (compilation of 1797 Act). This ancient sanction was clearly intended
to deter a "lowball" initial evaluation by the importer. See Bartlett, 57 U.S. at 274 ("compensation
for a violated law.., designed to operate as checks and restraints upon fraud and injustice").
62. Some appear brutal, despite possible efficacy. For example, the District of Columbia
enforced a tax on dogs through a penalty providing for the killing of the dog in case of default
of the tax. Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 157, § 5, 13 Stat. 193, 193. This penalty preceded, by only
a few days, the introduction of a fleshed out penalty system in the Civil War income tax law.
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 14-15, 13 Stat. 218, 227.
63. Hill, supra note 12, at 416.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 68-80.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 81-86.
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the reemergence of the income tax, the tax penalties emerged in their
basic modern structure.6 Not until the 1980s were the rules fundamentally altered by additional types of penalties.67
1. Fraud
The penalty for civil fraud is the highest civil tax penalty.r This
constitutes the only accuracy-related civil tax penalty that can be tied
69
directly to a Civil War tax act provision.
Those acts, providing for income and estate taxes, received signif0
icant support due to the obvious necessity of financing the Civil War.7
Despite some suggestion as early as 1815 that such taxes might raise
significant federal revenues 7 1 it was not until 1862 that the internal
revenue laws first contained such an "income duty" and an inheritance
tax 2 for implementation in the following year. - Those nascent revenue
laws initially possessed only rudimentary provisions dealing with procedural matters.7 4 But within the period of these taxes, the administrative and penalty provisions developed quickly. During the supportive atmosphere of the Civil War years,7 5 such tax acts were passed

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See infra text accompanying notes 107-26, 139-44.
Se infra text accompanying notes 169-214.
See I.R.C. § 6663 (1991).
See Leyman, 344 F.2d at 768.
Hill, supra note 12, at 416.
EDWIN R. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 430 (1911); Lewis Eisenstein, The
Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 225 n.10 (1956). Earlier still, in 1797
a form of an estate tax under the label of a stamp duty on certain types of transmissions of
property upon death enjoyed a short life. See Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527, 527
(repealed 1802).
72. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 89-93, 111-114, 12 Stat. 432, 473-75, 485-88. Congress
had passed an income tax in the previous year. See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292,
292-313. But that Act was never used by the Treasury Department. Hill, supra note 12, at
420. Thus, the 1862 Act first made the income tax operational in the year following the passage
of that Act. See SELIGMAN, supra note 71, at 435-40. Hill noted that it is surprising that
Congress enacted the income tax so early in the war before the necessity of previously unheard-of
federal funds became obvious. Hill, supra note 12, at 416. At that time, most people believed
the war would be quickly and easily resolved. When William Tecumseh Sherman declared in
1861 that the war would require great resources before a victory, some thought him mentally
unbalanced. 1 SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR - A NARRATIVE 62 (1958).

73.

SELIGMAN,

supra note 71, at 438-39.

74. See id. at 437-38.
75. The citizenry showed initial enthusiasm for the income tax since it was seen as a vital
temporary means of financing the war. See id. at 439; Haws, supra note 54, at 113; Hill, supra
note 12, at 445. This feeling was so strong that one commentator observed that evasion of the
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almost yearly.76 The 1864 Act instituted enhanced administrative provisions, including significant penalty provisions,- seemingly passed
without significant debate preserved as legislative history7 8
A crude form of the civil fraud penalty first appeared in the 1864
Act. That penalty provision directed the assessor to "add one hundred
per centum to such duty" or tax "in the case of the return of a false
or fraudulent list or valuation." 79 The sanction amount in this provision
and its successors was apparently intended to be measured on the

entire tax reportable, rather than the underpayment or understatement, although the Service took both positions throughout the next
several decades 0 This penalty provided a significant, if crude, base

upon which the federal tax penalties grew.
The primary deficiencies in that early provision lay in its bluntness
in the potential application of the penalty rate to the entire tax rather
than just the underpayment, and its lack of precision in specifying the
conduct to which it applied. These problems persisted for decades.
Both of these penalty issues ultimately were resolved in a manner
that restricted the strength of the penalty.

tax was equated with treason. Charles F. Dunbar, The New Income Tax, 9 Q.J. ECON. 26, 37
(1894). The Civil War tax acts were, in this atmosphere, ruled constitutional. Springer v. United
States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 347 (1874). Even in
this supportive period, tax cheating apparently occurred at relatively high levels. SELIGMAN,
supra note 71, at 447 (stating that the act opened the door to "innumerable frauds").
76. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 223-306; Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch.
78, 13 Stat. 469, 469, 487; Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98, 98-177.
77. See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 14, 15, 13 Stat. 223, 226-27.
78. Apparently no discussion regarding these provisions was preserved. See SELIGIAN,
supra note 71, at 446.
79. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 223, 226-27. That Act also provided that
upon conviction of making a "false or fraudulent list, return, account, or statement, with intent
to defeat or evade the valuation, enumeration, or assessment intended to be made," sanctions
of a $1,000 fine and one year imprisonment could be imposed. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §
15, 13 Stat. 223, 227. See Hill, supra note 12, at 435-36. Commentators may readily conclude
that these civil and criminal penalties, established respectively were intended to reach roughly
the same kind of wrongdoing in reporting tax liability. Asimow, supra note 53, at 647 n.54
(although legislative history is lacking, civil and criminal fraud statutes "were designed to
penalize approximately the same kinds of conduct").
80. See Commissioner v. Estate of Leyman, 344 F.2d 763, 766-70 (6th Cir.), vacated, 383
U.S. 832 (1965). As described in Leyman, this conclusion was not adopted consistently. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue had in 1899 taken a contrary view that the penalty was
measured by the amount over that shown due on the return, but the Service reversed that
interpretation in 1915 by calculating the penalty on the full amount of tax rather than just the
understatement. Id. at 769. Commentators had concluded that the 1915 interpretation was the
correct one. Id. at 769 nn.26-27 & 29.
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The wartime tax acts were repealed in the years following the
war, 81 but the penalty provisions remained applicable to other taxes
on the books. Even following the repeal of the Civil War income and
estate taxes, the basic fraud penalty remained and applied to other
internal revenue taxes. 2 This general fraud penalty then could be
imposed with respect to new federal internal taxes as they were
enacted,3 such as the brief revival of the income tax in 18941 (held
to be unconstitutional in 1895 as a direct tax violating the apportionment clause-) and the temporary reemergence of the estate tax shortly
thereafter.The common reading of this provision, the ancestor of the current
civil fraud penalty, restricted its reach only to the highest levels of
culpability. However, that issue was not settled for some time. For
approximately the first three decades of its existence, a false or fraudulent return triggered the 100% civil penalty. The language of the
statute did not require an intentional act or one designed to defraud.The provision by its literal terms might have applied to "false" returns
that were not fraudulent, because a return that was simply erroneous

81. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, §§ 3, 6, 16 Stat. 256 (repealing inheritance tax); Act of
June 6, 1872, ch. 315, 17 Stat. 230, 230-58 (repealing income tax).
82. See REV. STAT § 3176, 3179, 3184 (2d ed. 1878); Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34,
28 Stat. 509, 557-59.
83. See Leyman, 344 F.2d at 768.
84. See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-35, 28 Stat. 509, 553-59. In this Act, the
definition of income included "money and the value of all personal property acquired by gift or
... Id. § 28. This renowned "income tax" act thus additionally provided for an
inheritance.
estate tax. See Eisenstein, supra note 71, at 227 n.22. One contemporary writer noted with
some amusement that this Act was entitled "an act to reduce taxation, to furnish revenue for
the government, and for other purposes." Dunbar, supra note 75, at 26. One can only speculate
whether that writer would find more truth in labelling current tax acts.
85. Although the Supreme Court had earlier upheld an income tax in the Civil War era,
the Court reversed itself in 1895 by holding such a tax unconstitutional. It reasoned the tax
constituted a direct tax that was not apportioned among the states in line with the census
results. See Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1894), mwdified, 158
U.S. 601 (1895), overruled on other grounds by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
In its first opinion in this case, the Court pointed out that previous income tax acts were
occasioned by war needs. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 572-73.
86. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 29-30, 30 Stat. 448, 464-66 (amended); Act of Mar. 2,
1901, ch. 806, § 11, 31 Stat. 938, 948-49 (enacting); Act of Apr. 12, 1902, ch. 500, §§ 7, 11, 32
Stat. 96, 97-99 (repealing).
87. See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 223, 226-27. Compare REV. STAT. §
3176 (2d ed. 1878) ("any return of a false or fraudulent list or valuation") with Act of Aug. 27,
1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 509, 557-59 ("any return of a false or fraudulent list or valuation
intentionally").
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could be characterized as "false" without reference to the maker's

state of mind. Thus, the early 100% penalty was arguably a rather
open-ended, broad provision giving the government assessors consid-

erable leeway in dealing with noncompliant taxpayers.
The authorities from this era show that this was a substantial
issue. During the Civil War, the assessors appear to have freely im-

posed the 100% penalty, perhaps to the point of not inquiring into the
reasons for an error on the return. 0nly fourteen years after the
enactment of the provision, in German Savings Bank v. Archbold,89

a lower federal court held: "It is not a prerequisite to the addition of
the penalty that the return should be willfully false. If the return is
not in fact true, the Commissioner is authorized to affix the penalty.9''
Later authority suggests a similar interpretation, even where returns
were simply in error. 91
It is possible that Congress initially intended to reach levels of
fault lower than fraud, and had this intention been stated more precisely, the scope of action subject to penalty might have expanded
sooner. Courts, however, have long refrained from upholding penalties

88. See SELIGMAN, suprm note 71, at 452. As was noted by Professor Seligman, these
actions appeared overly aggressive to some in Congress:
Hale referred to the abuses on the part of the assistant assessors in making their
corrected returns of income, and imposing the high penalty whenever they considered the returns fraudulent. He contended that this ought never to be done without
a preliminary hearing accorded to the taxpayer.
Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2788 (1866) (remarks of Hale)). See generally
PAUL, supra note 57, at 28 ("administration [of the Civil War income tax] was inadequate and
developed much popular adverse prejudice"). In a compromise designed to phase out the income
tax, this penalty was not to be assessed prior to a hearing on the issue. SELIGMAN, supra note
71, at 464-65.
89. 10 F. Cas. 260 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 5,364), rev'd on other grounds, 104 U.S. 708
(1881).
90. Id. at 262 (construing REv. STAT. § 3176). The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court as to the existence of a tax deficiency, a result which eliminated the penalty but avoided
a decision on the applicability of the penalty without fault. German Say. Bank v. Archbold, 104
U.S. 708, 710 (1881).
91. See KLEIN, supra note 58, at 1675. Klein, some 48 years later, noted a literal construction of a penalty statute was possible because a "false return is one which is erroneous or
incorrect but which does not involve intentional wrongdoing." Id. However, "false" is often
interpreted as meaning willfully and intentionally false for purposes of assessing penalties. See
National Bank of Commerce v. Allen, 223 F. 472, 478-79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 642
(1915). But see Eliot Nat'l Bank v. Gill, 218 F. 600, 603-04 (1st Cir. 1914) (interpreting 1909 Act:
"false" can mean simply erroneous for purpose of allowing additional assessment of tax by
Commissioner after taxpayer files "false or fraudulent" returns).
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without some degree of fault.- The penalty provision could, with minor
sleight of hand, be read as punishing "false and fraudulent conduct,"
even though this is not the actual language. 93 In construing the "false
or fraudulent" language, courts were generally inclined to interpret
the phrase to mean intentional, or at least culpably negligent, conduct.- Given this sort of resistance, Congress should have been more
clear if it intended to reach a level of culpability less than fraud.9 5
Only years later did amendment of the statute expressly resolve
this issue. The amendment was restrictive perhaps because of the
rather expansive reading once given the statute by the German Savings Bank lower court. In the 1894 Act, the conduct triggering the
penalty was rephrased to cover only intentional actions.- After this

92. See Dayton Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan, 281 F. 709, 714 (6th Cir. 1922); see also
Six Hundred & Fifty-One Chests of Tea v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 253, 256 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1826) (No. 12,916) ("I am not aware of a single instance where by any positive provision in the
revenue laws, a forfeiture is incurred, that it does not grow out of some fraud, misconduct, or
negligence of the party on whom the penalty is visited."). In German Say. Bank, the Supreme
Court refused to decide the penalty question, but remarked:
We express no opinion as to the legality of imposing a penalty where no fraud was
intended. As a general thing, the imposition of a penalty implies delinquency by
the party on whom it is imposed. Its consideration, however, is immaterial, in
view of the construction we give to the law.
German Say. Bank, 104 U.S. at 710.
93. See, e.g., German Say. Bank, 104 U.S. at 709 (dicta); Eliot Nat'l Bank, 218 F. at 603,
604 (dicta); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Slack, 17 F. Cas. 262, 263 (C.C.D. Mass. 1873) (No. 9,527)
(failing to determine that omission was "false and fraudulent").
94. See, e.g., United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 139 F. 961, 966-70 (8th Cir. 1905)
(requiring "knowledge of falsity" or "culpable negligence" required), cert. denied, 201 U.S. 645
(1906); Ratterman v. Ingalls, 28 N.E. 168, 171 (Ohio 1891) (defining "false return or statement"
as one that was known to be untrue or was untrue due to "culpable negligence").
95. Further contextual support for a fault requirement is implied by the term "false or
fraudulent" in the administrative provisions relating to examination of returns. The 1864 Act
permitted the assessor to take evidence if the assessor held the opinion that the return was
"false or fraudulent, or contains any understatement or undervaluation." Act of June 30, 1864,
ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 223, 226. This implies that there might be an undervaluation that is not
correct, yet not "false." Other examination provisions using redundant language also exist. See,
e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 16, 39 Stat. 756, 774 (referring to a return that is
"erroneous, false, or fraudulent, or contains any undervaluation or understatement").
96. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 509. The Act of Aug. 27, 1894 reenacted
the Civil War statute but modified it to apply a 100% penalty to "any return of a false or
fraudulent list or valuation intentionally." Id. (emphasis added). The 1913 and 1916 Acts contained similar phrasing. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.I, 38 Stat. 114, 179; Revenue Act of
1916, ch. 463, § 16, 39 Stat. 756, 775.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss5/1

18

Winslow: Tax Penalties--"They Shoot Dogs, Don't They?"
TAX PENALTIES

829

amendment, it became clear that this penalty provision did not apply
to simple mistakes or even negligenceY
Beginning with the late nineteenth century and continuing beyond
the 1913 adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment,9 this general civil
fraud penalty and other penalties specific to each individual congressional act applied to the several versions of income tax subsequently
imposed.9 In that period, Congress tinkered with the form of the
penalty provisions while providing for income taxes in a series of
revenue acts starting with the 1894 Act (and including the 1909, 1913,
and 1916 Acts). The Civil War fraud penalty1°° together with an addi-

97. See Collinson v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 561, 562 (1925). A contemporaneous commentator writing after the amendments was only willing to state that the penalty provision did "not
seem to include" returns that were simply erroneous. GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 424 (1917).
98. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
99. The 1894 Act amended § 3176 to clarify that only intentional conduct was covered by
the penalty. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, § 34, 28 Stat. at 559. The 1913 Act retained identical language.
Revenue Act of 1913, § II.I, 38 Stat. at 179. The 1916 Act amended § 3176, changing the
conduct standard to willful. Revenue Act of 1916, § 16, 39 Stat. at 775.
The Tariff Act of 1909 enacted a special excise tax on corporations. Tariff Act of 1909, ch.
6, § 38, 36 Stat. 6, 112-17. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), the Court upheld
this tax and distinguished it from the 1894 income tax struck down in Pollock. Id. at 150.
Contemporary commentators stated that the 1909 tax was in effect a corporate income tax.
ROBERT H. MONTGOMIERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 5 (1918). This Act foreshadowed the
direction of tax law. PAUL, supra note 57, at 90-96.
The 1909 Act established a civil penalty of 100% of the tax for "any return made with false
or fraudulent intent." Tariff Act of 1909, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 116. That Act also established a
criminal penalty of between $1000 and $10,000 for rendering a "false or fraudulent return" and
a fine of up to $1000 or imprisonment up to one year or both for the officer making the return.
Id. at 117. These penalties applied only to the newly created corporate excise tax. Id.
Corporations were added to the list of taxpayers liable for civil fraud under § 3176 in the
1913 Act. Revenue Act of 1913, § I.I, 38 Stat. at 179. The criminal penalties for corporations
remained separate and the minimum fine was removed. Id. § II.G.(d), 38 Stat. at 177. Identical
language with a provision for an extension of the filing date was enacted in the 1916 Act.
Revenue Act of 1916, § 14(c), 39 Stat. 773. The criminal penalty for individuals merged with §
II.F. in 1913. Revenue Act of 1913, § II.F, 38 Stat. at 171.
The Civil War tax had included a criminal penalty for delivering a "false or fraudulent list,
return, account or statement, with intent to defeat or evade the valuation." Act of June 30,
1864, ch. 173, § 15, 13 Stat. 223, 227. This penalty was not amended in the 1894 Act. See Act
of Aug. 27, 1894, §§ 27-37, 28 Stat. 553-60. The criminal penalty for making a "false or fraudulent
return or statement with intent to defeat or evade the assessment" was included in the 1913
Act. Revenue Act of 1913, § II.F., 38 Stat. at 171. Identical language was enacted in the 1916
Act. Revenue Act of 1916, § 18, 39 Stat. at 775-76.
100. Asimow, supra note 53, at 647 n.54; see Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat.
509, 559 (inserting the word "intentionally" as describing "any return of a false or fraudulent
list or valuation" into REV. STAT. § 3176).
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tional penalty directed at fraud,' 0' and occasionally accompanied by a
the enforcement support for
corporate tax fraud penalty provided
10 2
these versions of the income tax.
The United States' entry into World War I led to the grandest
act including this sort of penalty grab-bag: the Revenue Act of 1917.
The Act, which added war income and estate taxes, included a provision that threw many of the previously enacted specific and general
penalty concepts together in a single section.i°3 As part of this assortment and constituting a civil penalty capstone, this provision set forth
a special civil fraud "penalty of double the tax evaded," apparently
designed especially for the taxes contained in the 1917 Act. 1°' At the
time of the 1917 Act, the need for revenue was great. Therefore, the
war income tax was designed with much steeper rates to raise more
funds than the 1913 to 1916 Acts. 10 5 Presumably, the tolerance for

101. The provision was directed at "a willfully false or fraudulent list." Act of Aug. 27,
1894, ch. 349, § 29, 28 Stat. 554. See Asimow, supra note 53, at 647 n.54.
102. See Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 116-17. The Act of Aug. 5, 1909 also
appended a monetary penalty of between $1000 and $10,000 that applied if a corporation filed
a "false or fraudulent return" and a criminal provision allowing for a fine of up to $1,000 and
imprisonment for up to one year for a "false or fraudulent return, or statement, with intent to
defeat or evade the assessment. . . ." Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 117; see
Asimow, supra note 53, at 647 n.54.
The 1909 Act, which has been called a "jumble of penalties," left on the books the two old
Civil War penalties and slightly reworded the fraud penalty newly added in the 1894 Act.
Asimow, supra note 53, at 647 n.54. These latter two, together with the old Civil War penalties,
seem to be the basis for a pattern in the inaccuracy penalties used in the 1913 and 1916 Acts.
See id. (stating that tax acts in years immediately after 1909 "contained an assortment of
confusing civil and criminal penalties [that] yielded no clear pattern of different wording for
civil and criminal penalties"). The 1913 Act contained provisions in its penalty structure that
resembled the latter two additions in the 1909 Act. The Revenue Act of 1913 provided that any
person making "any false or fraudulent return or statement with intent to defeat or evade the
assessment" would be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined up to $2,000 and/or imprisoned for up
to one year, together with costs of prosecution. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 10, § II.F., 38 Stat.
114, 171. Section G provided that if a corporation or various other business organizations "shall
render a false or fraudulent return," it incurred a penalty not exceeding $10,000. Id. § I1.G.,
38 Stat. at 177.
The Revenue Act of 1916 continued in this basic pattern. Section 14 provided that if a
corporation filed a "false or fraudulent return" a penalty of up to $10,000 could apply. Revenue
Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 14(c), 39 Stat. 756, 773. An individual or officer of a corporation who
made a "false or fraudulent return or statement with intent to defeat or evade the assessment"
could be fined up to $2000 and imprisoned for up to one year. Id. § 18, 39 Stat. at 775.
103. See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1004, 40 Stat. 300, 325-26.
104. Id. The Act provided for its application in the event that a person "makes any false
or fraudulent return" or "evades or attempts to evade any tax imposed by this Act." Id.
105. The 1913 Act had provided an income tax rate schedule that was minimal by today's
standards. Rates started with a 1% "normal income tax" for incomes of less than $20,000 and
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penalties had grown with the need for revenues. Thus, Congress was

impelled toward a focused0 6 fraud penalty with high impact, a sanction

of twice the tax evaded.
The 1918 Act started out on the same path as the 1917 Act in

terms of raising funds for a massive ongoing war effort, but it changed
course in midstream. 1' When the war suddenly ended, immediately
after the House's passage of the bill, the Senate realized that the
amount of revenue raised by the Act exceeded the government needs
and could be cut.108 Thus, the legislation, which originally set out to
raise enormous sums to answer the crisis, was not ultimately addressed
to a wartime emergency. But in final form, the Act was designed to
provide for sufficient taxes to pay for a war-to-peace transition. Hence,

the Act, while not raising the enormous funds initially envisioned, still
set rather steep income tax rates'09 and estate tax rates." 0
were supplemented by a graduated "additional tax" that reached 6% for incomes that exceeded
$500,000. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.A.1-2, 38 Stat. at 166.
The 1916 Act raised income tax rates somewhat. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 1(a)-(b),
39 Stat. at 756-57. In the 1916 Act, Congress raised the "normal tax" rate to 2% and the
"additional tax" rate to as high as 13% on incomes exceeding $2 million. Id. The 1916 Act also
restored the estate tax as a permanent aspect of United States taxation. See Revenue Act of
1916, §§ 200-212, 39 Stat. 777-80; JOHN R. PRICE, CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING 53
(1983); Eisenstein, supra note 71, at 230-59.
The War Revenue Act of 1917 brought about a significant increase in rates of both income
and estate taxes to fund the war effort. See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, §§ 1-2, 40 Stat.
at 300-01, 324-25. The taxes under the 1917 Act applied on top of the taxes payable under the
1916 Act; in addition to the "normal tax" of the 1916 Act, a "normal tax" of 2% applied as well.
Id. § 1, 40 Stat. at 300-01. The war income tax provided for a maximum marginal rate of 50%.
Id. § 2, 40 Stat. at 301. Congress had earlier raised the estate tax rates more gently. Act of
Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 159, § 300, 39 Stat. 1000, 1002. By that time, the revenue acts were clearly
viewed against the backdrop of great need for war finances. Statements at the time by practitioners indicate a remarkable tolerance of taxes due to that need. See MONTGOMERY, supra note
99, at ii("We must win the war... The reader will find no information in this book which
will be helpful in evading taxes.").
106. War Revenue Act of 1917, § 1004, 40 Stat. at 325-26.
107. S.REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 117-18.
108. Id.
109. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 210-211, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062-64. In the 1918 Act,
Congress boosted the "normal tax" rate to 12% (decreasing to 8% for years after 1918). Id. §
210, 40 Stat. at 1062. The highest additional tax, now called a "surtax," was raised to 65% on
income that exceeded $1 million. Id. § 211, 40 Stat. at 1063-64. This schedule was a steep bump
up in rates compared to the rates under the 1916 Act. Thus it has been said that the "1918 Act
sharply increased the tax rate structure, raising the normal tax rate... ." See ABA PENALTIES
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 19 n.6 (emphasis added). But if the income tax rates
of the 1918 Act are compared to the sum of the 1917 war tax rates and the rates of the 1916
Act, the increase is not so remarkable. See supra note 105.
110. Revenue Act of 1918, § 401, 40 Stat. at 1096-97; see Eisenstein, supra note 71, at
230-31.
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Reflecting the same spirit that tempered the urge to seek much
higher tax rates, Congress showed leniency toward taxpayers by a
sudden reduction of sanctions.-' This reversed the direction taken in
the 1917 Act that increased tax penalties. 112 The new civil fraud penalty
rate under the 1918 Act, which applied to "estate [and] other indirect
or excise taxes,""13 was amended by reducing the penalty from 100%
to 50% of the tax. 14 Concurrently, a reduction occurred in the new
income tax fraud penalty rate, supplanting the general fraud penalty
in that field." 5 The 1918 House Bill would have set the new penalty
at "100% of the amount of the tax understated," which was to be "in
addition to other penalties provided by law for false or fraudulent
returns." 116 The Conference agreement in 1919 reduced the income tax
fraud rate to "50 per cent of the tax understated" and made it "in
lieu of' the general fraud penalty in section 3176.117 This revision
reduced the penalty in two ways: first, it lowered the rate to 50%
from the initially proposed 100% rate and it made the penalty exclusive. Second, as this new penalty was based on the tax understated,
rather than on the entire tax, the new income tax fraud penalty already
yielded a lower penalty amount than the general civil fraud penalty
would have yielded. The overall effect of these amendments was to
turn a planned increase in tax penalties into a substantial reduction
in sanctions.
This penalty reduction, to some extent, may be attributed to a
laudable sense of orderliness. Congress may have wanted one clear
penalty rather than multiple overlapping and confusing penalties. The
Senate Report accompanying the 1918 Act suggests that this sort of
concern in part motivated its amendments.," But this purpose is not

111. See Revenue Act of 1918, § 1317, 40 Stat. at 1147-48 (reducing penalty for willful filing
of fraudulent return to 50%).
112. See supra text accompanying note 104.
113. Commissioner v. Estate of Leyman, 344 F.2d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated, 383
U.S. 832 (1966).
114. H.R. REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 (pt.2) C.B. 130, 166;
see Revenue Act of 1918, § 1317, 40 Stat. at 1146-48 (amending REV. STAT. § 3176).
115. Revenue Act of 1918, § 750(h), 40 Stat. at 1083.
116. H.R. REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 (pt.2) C.B. at 144.
117. Id.; see Revenue Act of 1918, § 250(b), 40 Stat. at 1083.
118. See S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 117, 130 (House
bill "provision making general provision for penalties" was "withdrawn to make clear the precise
offense to which it applies and to avoid conflict with or duplication of other provisions"; amendments to proposed legislation would "prevent a duplication of penalties under the specific and
general provisions of the statute, and the amounts of some of the assessable penalties have
been changed.").
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very clearly expressed in the legislative history" 9 and cannot, in any
event, account for all the amendments to the fraud penalties. The
final version of the Act did more than simply consolidate and clarify.
The 1918 Act drastically lowered penalties for fraudulent reporting
by making the penalty exclusive and reducing both the penalty rate
and the base to which the penalty was applied. 20 The overall effect

is highlighted by comparing the 1918 Act to the 1917 Act which had
provided a fraud penalty of double the tax evaded. 2 1 With the passing

of the greatest part of the war crisis, the desirability of or need for
stern measures was apparently reduced.
The contours of the modern fraud penalty were largely set by the

Revenue Act of 1918. The "new" income tax fraud provision specified
that the penalty applied if the understatement was "false or fraudulent
with intent to evade the tax."'22 Similar phrasing generally continued
through the 1939 Code.m With the 1954 Code 24 the penalty applied
"[i]f any part of any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a
return is due to fraud,"'25 a phrasing taken as the equivalent of the
prior version in the 1939 Code.2 6 Thus, the general content of the

fraud penalty was retained with a few changes over decades.

119. Professor Asimnow suggested that the passage quoted supra note 118 dealt with the
amendments to the fraud penalty as well as to the delinquency penalty and went on to characterize
the description of the penalized conduct as general, rather than specific. See Asimow, supra
note 53, at 651 n.72.
120. Revenue Act of 1918, § 250(h), 40 Stat. at 1083.
121. See id.; War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1004, 40 Stat. 300, 325-26.
122. Revenue Act of 1918, § 250(b), 40 Stat. at 1083.
123. The income tax fraud penalty was, for example, rephrased in 1921 to apply "[i]f any
part of the deficiency [was] due to fraud with intent to evade tax." Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 227, 264-65. This phrasing continued in force until the consolidation of
the tax code in 1939. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 293(b), 53 Stat. 1, 28.
The fraud penalty that had arisen during the Civil War still remained applicable to deficiencies
in other taxes such as the estate tax. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1921, § 1311, 42 Stat. at 311-13.
It continued in effect separately from the individual income tax penalties and was codified in
the 1939 Code. Revenue Code of 1939, § 3612(d)(2), 53 Stat. at 438; see Commissioner v. Estate
of Leyman, 344 F.2d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated, 383 U.S. 832 (1966) (general civil fraud
penalty, predecessor to estate tax fraud penalty, "remained in force as [part of Revised Statutes]
until incorporated into the 1939 Code as Section 3612(d) (2)"). That sanction then boasted a 50%
penalty rate. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 3612(d)(2), 53 Stat. at 438. But unlike the income
tax fraud provision, which applied the penalty rate against the deficiency, the estate tax fraud
penalty rate of 50% applied to the entire tax, as had the Revised Statutes provision. Leyman,
344 F.2d at 766-69.
124. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3.
125. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 6653(b), 68A Stat. at 822.
126. Section 6653 provided no definition of the word 'faud." The 1939 Code had been more
expansive, penalizing "fraud with intent to evade tax." Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 293(b),
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The fraud penalty, in this form, continued to represent the capstone
of the civil penalty system for tax cheating. Its phrasing delimited a
rather narrow scope. Fraud meant that the taxpayer made the incorrect reporting while knowing it was wrong and intending to evade
the tax owed. "Negligence whether slight or great, is not equivalent
to the fraud with intent to evade tax named in the statute. The fraud
meant is actual, intentional wrongdoing, and the intent required is
the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be owing.' 1 27 The fraud
penalty accordingly encompassed reckless conduct only to the extent
that the recklessness indicated an inclination to err against the government; for example, choosing arbitrary figures knowing they would
reduce the tax reported.128
The fraud penalty was not extended to items involving an inherent
uncertainty, or to cases where the taxpayer merely adopted a position
with which the government disagreed.129 Because a fraudulent intent
does not exist when there is simply a difference of opinion, the fraud
penalty did not apply to items involving uncertainty when the taxpayer
adopted a plausible position and gave no indication of an attempt to
cheat. 130 In one instance, the penalty did not even apply when the

53 Stat. at 88. The legislative history of the 1954 fraud provision does not indicate that the
content of the term "fraud" was to be altered. Thus, the 1954 Code provision was taken to have
the same intent as the version in the 1939 Code. MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 1 7.08[2], at 7-56 (1981); see Levinson v. United States, 496 F.2d 651, 654-55 (3d Cir.)
(finding fraud penalty applies to all of understatement so long as part of understatement was
driven by fraud), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974); Webb v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 366,
377-78 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that tax fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence
and that negligence is not fraud); Danenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 370, 393 (1979).
127. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941). Because fraud under the
definition quoted in the text requires intent, a taxpayer suffering from "severe psychosis" may
lack the requisite mental state to be liable for the civil fraud penalty. See Hollman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 251, 259-60 (1962). But mental incapacity will not always be a defense. A pituitary
tumor potentially affecting the operation of taxpayer's brain will not negate intent, at least
where the actions in question occurred before the effects of the tumor became pronounced. See
Farber v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 407, 421-25, modified, 44 T.C. 408 (1965).
128. Emanuel L. Gordon, Income Tax Penalties, 5 TAx L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1950); see In
re Frank Fehr Brewing Co., 160 F. Supp. 631, 635-36 (W.D. Ky. 1958), affd sub nor., Clarke
v. United States, 274 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1960); Owens v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 621, 627
(W.D. Ark. 1951), affid, 197 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1952); White v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 623,
625 (W.D. Ky. 1937); Clarke v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 314, 328 (1931). But cf. Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 822, 825-26 (1941) (holding that "gross carelessness" or "gross negligen[ce]" is not fraud).
129. See HARRY G. BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION 8.03[9][c] (4th ed. 1976).
130. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943); see Delone v. Commissioner, 100
F.2d 507, 509 (3d Cir. 1938); Estate of Spruill v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1197, 124148 (1987);
Estate of Wheeler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. 51, 110-13 (1978); Doric Apt. Co. v. Commis-
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taxpayer took a doubtful position for the purpose of setting a negoti131
ation position with the Service.
The taxpayer's reliance on expert advice also greatly reduced the
possible application of the fraud penalty. The fraudulent intent necessary for the penalty to operate did not exist when a taxpayer honestly
held a reasonable view as a result of reliance upon advice of counsel
or qualified others. 132 Advice sufficient to avoid the penalty would
consist of an opinion that a "reasonable basis" exists for resolving the
issue in the taxpayer's favor. 13 But advice that a taxpayer could not
reasonably believe did not negate the fraudulent intent."3

Although the general scope of the conduct penalized remained basically unchanged since 1918, several changes to the operation of this
penalty affected its relative strength. The 1918 Act set the civil fraud

penalty rate at 50% of the entire understatement or, as later specified,
the "underpayment," (for the income tax fraud penalty) where it remained for nearly seven decades. 13 Increases in tax shelters and tax

sioner, 32 B.T.A. 1187 (1935), affd, 94 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1938); see also BALTER, supra note
129, 8.03[9][c] (stating that honest error is not fraud); ROBERT M. SCHMIDT, LEGAL AND
ACCOUNTING HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL TAX FRAUD 442-43 (1963) (taking doubtful deductions
not fraudulent if the issue is not settled).
131. Ross Glove Co. v. Comnmissioner, 60 T.C. 569, 609 (1973).
132. Gordon, supra note 128, at 151-52; see Rogers Recreation Co. v. Commissioner, 103
F.2d 780, 783 (2d Cir. 1939); Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1398 (1970), affd in part
and rev'd in part on other issues, 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974);
United Dressed Beef Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 879, 887 (1955); Rice v. Commissioner, 14
T.C. 503, 507-08 (1950); see also Bronson v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 529, 535-36 (2d Cir. 1950)
(finding reasonable view honestly held is not a basis of fraud).
133. James R. Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client That He May Take a Position
on His Tax Return?, 29 TAX LAW. 237, 258-60 (1976); see Jemison v. Commissioner, 45 F.2d
4, 5-6 (5th Cir. 1930); Spruill, 88 T.C. at 1244-46.
134. Gordon, supra note 128, at 152 (citing Dorsey v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 295 (1935)).
135. The provision in 1918 provided that the penalty amount was determined by multiplying
the 50% penalty rate by the understatement amount. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b),
40 Stat. 1057, 1083. Thus, the penalty was 50% of the understatement of the tax revealed on
the return regardless of subsequent payments before the Service sent the notice of deficiency.
Wilson v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 395, 398 (1946) (stating that the "Congressional intent [was]
that the penalty was to be computed upon the total amount of the actual tax liability understated
on the return"). See H.R. REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., reprintedin 1939-1 (pt.2) C.B.
130, 144 ("if a false or fraudulent return is made with intent to evade the tax... 50 per cent
of the tax understated"). No exception appeared for a portion of the deficiency attributable to
causes other than fraud, once fraud had touched the return. In any event, the 1921 Act soon
made express this concept by providing that: "If any part of the deficiency is due to fraud with
intent to evade tax ... there shall be added as a part of the tax 50 per centum of the total
amount of the deficiency in the tax." Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 227,
264-65. See Arlette Coat Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 751, 756 (1950) (contention that "fraud
penalty can not be applied to the entire deficiency where only part of the deficiency arises from
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protests led to heightened activity in the penalty field in the early
1980s and Congress enhanced the fraud penalty in 1982 to include an
additional amount of 50% of the interest attributable to the fraudulent
part of the underpayment. 136 Only four years later, in 1986, with somewhat offsetting changes, Congress increased the fraud penalty rate
from 50% to 75%, but restricted the base upon which the penalty was
computed. 137 The penalty rate thereafter applied only to that part of
the underpayment that was tainted with fraud. After the proof of
fraud, the taxpayer had the burden to prove that some portion of the
underpayment was not attributable to fraud. - These latter changes
in 1986 more efficiently focused the impact of the civil fraud penalty
as it stood in the mid-1980s. The pattern of these changes in the 1980s
generally is consistent with the noticeable trends in the history of the
fraud penalty, specifically, that strengthening changes have been made
when there has been a challenge to which the revenue system must
rise.
2. Negligence
For over a century the higher levels of culpability have been rather
consistently covered in the civil penalty scheme. The fraud penalty's
reach has been restricted to instances of the highest culpability. Much
of the effort in recent decades has been to cover definitively some of
the lower reaches of culpability. The first clear attempt to reach the
lower levels of culpability was in the 1918 Act. 139 That Act added a
penalty provision which was triggered by the taxpayer's negligent
reporting.
The negligence penalty amount has been generally rather modest
compared to that of the fraud penalty. At its adoption the ad valorem

fraud" was foreclosed as issue was "well settled" to the contrary by precedent). Congress
amended the fraud penalty in 1954 so the penalty only applied to the actual underpayment
outstanding. ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 22.
136. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 325, 96 Stat.
324, 616 (1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6653(b)(2) (1982)).
137. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1503, 100 Stat. 2085, 2742-43 (1986)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6653(b)(2) (1988)).
138. I.R.C. § 6653(b)(1)-(2). The congressional intent was that these amendments would
further deter tax cheaters through the increased focus of the measure of the penalty amount.
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM

ACT OF 1986, at 1274-75 (1987).
139. The 1917 Act did not include a penalty directed at negligence. United States v. Jaffray,
97 F.2d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 1938), affd, 306 U.S. 276 (1939); see Asimow, supra note 53, at 651
("By the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress for the first time added a negligence penalty to the
traditional fraud penalties.").
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penalty amount was set at "5 per centum of the total amount of the

deficiency" and the penalty amount stood roughly at that amount for
a number of decades. But in its earliest years the negligence penalty
also provided for an interest component. That component called for
interest from the due date of the tax payment "at the rate of 1 per
centum per month on the... deficiency" in the event of negligence. 140
Congress repealed that early interest component in 1924 as the war

emergency and the extraordinary need for revenue faded into the
14
past. 1
From its earliest days the negligence penalty suffered from lack

of precise definition. In its original form, it provided for a penalty in
the event that an "understatement [was] due to negligence on the
part of the taxpayer, but without intent to defraud. 14m2 Although this
rather clearly shows the use of a fault-based system with a standard

140. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083. The 1918 and 1921 Acts
contained the short-lived additional interest penalty on negligent deficiencies of 12% per year.
See MONTGOMERY, supra note 99, at 231 n.18. Before 1921, the tax statutes failed to provide
the government with a right to collect interest with respect to simple, non-negligent deficiencies.
See KLEIN, supra note 58, at 1683.
141. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 275(a), 43 Stat. 253, 298. The elimination of the
interest component on negligent deficiencies in 1924 led to the further surprising result that
the only instance in which no interest accrued on a deficiency was where the deficiency was
attributed to negligence, a situation that existed for a number of years. Under the 1924 Act,
interest generally ran at 6% on deficiencies. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 274(f), 43 Stat. 253,
297. That Act, however, also removed the interest component of the negligence penalty. See
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 275(a), 43 Stat. at 298. This was not because that component's
presence led to a mixing of culpability and time value of money concepts, but because the typical
experience with the penalty and the fact situations from which it arose did not merit the larger
penalty amount. The congressional reports reveal simply that:
Experience has shown that the act or omission by the taxpayer which gives rise
to these additions is usually not so serious as to require both an increase in the
tax of 5 per cent and 1 per cent a month on this amount from the time the tax
was due.
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1939-1 (pt.2) C.B. 241, 259; see S. REP.
No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1939-1 (pt.2) C.B. 266, 287. The rather surprising
result of the amendments made to implement this concept was that the government could not
collect interest if it received a penalty for the taxpayer's negligence. Compare Montgomery,
supra note 99, at 231-32 (finding no interest in this era on deficiencies where there is negligence)
with KLEIN, supra note 59, at 1686 (stating that interest does run on negligent deficiencies).
This problem apparently remained unresolved until the 1954 Code. See ABA PENALTIES TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21-22.
'142. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. at 1083. Conversely, another passage
of the statute made clear that "if the return [was] made in good faith and the understatement
of the amount in the return is not due to any fault of the taxpayer, there shall be no penalty
because of such understatement." Id. § 250(b), 40 Stat. at 1083.
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lower than fraud for income tax reporting, 14 the legislative history of
the 1918 Act speaks no further about the content Congress intended
this passage to have.-" In addition, the negligence penalty was soon
expanded to include terms even more confounding, such as the 1921
Act's provision that the penalty was to apply to "intentional disregard
of authorized rules and regulations with knowledge thereof.' ' 45 The
penalty subsequently restated this phrase to cover an "intentional
46
disregard of rules or regulations (but without intent to defraud).'
In 1986 these defining terms of the negligence penalty were rephrased and the penalty's scope enlarged. Its scope was enhanced by
an amendment making the sanction applicable to deficiencies in any
federal tax. 147 The penalty's terms were defined by rephrasing the

negligence definition to include "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions" of the internal revenue title and
"disregard" to include "any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard.' ' 4 These changes did not appear to remedy any of the uncertainties in coverage of the penalty or limitations in its reach.
Given its variety of triggering terms, the negligence penalty has
had remarkable breadth. When compared to sanctions for negligence

143. The 1918 Act set up a complete structure of penalty provisions designed exclusively
for application with respect to the income tax, as was seen appropriate for a distinct kind of
tax. Commissioner v. Estate of Leyman, 344 F..2d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated, 383 U.S.
832 (1966). See Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 250, 253. For a considerable time thereafter, the estate
tax lacked a negligence penalty as it relied principally on the penalties in the Revised Statutes
which did not provide for a negligence penalty. Only in 1986 was this imbalance rectified. Until
then the penalty for negligence only attached to taxes "imposed by subtitle A [income tax], by
chapter 12 of subtitle B [gift tax], or by chapter 45 (relating to windfall profit tax)." I.R.C. §
6653(a) (1985) (repealed 1986).
144. Asimow, supra note 53, at 651.
145. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 265. This phrase is not explained by
the legislative history and has had an uncertain reach. Asimow, supra note 53, at 659. The
phrase "with knowledge thereof' was soon eliminated in the Revenue Act of 1924 without
explanation in the legislative history. See Arnold Hoffman, Intentional Disregardof Rules and
Regulations, 28 TAXES 111, 113 (1950). This amendment would seem to make ignorance of the
particular rule or regulation irrelevant, especially since ignorance of an important provision
would seem to be negligence. Id. (citing Gibbs & Hudson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 205
(306)).
146. See I.R.C. § 6653(a) (1985) (repealed 1989).
147. I.R.C. 6653(a)(1) (1986) (repealed 1989); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N,
supra note 138, at 1274 ("Congress believed that the negligence penalty should apply to all
taxes under the Code.").
148. I.R.C. § 6653(a)(3) (1986) (repealed 1989). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N,
supra note 138, at 1275 (definition of negligence clarified by changes and not limited to items
listed in statute and includes conduct encompassed by previous definition).
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in the tort field, it potentially covered a "surprisingly broad range of
conduct" including "reckless or intentional conduct because there is
no greater penalty for reckless or intentional conduct short of the
flagrant behavior punishable as civil fraud.' 1 49 Although one simple
transcription error would not trigger the sanction, a computation error
indicating carelessness resulted in a penalty.150 Intentional actions were
also covered by this provision. A taxpayer who intentionally reported
contrary to rules and regulations that are not the subject of contest
could be penalized.' 5' The negligence penalty, thus, covered a very
wide range of conduct.
In light of this breadth, the failure of the negligence penalty to
cover some calculated actions is striking, particularly given its coverage of some careless actions. Prominent authorities have noted that
courts have traditionally insisted that the taxpayer's intent approach
that of fraud in order to uphold a negligence penalty on the reporting
of uncertain items. 52 The potential application of the penalty to intentional disregard of rules and regulations did not foreclose numerous
positions not expressly covered by rules and regulations. Nor did it
affect the taxpayer purporting to challenge the Service's position without disclosure if the taxpayer honestly and reasonably believed that

149. Asimow, supra note 53, at 651. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 specified that the
fraud penalty would apply 'in lieu of' the negligence penalty. I.R.C. § 6653(b) (1954) (repealed
1986). With the passage of the Code of 1986 this control of the overlap of these penalties shifted
to the negligence penalty section. The 1986 Code removed the possibility that the fraud penalty
would also apply to a deficiency penalized as negligent. I.R.C. § 6653(a)(2) (1986) (repealed
1989). 'There shall not be taken into account under this subsection any portion of an underpayment
attributable to fraud with respect to which a penalty is imposed unser subsection (b)." Id.
150. See Canfield v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 944 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 168 F.2d
907 (5th Cir. 1948); MONTGOMERY, supra note 99, at 232 (stating there is no penalty for typical
arithmetic errors, but there is a penalty if the error is so blantant that it should have been
recognized as a mistake); Gordon, supra note 128, at 162.
151. See BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
45.3, at 45-14 to -15 (1988).
INDIVIDUALS
152. See Asimow, supra note 53, at 650-51; Calvin H. Johnson, "True and Correct," Standards for Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 1521, 1523 (June 19, 1989);
Mansfield, The Role of Sanctions in Taxpayer Compliance, in COMPLIANCE CONFERENCE
REPORT, supranote 4, at 217, 220. Mansfield stated that: "[T]he courts have applied a different
concept, penalizing some culpable, intentional conduct and refusing to penalize some conduct of
simple negligence, so that the range of the penalties application is not very broad." Id. Several
remarkable examples have been noted in which the fault penalties would seem applicable, but
were not sought by the Service or upheld by the courts. See 1988 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET,
supra note 2, at 15 (noting that a taxpayer disregarded his own detailed mileage records in
determining percentage of business use of vehicle).
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the Service's position was erroneous. ' As a result, some highly regarded tax lawyers concluded that a fault-based penalty cannot accommodate such situations at early stages since a specific issue would not
be determined then, and up to that point a taxpayer adopting a favorable position would not have acted negligently.'5 In addition, if the
taxpayer received advice from a competent attorney or other expert,
the negligence penalty could only be applied to a limited number of

cases. 155
As a result of this limitation in scope of the negligence penalty, it
was not as effective as it might have been to influence taxpayer reporting. A taxpayer could, without much fear of this penalty, take return
positions that are very aggressive or suffer convenient (if not too
frequent) lapses of memory in failing to report some items as if such
errors were simply ordinary "mistakes" not amounting to carelessness.
Congress's occasional attempts to target certain narrow actions as,

153.
154.

See BiTTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 151,
45.3, at 45-14 to -15.
See Jerome Kurtz, Penalty Revision and the Case for Section 6661, 42 TAx NOTES
(TAx ANALYSTS) 1617, 1622 (Mar. 27, 1989); 1988 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note
2, at 15. But see ABA PENALTY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 31-33 (developing a
"standard of conduct" through case law evolution is required before a position can be negligent).
As former Commissioner Kurtz has noted, this "takes years and by the time a court opines on
a specific scheme, the market has generally moved on to others." Kurtz, supranote 154, at 1622.
155. Gordon, supra note 128, at 162; Kurtz, supra note 154, at 1622; see United States v.
Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985); Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990); Betson v.
Commissioner, 802 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1986); Gralnek v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1313
(1989); Davis v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 650 (1989); Ewing v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.
396 (1988) on appeal to 9th and 5th Cir.; Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner,
51 T.C.M. (CCH) 294 (1986), affd, 820 F.2d 1543 (1987); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A.
1372 (1929).
Of course, advice of counsel or an opinion from a lawyer will not provide unqualified protection.
Such advice constitutes only one aspect of any case to be evaluated and any reliance must fall
within a range of reasonableness for the defense to hold. Skeen v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 93,
96 (9th Cir. 1989); Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 888 (1987), affd, 904 F.2d 1011 (5th
Cir. 1990). The professional opinion may in some circumstances require seeking other advice,
as with tax opinions associated with tax shelters. Coleman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH)
123 (1990). A taxpayer must consult a competent advisor and give that advisor all relevant
information to establish this defense. See Ma-Tran Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 158, 172-73,
178 (1978). These qualifications of competence and full disclosure have been used to support the
argument that "[t]here has been an uncritical acceptance of the statement that reliance on a
competent tax adviser is a defense to a negligence or fraud penalty." ABA PENALTIES TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at. 35. The qualifications, however, do not pose a serious problem
to many taxpayers seeking to adopt aggressive positions because where such qualified advice
exists, there is no "fault" in relying upon it.
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essentially, per se negligence, 156 and its general exhortation of the
Service to be more aggressive in asserting the negligence penalty,
show the difficulty in trying to make such a penalty stick in such
15 7
cases.
This problematic aspect of the negligence penalty derived from the
reporting standard implicit in its terms.', The negligence standard
was interpreted as a benchmark that permitted aggressive reporting
positions without serious threat of penalty because the courts looked
to good faith and reasonableness. 159 Even though there has been some
uncertainty regarding the effect of the "intentional disregard" language
on positions consciously adopted, 16° commentators observed that "the

156. Congress has occasionally been tempted to proscribe certain kinds of errors as involving
negligence per se, where problems of proof exist. The Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance
Act of 1983 added a subsection that presumed negligence in the absence of solid contrary
evidence, if the return neglected to report certain items reported on information returns, interest
and dividends being the primary examples. See I.R.C. § 6653(g) (1983) (repealed 1989); H.R.
REP. No. 325, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1983), reprintedin 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 643, 693 (noting
that an omission of this sort of item not justified as inadvertent). See infra note 227. This
targeting of certain types of reporting with presumptions of negligence demonstrates the perceived difficulty in penalizing such conduct with the more traditional tools.
157. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMi. ON TAX'N, supra note 138, at 1276.
158. As Professors Bittker and McMahon have noted: "Section 6653(a) does not contain a
"reasonable cause" escape hatch, as do some other penalties; but since negligence is the antithesis
of reasonable behavior, a showing of reasonable cause for the underpayment in effect negates
the existence of negligence." BiTTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 151,
45.3, at 45-14.
159. See Skeen v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1989); Ewing v. Commissioner,
91 T.C. 396 (1988); Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 888 (1987), affd, 904 F.2d 1011 (5th
Cir. 1990); Brown v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 399, 410 (1967), affd, 398 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1968);
Heffelfinger v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 1232 (1935), affd, 87 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1937); BrNrKER
& MCMAHON, supra note 151,
45.3, at 45-14; Asimow, supra note 53, at 659 (stating that a
genuine contest over regulation's status should not be penalized even absent disclosure).
160. The meaning of the intentional language in former § 6653(a) has been problematic.
This language was added "in 1921 evidently because of concern that taxpayers were ignoring
regulations thought to be invalid without flagging this fact on their returns." BITrKER &
MCMAHON, supra note 151,
45.3, at 45-14; see Asimow, supra note 53, at 659 (suggesting
that the phrase might reach the taxpayers' practice of challenging regulations as invalid without
disclosing the challenge on the return); Hoffman, supra note 145, at 113 (stating that the "obvious
purpose" of the 1921 system under which taxpayers had to pay the disputed amount before
litigating their case, "was to cause the taxpayer to give the same respect to Treasury rules and
regulations as he owed to the statutory language itself'). Even so, the penalty has not often
been applied in such cases because of the assumption that the penalty will not reach a taxpayer
taking a position honestly and reasonably that the Service's position is wrong. BiTTKER &
MCMAHON, supra note 151, 1 45.3, at 45-14; see Asimow, supra note 53: at 659; Hoffman,
supra note 145, at 113-14 (acknowledging possible argument that with 1924 advent of the ability
to litigate without prior payment Congress may have intended to permit challenge to rules and
regulations without penalty - but not persuaded by it). Saltzman states that the disregard of
rules and regulations cannot refer to rulings and interpretive regulations and that it can only
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'reasonable basis' standard [is] applied with respect to imposition of
the negligence penalty. '' 161 Thus, the language was commonly understood to permit adoption of return positions that had only a reasonable
basis. This understanding seems to have been a part of the tax lore
for a long time,,62 although blanket statements as to its applicability
without regard to whether the taxpayer disclosed the position on the
appropriate return were questioned occasionally.- s Therefore, tax attorneys sometimes advised a client that there was a return position
on an issue if it was supported by a reasonable argument, even though
the taxpayer may be very likely to lose if the Service contested the
issue. 16

The relative laxness of the negligence penalty in this regard came
to affect indirectly the amount of the sanction under that provision.

mean "disregard of ... procedural requirements that the Service imposes which prevent it
from carrying out its statutorily mandated function of determining and collecting the correct
amount of tax - for example, failing to keep adequate inventory and other records." SALTZMAN,
supra note 126,
7.09[1], at 7-73.
In the context of a taxpayer's divergence from the statute, however, the Second Circuit has
stated that the intentional disregard penalty was crafted to prevent taxpayers from intentionally
filing returns that were at odds with regulations that are undergirded by a statute (in that case
the marriage penalty) in order to test its constitutionality, as the penalty is mandatory and has
no 'reasonable basis' exemption" if the taxpayer acts deliberately. Druker v. United States,
697 F.2d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). Druker has been cited as an
example of the proposition that: "It has been accepted by some courts at least that a taxpayer
who wishes to contest a tax law or established rule of law must do so by paying the tax and
suing for a refund of a portion of the tax claimed to have been overpaid as a consequence of
the alleged invalid law." ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 35 (arguing
further that this should not be the case for interpretive regulations). But Druker, although it
contains much language about challenging regulations, was fundamentally a case where the
taxpayers were not simply challenging a regulation, but had disregarded the clear "statutory
requirement." See BITTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 151, $ 45.3, at 45-14 n.56 & 45-15.
161. Marvin J. Garbis & Miriam L. Fisher, The Tilted Table: Penalties and Interest on
Federal Tax Deficiencies, 7 VA.TAX REV. 485, 495 (1988); cf. James P. Holden, Constraining
Aggressive Return Advice: A Commentary, 9 VA. TAX REV. 771, 772 n.8 (1990) (finding "position
below non-frivolous" which is itself lower than reasonable basis "takes on connotations beyond
aggressiveness, i.e., risk of negligence or fraud penalties").
162. 2 JACOB RABKIN & MARK H. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE
TAXATION 4041 (1945) (stating there is no penalty "where the taxpayer had reasonable grounds
to differ from the conclusions reached by the Commissioner" or "where the taxpayer honestly
believed that [a certain treatment was appropriate] and there was a reasonable basis for such
belief').
163. See Rowen, supra note 133, at 256-57.
164. See id. at 24243. The reasonable basis standard corresponded with a tax attorney's
professional standard when advising on reporting an issue to be reflected on a tax return. See
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In the early 1980s the pre-reform version of the penalty provided for
a sanction in an amount of "5 percent of the [entire] underpayment.' 16
Following the difficulties associated with the rise of tax shelters and
increasing numbers of tax protesters, the negligence penalty was seen
as too light. The penalty, as it stood in the pre-reform years, could
produce a sizable sanction since its nominally low rate of 5% applied
to the entire underpayment. 1 6 However, it was smaller than the original negligence penalty because that early version had included the
unique interest component on the entire underpayment from the return
date.16 7 To reinforce this sanction in light of the increased pressure
on the tax system, Congress enhanced the negligence penalty. Begin-

id. at 243. Under the former ABA Formal Opinion 314, "a lawyer who [was] asked to advise
his client in the course of the preparation of the client's tax returns [could] freely urge the
statement of positions most favorable to the client just as long as there [was] a reasonable basis
for [that] position." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314
(1965). That opinion was interpreted as "suggest[ing] that a tax practitioner need not have a
genuine belief that a particular scheme will succeed ..... United States v. Yorke (unpublished
opinion, D. Md., July 19, 1976), reprinted in MARVIN J. GARBIS, STEPHEN C. STRUNTZ &
RONALD B. RUBIN, TAX PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD 674 (2d ed. 1987).
The professional standard rose somewhat in the 1980s. The ABA standard was later restated
slightly as follows:
[A] lawyer, in representing a client in the course of the preparation of the client's
tax return, may advise the statement of positions most favorable to the client if
the lawyer has a good faith belief that those positions are warranted in existing
law or can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law. A lawyer can have a good faith belief in this context
even if the lawyer believes the client's position probably will not prevail. However,
good faith requires that there be some realistic possibility of success if the matter
is litigated.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). The "realistic
probability of success" standard represents about a 30 to 35% chance of success which appears
to represent a higher standard than the old reasonable basis standard. Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing
with the "Authorities": Determining Valid Legal Authority In Advising Clients, Rendering
Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072, 1128 (1988); see
Notice 90-20, 1990-1 C.B. 328. Professor Graetz noted a small difference between the standards
and remarked that the "'laugh aloud' standard has been replaced by a 'giggle test."' Michael J.
Graetz, Too Little, Too Late, TAX TIMES (Feb. 1987), reprinted in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 105, 106-07 (1988). The Tax Section had sought to elevate the

ethical standard, but "some observers have questioned whether it does anything other than
restate the reasonable basis standard of Opinion 314." Holden, supra note 161, at 771; see James
P. Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Market Place: Opinions 314, 346 and
Circular230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 209 (1985); Calvin H. Johnson, Tax Return Positions in
Contempt of Civil Penalties, 33 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 501, 502 (Nov. 6, 1986).
165. I.R.C. § 6653(a) (1981) (repealed 1989).
166. See Commissioner v. Asphalt Products Co., 482 U.S. 117, 120 (1987).
167. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
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ning in 1982, the negligence penalty was amended to add an additional
penalty amount consisting of "50 percent of the interest [on] the underpayment . . . attributable to . . . negligence.",- In this respect, the
sanction substantially increased in size in response to the high concern
about the integrity of the tax reporting system.
The evolution of the negligence penalty up to this point resembles,
loosely, that of the civil fraud penalty. The negligence penalty first
appeared in a time of crisis and financial need. Thereafter, the force
of its sanction, as evidenced by the penalty amount produced by its
application, has varied to some extent with crises affecting the revenue. Moreover, although its terms have a potentially broad reach, by
interpretation it has occupied a less important place in the tax penalty
system than its terms suggested on an initial reading. In short, the
negligence penalty did not plug the gap that it might have.
3.

No-Fault Penalties

Congress was relatively slow to institute penalties giving taxpayers
a more direct incentive to report more accurately than that which the
negligence penalty provided. Some taxpayers sought out and embraced
schemes calling for extremely aggressive tax return positions. Tax
shelters began to spread at an accelerated rate in the 1960s and
1970s, 169 and the fault-based penalties allowed taxpayers to take highly
doubtful return positions with no risk of penalties.170 This led to a
reexamination of the return position standard.
The movement to reexamine the standard gained steam in the late
1970s. Then-IRS Commissioner Kurtz initiated public discussions
about the ability of taxpayers to fail to disclose questionable positions
and take their chances with the "audit lottery. '' 17 1 Subsequently, in
the early 1980s, a series of new provisions was enacted to strengthen
tax compliance. Because the Service was given the power to apply
the penalties based on objective circumstances alone,17 2 these penalties

168. I.R.C. § 6653(a) (1982) (repealed 1989).
169. BiITKER & MCMAHON, supra note 151, 15.3, at 15-8 to -13; see also A Tax Shelter
Bibliography, supra note 33.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 152-64.
171. See Jerome Kurtz, Discussion on "QuestionablePositions," 32 TAX LAW. 13, 13 (1978)
(elaborating on disclosure theme and noting that disclosure works in SEC filings because there
is a penalty for error); Jerome Eurtz, Remarks to the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, DAILY TAX REP., May 26, 1977, at J-3 (proposing rule requiring disclosure of
"questionable positions" taken on return) [hereinafter Kurtz, Remarks]; see also Rowen, supra
note 133, at 237 (anticipating some aspects of the later enacted substantial understatement
penalty).
172. See infra text accompanying notes 179, 199-208.
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were sometimes, with slight inaccuracy, referred to as no-fault penalties.
The no-fault penalties cut back on a taxpayer's ability to take
aggressive positions because they raised the penalty-free reporting
standard. They thus' made the game more expensive to play, even
though the chances of losing were very small given the low audit rate
of about 3% of all returns. 17 The purpose of these no-fault penalties
was clearly to deter taxpayers from engaging in aggressive underreporting. 174 These penalties, which, notwithstanding the name, ultimately did utilize the taxpayer's "fault," made it unnecessary for the
Service to establish as an initial matter the taxpayer's level of care. 175
The primary concern initially about tax shelters obscured the more
general compliance problems that were also targeted by these penalties.
The first of the innovative no-fault penalties, section 6659,176 appeared in 1981. This penalty sanctioned valuation overstatements reported on income tax returns. 17 Beyond a threshold level of error,
the amount of penalty was tied to the size of the valuation error. As
the level of error grew, the penalty rate increased. 17 The penalty
applied regardless of the taxpayer's level of care, although the Service
could waive a penalty if the taxpayer acted reasonably and in good
faith.179

173. Kurtz, Remarks, supra note 171, at J-3. The audit rate dropped even further throughout the 1980s.
174. See STAFF OF JOINT COiAM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX EQuiTY
AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at 216 (1982). The passage of this penalty came
about based on Congress's belief that: "Reasonable reliance on the advice of a tax advisor

generally will prevent application of the fraud and negligence penalties." Id. The deterrence
theme recurred throughout the enactment of such penalties in the 1980s. See STAFF OF THE
JOINT COaMs. ON TAX'N, supra note 138, at 1277 ("Reasonable and justifiable reliance on a tax

advisor generally prevents the imposition of either the negligence or fraud penalty.").
175. Application of fault-based penalties turns upon the taxpayer's understanding and intent.
Inquiry about such matters is problematic and a taxpayer adopting an overly aggressive position

on a return can avoid such penalties if the taxpayer's "fault" in adopting that position cannot
be proven. See 1988 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 14. No-fault penalties
"are imposed on the basis of the return position taken by the taxpayer which can be established
by objective evidence, as opposed to the more subjective element of knowledge or state of mind

of the taxpayer." Id.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See I.R.C. § 6659 (1981) (repealed 1989).
I.R.C. § 6659 (1981) (repealed 1989).
I.R.C. § 6659 (1981) (repealed 1989).
I.R.C. § 6659(e) (1981) (repealed 1989).
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Initial use of a no-fault penalty arose with respect to valuation
because valuation overstatements presented serious problems at that
time. The 1981 penalty principally targeted tax shelters.'1 ° Valuation
in that context was seen as a particularly difficult issue and the number
of valuation disputes in the tax shelter context was growing.'Sl
The 1981 penalty's coverage, however, stretched beyond tax shelters.a1 For example, the 1981 penalty also applied to overstated depreciation deductions or charitable contribution deductions.l- Because of
the application of the penalty to inflated valuations of property contributed to charity, it addressed the valuation issue in a context where
the Service had rarely sought any sort of penalty.M
The prior reticence with respect to penalties in the valuation context arose from the nature of valuation issues. Valuation is an imprecise process involving case-specific issues with difficult questions of
fact. 1 5 Resolutions of valuation cases frequently featured a "split of

180.

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC

RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 332-33 (1981); SALTZMAN, supra note 126, 9 7B.02[4].
181. See sources cited supra note 180.
182. One commentator has stated that: "Congress clearly was targeting tax shelter promotions utilizing overvalued property to generate tax deductions when creating the new penalty.
However, the penalty can apply in more prosaic transactions, such as charitable contributions
of property, purchases of business assets, Section 334(b)(2) liquidations, and the sale of property
received from an estate." SALTZMAN, supra note 126, 1 7B.02[4]; see also Nielsen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 779 (1986) (applying the section in the tax shelter context); STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 180, at 333 n.1 (confirming Saltzman statement).
183. See I.R.C. § 6659(f)(3)(A) (1988) (repealed 1989); SALTZMAN, supra note 126, 1
7B.02[4].
184. For a later case in which the Service unsuccessfully sought a negligence penalty with
respect to valuation of a charitable contribution, see Sammons v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 330,
337-38 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting taxpayer reliance on expert valuation). For examples of cases
where the Service prior to 1980 sought unsuccessfully to press for a civil fraud penalty on
account of substantial valuation errors, see Delone v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.
1938), acq., 1937-1 C.B. 7; Estate of Wheeler, 37 T.C.M. 51 (1978); Doric Apt. Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 1187 (1935), 1937-1 C.B. 8, affd, 94 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1938). Cases such as
United States v. Wolfson, 573 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1978), were the exception. In Wolfson, the
government prosecuted an appraiser for aiding in the preparation of fraudulent tax returns
under I.R.C. § 7206(2). Id. at 218. The appraiser inflated appraisals for donors of yachts to
Florida universities. Id. The case was reversed on appeal due to errors in the jury instructions
and the indictment was dismissed following remand due to the defendant's death. The appellate
briefs reveal numerous inflated appraisals and some inconsistent valuations by the appraiser.
See generally Ira L. Tilzer, Should an Appraisal of Fair Market Value Be the Subject of a
Criminal Prosecution?, 50 J. TAX'N 180, 181 (1979) (arguing that prosecutions should not be
made unless "a factor other than the alleged inflated appraisal [is] the essence of the government's
proof of the criminal violations").
185. See Buck v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 90, 92 (D. Del. 1957) (noting that valuation
"calls for an educated guess"); Estate of Smith, 57 T.C. 650, 655 (1972) (noting that valuation
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the difference."1 That tendency encouraged additional disputes and
upset Congress and the courts. Congress reacted to this tendency
by passing the first of the no-fault penalties. 187 The courts reacted
by resolving to take a firmer stand on valuation issues.188 The
Service recognized that taxpayers had been encouraged to create disputes and benefit from the uncertainties of the administrative and
judicial processes by taking aggressive positions on valuation issues.
Thus, the Service asserted the fraud penalty in some substantial cases
beginning in the early 1980s when large valuation differences between
the taxpayer's and the Service's positions occurred. 11
The futility of the Service's attempts under the fault-based penalty
structure was clear long before the Service's initiatives in these valuation cases were rejected, 19° because valuation is an inherently uncertain issue. It requires an opinion. A taxpayer who reports an erroneous
valuation is accordingly difficult to penalize on the basis of intent. 9'
This point is abundantly clear from an analysis of the Spruill case,
highlighted in the introduction,'9 where relatively unsophisticated taxpayers relied, as was their custom, on advisors in a valuation mat-

is "an inherently imprecise process"), acq., 1974-2 C.B. 4, affd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975);
Estate of Mitchell, 27 T.C.M. 1568, 1569 (1968) (noting that valuation "defies talismatic precision
and involves at best, an educated guess"); Morris M. Messing, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967) (noting
valuation is "inherently imprecise" and can be resolved only by "Solomon-like pronouncement").
186. Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980) (relating prior
practice of splitting the difference); Morris M. Messing, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967) (resolvable only
by "Solomon-like pronouncement").
187. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COlMMs. ON TAX'N, supra note 180, at 332.
188. The Tax Court grew so upset with frivolous valuation cases that it was no longer
inclined to split the difference but encouraged settlement resolutions by simply finding for the
party with the stronger case. See Buffalo Tool, 74 T.C. at 452. Although the court had undoubtedly seen many weak taxpayer cases, the Service too presented it with some losers, including
one of the first following Buffalo Tool. See Strutz v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 757 (1980).
Indeed, the Tax Court years later rejected entirely the valuation approach of the Service in
some major valuation cases. See Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 252 (1990);
Estate of Spruill v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1197, 1248 (1987).
189. See Newhouse, 94 T.C. at 194; Spruill, 88 T.C. at 1241.
190. See Newhouse, 94 T.C. at 252; Spruill, 88 T.C. at 1248; Alison Frankel, How the
Newhouses Crashed the IRS, 12 AM. LAw. 40, 42 (1990).
191. See Delone v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1938), acq., 1937-1 C.B. 7; Estate
of Wheeler, 37 T.C.M. 51 (1978); Doric Apt. Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 1187 (1935), acq.,
1937-1 C.B. 8, affd, 94 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1938); BALTER, supra note 129, 8.03; SCHMIDT,
supra note 130, at 441; see also Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943) (stating it is
'"ot the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made
despite the exercise of reasonable care").
192. See supra text accompanying notes 22-29.
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ter, and the Tax Court denied the Service the asserted fraud penalty.
The contrast of Spruill with the Posner case, suggested in the introduction, shows that the government needed to find a smoking gun as
it did in Posner 93 before it could make a fraud case out of a valuation
controversy. The valuation overstatement penalty of former section
6659' was the first to address this situation. Valuation was suggested
as being somewhat unusual in presenting "difficult questions of fact"
with a range of reasonable views,' 95 even though certainly other issues
exist that are highly uncertain, like debt-equity and reasonable compensation issues. In any event, because valuation represented a highly
visible problem as part of the larger tax shelter-audit lottery problem,
it was addressed first. Later, the broader relevance of valuation issues
was soon confirmed as the no-fault penalty solution was applied outside
the income tax context in the estate and gift tax area.The need to address the same types of uncertainty outside the
valuation area was also clear and the general application of the "nofault" concept was not long in arriving. The substantial understatement penalty of section 6661,197 part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),198 was a general solution to the
aggressive reporting positions. That provision initially contained a 10%
penalty, which increased to 25% in 1986.199 A substantial understate-

193. United States v. Posner, 764 F.2d 1535, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1182 (1986).
194. I.R.C. § 6659 (1981) (repealed 1989).
195. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 180, at 332.
196. In 1984, Congress followed the no-fault penalty pattern in dealing with valuation
understatements in the estate and gift tax context. I.R.C. § 6660 (1984) (repealed 1989). The
concern was once again with players of the "audit lottery" in the uncertainty-laden context of
a valuation. Congress felt that: "[I It is equally important to deter incorrect valuations for estate

and gift tax purposes as for income tax purposes."

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N,

GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT
OF 1984, at 504 (1984).

197. I.R.C. § 6661 (1985) (repealed 1989).
198. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., 96 Stat. 324.
199. Congress initially doubled the penalty rate for a substantial understatement to 20%.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1504(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). This upward
adjustment of the penalty rate was thought desirable because "Congress believed that the
current level of the substantial understatement penalty provides an insufficient deterrent."
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 138, at 1277. This rate increased to 25%.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 8002, 100 Stat. 1874, 1951
(1986) (OBRA I). This situation became confused when the Tax Reform Act was signed after
OBRA I, but the Tax Court resolved the issue in favor of the 25% rate of OBRA I. Pallottini
v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 498, 503 (1988) (involving 1982 return).
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ment of income tax triggered the penalty. A substantial understatement was an understatement in excess of the greater of 10% of the
tax shown on the return or $5,000.m The provision, however, did not
follow strict no-fault principles. In general, an understatement was
not counted to the extent that there was substantial authority or
adequate disclosure of the issue on the tax return. 20 1 In addition, a
taxpayer reporting an item attributable to a tax shelter was only
relieved of the penalty if the taxpayer "reasonably believed" that the
treatment of that item on the return was "more likely than not the
proper treatment," even if the item had been disclosed on the return.m
The substantial authority standard for reporting non-tax shelter
items was an innovation.m Congress intended it to be a stricter standard than the old reasonable basis standard of the negligence penalty.
It was not to be as strict as the higher, "'more-likely-than-not' stand-

ard.,, 20

Congress also authorized the Service to waive the substantial understatement penalty. 215 That Code section stated that "the Secretary
may waive all or any part of [the penalty] on a showing by the taxpayer
that there was reasonable cause for the understatement (or part
thereof) and that the taxpayer acted in good faith."' The Tax Court
interpreted this provision to mean that a Service determination on

200. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(1)(A) (1982) (repealed 1989). A $10,000 figure was used for C corporations in place of the $5,000 general figure.
201. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B) (1982) (repealed 1989).
202. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(C) (1982) (repealed 1989).
203. The standard therefore involved some uncertainty since it was new, but Congress saw
this as an advantage.
The standard of substantial authority was adopted, in part, because it is a new
standard. Congress was unaware of any judicial or administrative decision interpreting the phrase "substantial authority." It was intended that the courts will be free
to look at the purpose of this new provision in determining whether substantial
authority existed for a position taken in any particular case.
H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1982).
204. See id.; Garbis & Fisher, supra note 161, at 495; Johnson, supra note 152, at 1525;
John A. LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit
Lottery, and Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES (TAX
ANALYSTS) 363, 378-79, 386-88 (Jan. 31, 1983); see also PATRICIA MORGAN, TAX FRAUD AND
PROCEDURE § 15.1.1, at 348 (1990). A perfect position was not required because tax advisors
may not be able to agree on such a conclusion; yet, taking doubtful positions favoring taxpayers
was to be controlled. H.R. REP. No. 760, supranote 203. See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON TAX'N, supra note 34, at 216-17 ('taxpayers and the Government may reasonably differ
over the sometimes complex Federal tax laws").
205. I.R.C. 6661(c) (1982).
206. Id.
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this waiver issue was reviewable only under an abuse of discretion
standard. Thus, reversal might result where the Service acted "arbitrarily, capriciously or without sound basis in fact. ' 207 This conclusion
was consistent with the long history of deference to the judgment of
the Service where the statutory language entrusts the matter in some
sense to the "discretion, belief, opinion, or satisfaction of the Commissioner" since the statute gave the Secretary the power to waive the
penalty but did not so require. 20 Moreover, it kept the section from
becoming another negligence section which would open the inquiry to
time consuming exercises. An interpretation that the taxpayer was
entitled to a waiver simply because he had a subjective intent amounting to innocence, or relied on an advisor in taking the position, would
have undercut the provision's attempt to introduce objective standards
to the tax reporting context. It also would have caused further controversy over the applicability of a penalty in a particular case.
The coordination or cumulation of this provision with other penalty
provisions permitted applying a substantial penalty to a taxpayer who
was subject to both this penalty and another accuracy-related penalty.
The penalty did not apply to an understatement based on valuation
that was penalized under section 6659 of the Code.- ° It could, however,
be "stacked" on top of negligence or fraud penalties.210 This meant,
particularly after the substantial understatement penalty rate was
raised, that negligent conduct might bring on a very significant penalty
amount. The section 6661 sanction of 25% could be "stacked" upon the
5% negligence penalty, which for a part of the 1980s was accompanied
by its 50% of interest component.2 1' Fraud, of course, bore an even
greater charge and for a time could be similarly "stacked" with the
substantial understatement penalty.212
The substantial understatement penalty represented the climax of
the 1980s increase in penalties. It was a fresh start on the reporting
standard by breaking from the old reasonable basis standard. It required the taxpayers to aim higher to avoid a penalty than they had

207. Mailman v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1079, 1084 (1988).
208. See Roswel Magill, Finality of Determinations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 147, 166-67 (1930).
209. See I.R.C. § 6661(b)(3) (1982) (repealed 1989).
210. ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 47; Garbis & Fisher, supra
note 161, at 492-93; Marvin J. Garbis & Stephen C. Struntz, Thorns Among the Roses - The
Problems of the Investor in an "Abusive" Tax Shelter, 44 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx'N 5-1
(1986); LeDuc, supra note 204, at 379-80.
211. See sources cited supra note 210.
212. See sources cited supra note 210.
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under the negligence penalty. In addition, the substantial understatement penalty provided, for the first time, a clear and significant penalty at the lower level of culpability. These features made it a lightning
rod in the coming reform efforts.
C. Post-1989 Penalties
Potential for reform was in the air in the latter 1980s. IMPACT
resulted from a widespread desire for a comprehensive revision
of the civil tax penalty system. In a sense, the Tax Reform Act of
1986214 may have led to the tax penalty revision in 1989. The much
celebrated 1986 reform of the Internal Revenue Code made many
sweeping changes in the substantive tax laws, 215 but largely left tax
penalties, including provisions relating to taxpayer reporting standards, intact.216 The 1986 Act's substantive reforms may have contributed to the felt need for a reevaluation of the penalty system. For
example, substantive reforms such as the passive activity loss provisions 2 7 that were designed to thwart the use of tax shelters addressed
issues that were the targets of some of the newer penalties. Those
who viewed the newer penalties as addressing primarily tax shelter
item reporting may have seen some of those penalties as superfluous
after 1986, since the substantive changes of the 1986 Act made many
tax shelters wholly non-viable. 218 Also, the mere passage of such a
massive set of legislation may also have led to this reassessment. In
any event, the changes to the substantive provisions led naturally to
the question of whether the procedure and penalty sections should be
reformed.
Fundamental rethinking of the penalty system had occurred previously. The amendments in 1918 initially provided much of the modern
1989213

213. Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §
7711, 103 Stat. 2388 (1989) (codified in part relevant to this article at I.R.C. §§ 6662-6664, 6694
(1991)).
214. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
215. For a description of the process and extent of reform, see JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM
& ALAN S.

MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT

Gucci GULCH (1988).

216. Some amendments were made to these provisions, such as the rate of the fraud penalty
and the coverage and definition of the negligence penalty, but the structure and underlying
theories behind the penalty provisions remained largely untouched. For a more complete description of the 1986 changes in the penalty area, see supra text accompanying notes 137-38, 147-48.
217. I.R.C. § 469.
218. Even critics of the 1986 provisions acknowledged some efficacy in the new laws. See
Sandra L. DeGraw, Retributive Justicefor Tax Shelter Investors: The Tax Reform P.A.L., 61
TEMPLE L. REV. 51, 121-22 (1988).
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penalty framework. The initiatives of the early and middle 1980s made
bold advances. The changes had been piecemeal, however, and some
of the reforms did not fit well within an overall plan, except for the
general toughening of penalties in this era. Congress had never undertaken anything so ambitious as the comprehensive look at the penalty
structure that was to come at the end of the 1980s. Cleaning up and
rationalizing the system would be a difficult task.
The reform actually started before the 1989 comprehensive penalty
act was passed. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
eliminated the interest components of the fraud and negligence penalties . 219 This legislative action was clearly part of the simplifying force
that ultimately sustained the 1989 Act. 0
IMPACT 1989, which soon followed, adopted this sort of simplifying
and tidying up approach. The resulting provisions are better organized
even if, in many ways, the final product is less grand than it could
have been. The accuracy and fraud penalties are now organized into
two tiers.-, There is no intermediate tier between the fraud penalty
and the new lower-level "accuracy-related" penalty, which is a slightly
revised collection of the prior lower level penalties. There is little
change in the content of those penalties.
The fraud penalty remained essentially as it had been before the
Act.- The rate remains 75%.2 The taxpayer must disprove the presumption of fraud by a -preponderance of the evidence to any portion
of the understatement once fraud has been proven in general; and,
the former rule requiring the government to prove fraud initially by
clear and convincing evidence is retained.

219. See I.R.C. § 6653(a)-(b) (1988).
220. I.R.C. § 6601(e)(2) provided for accrual of interest on the fraud penalty from the
return due date instead of the usually much later date of assessment, notice and demand.
Congress in 1989 clearly intended to preserve the 1988 interest accrual feature. See H.R. REP.
No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1394 (1989) ("The bill retains the general rule of present law
that interest on these penalties commences with the date the return was required to be filed.").
Although the reference following the 1989 Act is less direct, I.R.C. § 6601(e)(2) still makes this
provision for early interest by referring to "part II of subchapter A of chapter 68," which
consists of I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6663 and 6664, which are the accuracy-related penalty, fraud penalty,
and definition sections. I.R.C. § 6601(e)(2) (1989).
221. I.R.C. §§ 6662-6663; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652, 654.
222. I.R.C. § 6662; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652-54.
223. I.R.C. § 6663 (applying 75% penalty rate to portion of underpayment attributable to
fraud); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 651, 654; 1989 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET,
supra note 2, at 6, 8.
224. I.R.C. § 6663; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 651, 654.
225. I.R.C. § 6663; H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 7, at 1392.
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The lower level penalty is now called the "accuracy-related penalty,"' 2 but it largely represents old concepts. It combines with some
modifications the pre-1989 negligence,22 substantial understatement,8
and valuation penalties.229 If one or more of those provisions are
triggered there is one 20% penalty on the underpayment attributable

to those conditions.2 0
The cleanup of the penalty provisions, which was suggested almost
universally in some form, occurred in the unification of the lower level
penalties and their relation to the fraud penalty. Only one 20% penalty
can apply to an understatement even though the provision contains
the several former lower level penalties in one section. This differs
from the prior law which had permitted the stacking of the negligence
and substantial understatement penalties.22 1 Also, the new unified accuracy-related penalty applies only if the fraud penalty is not imposed
on that portion of the underpayment,2 2 so that the possibility of stacking has been removed. The penalties do not overlap in what was
arguably a confusing manner. Of course, this elimination of stacking
also means that the total penalty amount in some cases will be less
than if more than one penalty could be imposed as in the 1980s.
The waiver provision that applies to all these penalties now provides that no penalty "shall be imposed ... if it is shown that there
was a reasonable cause for such [underpayment] and that the taxpayer

226. I.R.C. § 6662; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652. See infra notes 451-52
and accompanying text.

227. Negligence or disregard of rules or regulations triggers the penalty. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).
This includes "any failure to make a reasonable effort to comply" and "any careless, reckless,
or intentional disregard." Id. § 6662(c). This language tracks the prior definition of negligence.
1989 JoINT COMItITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 7. The 1989 Act repealed the presumption
of negligence from failure to follow information returns. Id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra
note 7, at 653.
228. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2)(d); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652, 653. This
penalty rate was lowered from 25% under prior law to 20% in line with the other accuracy
related penalties in the lower tier. Id. at 653; 1989 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note
2, at 7.
229. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(3)-(5), (e); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 653. These
provisions are triggered by generally the same conduct as before. See I.R.C. § 6659 (1981)
(repealed 1989); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 653; supra notes 176-79 and
accompanying text. However, § 6662(b)(3) extends to all taxpayers, and the breakpoints for
valuation penalties are changed. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 653-54; 1989 JOINT
CO[mIrTrEE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 8.
230. See I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 655 (stacking
eliminated); 1989 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMfPHLET, supra note 2, at 7.
231. I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652.
232. I.R.C. § 6662(b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652, 654.
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acted in good faith with respect to such [underpayment]. "2 The legislative history makes clear that the Service's discretion in imposing
this penalty will now be much more restricted than it had been previously.- The Chief Judge of the Tax Court opined at the hearings that
this provision called for a judicial review of a penalty's assertion without abuse of discretion insulation.m This overlay which applies generally to the "accuracy-related penalties" appears effectively to convert
6
the former no-fault penalties into fault-based penalties.2
D.

The Sum of the 1980s and the History of Penalties

The 1989 Act represents a retreat from positions taken during
times of greater perceived crises when Congress and the country felt
extraordinary threats and reacted accordingly.- 7 The decade of the
1980s saw tremendous change and finally vacillation on penalties. Penalty rates went up. No-fault penalties made their appearance. The
current relaxation lies in the reduced penalty amounts and the erosion
of the more strict standard that originally existed under the no-fault
penalties.

233. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).
234. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 7, at 1393; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7,
at 664.
235. 1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 250 (statement of Judge Arthur L. Nims III).
The judge stated that in the interest of fairness, the court was willing to undertake this additional
burden. Id.; see 1989 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 8 ("standardized waiver
criteria ... designed to permit the courts to review the assertion of penalties under the same
standards that apply in reviewing additional tax that the Internal Revenue Service asserts is
due").
236. See H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 7, at 1392-93 (referring to standard exception as
the "standard of behavior that is required"). The members of the bar urged that this conclusion
be made even more explicit. 1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 302 (statement of Muller);
id. at 291 (statement of Saltzman).
237. One might ask whether in 1989 the crises that had prompted the wave of penalties in
the early 1980s had abated. Taxpayer compliance has been a major topic throughout the 1980s.
The ABA Compliance Commission in 1987 observed that compliance was generally constant
proportionally between 1973 and 1981, but in that period the nominal and real noncompliance
rose. ABA Compliance Commission Report, supra note 4, at 334. The Service has judged that
the 1986 legitimate "tax gap" approximated $100 billion. Id. It has also concluded that the
majority of errors resulted in income underreporting. Id. The ABA Commission stated that
"[t]his trend suggests that more and more taxpayers are deliberately understating their tax
liabilities even though the proportional dollar amounts have remained relatively constant." Id.
at 335. Since both the Commission and the Service concluded that uncertainty about the proper
tax treatment of items were relatively unimportant, intentional tax cheating seems to be at the
core of this growth in the tax gap unless some other reason exists to expect increased negligent
noncompliance. Id. at 335 n.6, 339.
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These developments are consistent with the established pattern.
Penalties are to a large extent strengthened and weakened because
of political or social forces or current phenomena without regard to
the general theoretical desirability of the changes. To be sure, Congress added desirable refinements, such as the more precise use of
interest concepts and the elimination of overlapping penalties. But the
selection of rates, standard of reporting, and other features seem to
depend as much on a sense of crisis justifying strong measures because
of external forces challenging the tax system as on the theory behind
the penalties.
Numerous standards have served as the trigger for the penalty
provisions. In each case there has been what might be viewed as later
erosion. There have been a proliferation of standards: fraud, negligence, and substantial authority. Each was restricted by judicial interpretation or congressional intervention after its advent. Moreover,
none has ever been completely satisfactory in terms of setting the
minimum desirable normative standard for return positions.
The amounts and bases of the penalty rates have varied widely.
The fraud rate has been 100% of the tax, double the tax evaded, 50%
of the underpayment, and 75% of the underpayment attributable to
fraud, both with and without an interest penalty component. The base
has shrunk from the entire tax to the portion of the underpayment
attributable to fraud. The negligence penalty has had a similar if less
dramatic history. To be sure, some changes were desirable refinements, but ultimately the refining also reduced the penalty. Instead
of the burdensome penalties bemoaned by the bar, the tax penalties
in 1989 actually were in line with the tax penalties throughout history.
In a rough way, the institution of penalties and the adjustment of
standards and rates tend to reflect the feeling of the times regarding
financial needs and the need to take taxes seriously. Congress instituted the fraud and negligence penalties during wars. It cut the rates
on fraud and negligence after World War I. The rise and fall of no-fault
penalties in the 1980s have similar features. Innovations in penalties
occur because of a crisis. As the crisis abates, the forces of erosion
emerge. Moreover, this pattern is consistent with the pattern relating
to compliance measures in a broader sense.m

238. Wage withholding began during World War II with the Current Tax Payment Act of
1943, ch. 120, § 2, 57 Stat. 126. See Stark Report, supra note 6, at V-2 n.3. A logical extension

of the withholding concept to interest and dividends was attempted in the early 1980s, but
popular protest led to the repeal of interest and dividend withholding in 1983. Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248 § 301, 96 Stat. 324, 576. Instead, Congress

instituted a diluted form of withholding known as "backup withholding" that must be triggered
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For years, Congress, the Service, and the bar have debated penalties. This protracted discussion follows more than a century of experience with the penalty system. The continuing debate can be traced,
in part, to the surprising narrowness of clear theoretical support for
tax penalties. Among the justifications usually relied upon for penalties
in various contexts, none will support a complete or broad structure
of civil tax penalties. Each justification has very significant weaknesses
in the tax penalty context so that the extent to which the justification
can be used is questionable. When these observations are joined with
the historical contempt in which taxes have been held in this country,
the difficulty in achieving a stable and fully satisfying set of civil tax
penalties that does more than merely nick the really bad actors is
clear. A study of the potential and limits of such justifications in the
tax penalty context explains a great deal about the degree of conflict
and the length of the debate over civil tax penalties.
III.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CIVIL TAX PENALTIES

Tax penalties have risen and fallen seemingly almost randomly
because the common penalty justifications- 9 supply limited or incomplete support to tax penalty systems. Aside from some clear cases,
we encounter political and social pressure concerning the kind, amount
and scope of sanctions that may be enacted. In unclear situations, the
penalties vacillate for lack of direction and register a marginal or
ineffective presence. In addition, some justifications will support only
part of a tax penalty system. The difficulty of providing a theoretical
justification for tax penalties suggests that a more effective tax penalty
system that is designed to accomplish something of importance should
draw from more than one justification. Each justification can support
only a portion of a system. If the system is to cover a wide range,
more than one justification should be consulted.
To demonstrate these conclusions relating to the theoretical bases
of tax penalties, this section will deal separately with each of the

by taxpayer understatements. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, §§ 301-303, 96 Stat. 324, 576-87, repealed by Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance
Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 102, 104, 97 Stat. 369-80 (repealing withholding and enacting
backup withholding).
239. The goals of various punishments are often discussed as 'theories of punishment"
though they are simply justifications of punishment. Herbert L.A. Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 433, 446-47 (1957)

("major positions concerning punishment ... are moral claims as to what justifies the practice
of punishment - claims as to why, morally, it should or may be used").
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principal justifications for civil penalties.2A° Each subsection will explain
first the basic concepts of a penalty rationale. Second, it will relate
the rationale to the tax context. Finally, it will conclude by noting

problems with using that justification in the tax penalty context.
A. Punishment
Punishment is the most common justification for tax penalties.
Punishment serves two purposes: retribution and deterrence.1 These
rationales focus on distinctly different concerns and each presents

some substantial problems in its application to the civil tax penalty
context.
1. Retribution
Retribution looks backward. It justifies punishment by the nature
of the offense that has been committed.24 The notion of "just desert"

received by the offender undergirds the retributory concept.m This

24
notion is based on the culpable nature of the actor's wrongful conduct.
The degree of punishment must be proportioned to the offense, 2 and
the limits of punishment are determined by whether the punishment
is "fair."' 2A The actor's conduct determines the appropriate punishment
and if the punishment fits the act, the actor receives "just desert."
Under the retributive rationale, forward-looking concerns, such as
the correction of the actor's or other actors' future conduct, are irrele-

240. Penalties will almost certainly raise revenue. Raising revenue is not a theoretical
justification for penalties, and this article will not discuss it as such. If revenues are to be
raised, we should do the honest thing by raising tax rates or broadening the tax base. See
Stark Report, supra note 6, at 11-3.
241. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 439 (1989) ("punishment serves the twin aims
of retribution and deterrence. . . . [A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve
a remedial purpose, but rather can be explained only as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term."); HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 26 (1968) ("Punishment. . . has one or
both of two justifying aims: the prevention of undesired conduct, and retribution for perceived
wrongdoing.").
242. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 416-17 (1978).
243. See id. at 415; Note, Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through CriminalSanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (1979).
244. See C.W.K. Mundle, Punishment and Desert, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT
65, 70-71 (H. Acton ed. 1969); Anthony M. Quinton, On Punishment, in id. at 55-57.
245. See FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 416.
246. Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 71 (1985) ("[i]n the case of retribution fairness and
desert delimit the -proper scope of punitive sanctions").
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vant. Punishment is viewed as "a fitting social response to the commission of the crime," regardless of any consequences (although "desirable
consequences may follow" as "incidental benefits").- 7 Punishment,
thus, might be desirable even if no other support for a penalty is
offered.? 8 Retribution "justifies punishment as of the moment that the
punishment is imposed." 9 Future good, such as reduced number of
offenses, need not come from it.- If the actor receives a just desert,
the retributory concept is satisfied.
Retribution, however, has a severe limit in its applicability, and
that limit is very important in the civil tax penalty context. Retribution
supports punishment for wrongful conduct which is unjustifiable.-,
Indeed, it has been argued that only if we are willing to classify
something as criminal should we say it requires the support of the
retributory justification.22 Because of the overtones of morality in its
use, retribution usually has no role in a civil penalty scheme because
civil penalties generally do not implicate such conduct.- Thus, in order
for the retributive rationale to play a role in the civil tax penalty
system, the conduct serving as the basis of the penalty must be clearly
reprehensible.
This limit leaves very little room in the tax context. Criminal
penalties represent a moral judgment that the taxpayer who is crim-

FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 415.
248. See PACKER, supra note 241, at 38 ("The criminal is to be punished simply because
he has committed a crime. . . . [I]t is right for punishment to be inflicted on persons who
commit crimes.").
249. FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 417.
250. See id.
251. See Mundle, supra note 244, at 71; Quinton, supra note 244, at 55, 58-59.
252. Jonathan I. Charney, The Need for ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Defendants in Civil
Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 509 (1974) ("Because retribution is the essence of
the criminal action, any loss inflicted on that basis must be classified as a criminal sanction.").
Cf. Stark Report, supra note 6, at 11-4 ("If punishment of noncompliance is ever an independent
goal, the criminal sanctions of the Code are the place for such a purpose to be implemented.").
253. Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1456 n.136 (1979); Furlough O'Brien, Comment, The Use of Civil Penalties in Enforcing the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, 12
U.S.F.L. REV. 437, 445 (1978) (civil penalties can serve deterrence and compensation functions
rather than retribution). Professor Diver noted that:
Retribution ... [is] ... sometimes invoked as [a justification] for legal sanctions,
but [it was] not particularly relevant to [this] discussion [of civil penalties]. "Retribution," as a concept distinct from deterrence, is likely to be implicated only by
offenses against society's most fundamental moral convictions. The conduct punishable by civil monetary penalties usually does not have that character.
Diver, supra, at 1456-57 n.136.
247.
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inally punished did something morally wrong.2- Extension of the criminal sanctions to acts in which morality is not an issue can undermine
compliance with and respect for the law.2 Tax reporting offenses,
although they have come a long way in the last few decades, are still
a relatively new criminal area. Little moral force operates against tax
crimes.2 Tax offenses, like many instances of violations of "economic
regulations" and unlike more "traditional property offenses," do not
draw naturally the reprobation of the populace. 7 In the tax context
the limit of such moral force has been recognized by coupling the
underreporting of tax to the taxpayer's intent. The tax system has

254. See Richard C. Fuller, Morals and the CriminalLaw, 32 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
624, 624 (1942) ("a criminal statute is simply the formal embodiment of someone's moral values
(usually the group dominant in political authority) in an official edict, reinforced with an official
penal sanction"). Attaching "community condemnation" to a criminal conviction distinguishes
the criminal sanction from the civil sanction. See Herbert L.A. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404-05 (1958); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
423, 437 (1963). Professor Hart wrote that "a sanction which ineradicably imports blame, both
traditionally and in most of its current applications, is misused when it is thus applied to conduct
which is not blameworthy." Hart, supra, at 405 n.13. Thus, to declare an act criminal, 'It is
necessary to be able to say in good conscience i each instance in which a criminal sanction is
imposed for a violation of law that the violation was blameworthy and, hence, deserving of the
moral condemnation of the community." Id. at 412.
255. PACKER, supra note 241, at 65, 359 (arguing that "moral outrage" should be a requirement of making an act criminal, and failure to limit the reach of criminal sanctions to "blameworthy" acts undercuts compliance with the law).
256. See Kadish, supranote 254, at 423, 439-40. Only a little over four decades ago, it was
declared that "[tihere is not behind the taxing laws, as there is behind laws against crime, an
independent moral obligation." HERMANN MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 146 (1946) (quoting Lord Quickswood in letter to The Times, Feb. 20, 1943).
The large increase in criminal laws has come precisely in an area of behavior where
there is no cohesive public opinion branding the conduct as immoral. . . . Even
more recently the great depression facilitated new definitions of offenses in tax
...
laws ....
Such social legislation,... opposed in principle by powerful business
groups, .... gives rise to an entirely new sphere of criminal behavior.
Fuller, supra note 254, at 624, 627. Only a little over two decades ago, a "tax evasion prosecution"
was viewed as "still something of a special case [even though] . . . the tax evasion conviction
[had become] a sanction of some consequence." Kadish, supra note 254, at 439-40.
One might ask why that should be so, other than the fact that most offences are relatively
recent innovations, since a forceful analogy can be made between tax fraud and traditional
property offenses such as theft and forgery. See Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View,
17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 202-06 (1965); Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or
Reality?, 43 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 176, 184 (1952).
257. See Kadish, supra note 254, at 423, 424-26.
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required that the prohibited criminal act be done willfully,ne constituting an "intentional violation of a known legal duty."' 9 Of the civil tax
penalties, the only one turning upon the equivalent of willfulness is
the civil fraud penalty.26
This requirement severely limits the scope of cases to which the
retributory rationale might apply in the tax context. Willfulness will
not be present in numerous cases involving a lesser degree of tax
26
chiseling, so only the most culpable will be reached by such sanctions. 1
For political as well as theoretical reasons the tax crimes will not
likely be extended to conduct involving reckless or negligent action.2

258. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (tax evasion - 5 years and/or $100,000); I.R.C. § 7202 (willful
failure to pay - 5 years and/or $10,000); I.R.C. § 7203 (willful failure to file return, supply
information or pay tax - 1 year and/or $25,000); I.R.C. § 7206(1) (false statement in return or
other document verified under penalty of perjury - 3 years and/or $100,000); I.R.C. § 7207
(delivery or disclosure of false document - 1 year and/or $10,000).
259. See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412
U.S. 346, 360 (1973); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942); Kadish, supra note
254, at 428; Hart, supra note 254, at 418.
260. See MORGAN, supra note 204, at 157-62.
261. The Revenue Act of 1924 constituted an attempt to expand the use of the criminal
sanction in the tax context as it upgraded tax evasion from a misdemeanor to a felony and the
maximum prison term from one to five years. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1017, 43 Stat.
253, 343-44. These general penalties set forth criminal sanctions applicable to duties under the
entire act. A willful failure to pay taxes, make returns, keep records, or supply information
could result in a conviction of a misdemeanor and result in a fine of up to $10,000 and/or
imprisonment up to one year. Id. § 1017(a). A willful failure to collect, account for or pay over
tax and willful attempts to evade or defeat tax held the possibility of conviction of a felony and
a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years, together with the costs of
prosecution. Id. § 1017(b). Willful aiding and assisting or advising in preparing or presenting
false or fraudulent returns or other documents authorized or required by the internal revenue
laws carried the same penalties. Id. § 1017(c).
Use of the criminal sanctions has always been rather limited. The early use of the criminal
sanctions consisted of prosecution of noted underworld figures. PACKER, supra note 241, at
357 (During most of the first 40 years of tax felonies, "criminal enforcement was sporadic, being
reserved essentially as an aid to the civil recovery of taxes due and as a means of prosecuting
racketeers and other 'public enemies."'); see, e.g., THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount 1988).
Reforms in the early 1950s extended the potential of these sanctions to more general use and
deterrence. See PACKER, supranote 241, at 357 ("Beginning in 1952 a new policy of across-theboard criminal enforcement was inaugurated by the Tax Division of the Department of Justice.");
Kadish, supra note 254, at 439. See generallyJoseph H. Murphy, CriminalIncome Tax Evasion,
48 Nw. U.L. REV. 317 (1953) (describing various administrative and other reforms of that era).
The use of criminal sanctions has never been widespread or frequent. By 1986, the number of
criminal cases prosecuted numbered only 2726. I.R.S. COMM'R & CHIEF COUNS. 1986 ANN.
REP. 35.
262. Under the authorities requiring the actor to be blameworthy before being subject to
the criminal sanctions, a reckless actor can be culpable. Hart, supra note 254, at 416, 418
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For these reasons, the retributory rationale offers little assistance
in designing a civil tax penalty system. The willfulness requirement
severely limits the number of cases implicated. Since the civil fraud
penalty currently exists, the retributive rationale may shed some light
on the potential amendment of that penalty within the system, as
discussed below. However, the retributive justification will shed little
light on the lower-level accuracy penalties that complete the system
of tax penalties. The tremendous drain of resources in proving willfulness further limits the number of such cases that can be pursued.
This means that only the very bad actors can be reached by a retributive justification. The civil tax system obviously needs a broader de-

sign.
2. Deterrence
As mentioned above, punishment also includes the concept commonly described by the short-hand term "deterrence. ''2 3 The aim of
deterrence is "the prevention of undesired conduct, '' 2 64 in either the

(stating that "[i]f an individual knowingly takes a risk of a kind which the community condemns
as plainly unjustifiable, then he is morally blameworthy and can properly be adjudged a criminal,"
and that the requirement of "willfulness" or "culpable awareness," "knowing or reckless," of
law and facts resolves the problem of applying criminal law to conduct not viewed as "wrongful
in itself'). Given the antipathy that tax penalties typically provoke, it is very doubtful whether
society would be willing to condemn recklessness in tax reporting as plainly unjustifiable and
subject to such sanctions. See Michael J. Graetz & James A. Wilde, The Economics of Tax
Compliance: Fact and Fantasy, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 355, 358 (1985) ("Moreover, no criminal
sanction (nor even a substantial civil 'fraud' penalty) can be imposed absent satisfactory proof
that the tax understatement was willful.").
There is a debate about whether criminal penalties generally can be applied based on strict
liability or negligence, but the better view probably is that using the criminal sanction is
inappropriate in such cases. See Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From
Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 633 (1963); Hart, supra note 254, at 421-23. But see
Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the CriminalLaw, 12 STAN. L. REv. 731, 734-41
(1960) (offering arguments in favor of strict liability offenses).
263. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 439 (1989). Professor Diver preferred to
use the term "motivation" rather than "deterrence" when speaking of civil penalties:
Because of its association with criminal law, however, the term "deterrence" has
acquired in the minds of many a wholly prohibitory connotation not necessarily
appropriate in the civil regulatory context. Much modern regulation ... is essentially affirmative in operation; that is, it seeks to stimulate discrete forms of beneficial behavior more than to prevent isolated instances of harmful behavior.
Diver, supra note 253, at 1456 n.133. Dean Calabresi contrasted the general deterrence effects
of tort law as opposed to specific deterrence. For him deterrence may include affirmative as
well as prohibitory conduct. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94 (1970).
264. PACKER, supra note 241, at 26; Diver, supra note 253, at 1455-56.
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general or specific sense. 2- It is a progressive or "forward-looking"
concept that generally asks what may be accomplished by punishment. 26 Compared to retribution, it has been seen as an attractive
'
rationale,267
although commentators have long noted doubts regarding
the ability of sanctions to cause compliance in many contexts.2

265. Deterrence is used in both a specific and a general sense. General deterrence refers
to the discouragement to commit an offense that others receive when an offender is punished.
Those others are less likely to violate the standard set by the punishment. See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV.949, 949-54 (1966);
Andenaes, supra note 256, at 179-80; CALABRESI, supra note 263, at 21 n.4; Diver, supra note
253, at 1455-56; FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 414 (discussing this effect of criminal sanctions);
PACKER, supra note 241, at 39. Apparently general deterrence by government is sometimes
discussed under the heading of "regulation" that is defined as "the control of future conduct for
general purposes excluding the interests of private beneficiaries. It is public rather than private."
PACKER, supra note 241, at 24. Specific deterrence refers to the decreased likelihood that the
punished offender will again commit the same offense. CALABRESI, supra note 263, at 21 n.4;
Diver, supra note 253, at 1435, 1455-56; FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 414; PACKER, supra
note 241, at 39. For the most part, discussions of deterrence in terms of effectiveness of a
penalty focus on its effectiveness as a general deterrent.
266. FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 414-16; PACKER, supra note 241, at 11 ("retributive
view is essentially backward-looking" and "utilitarian view is forward-looking" as "it assesses
punishment in terms of its propensity to modify the future behavior of the criminal and ... of
others who might be tempted to commit crimes"). Cf. Hart, supra note 254, at 409 (referring
to the "grim negativism . . . of the criminal law when it is considered simply as a means of
preventing undesired behavior").
267. PACKER, supra note 2,41,
at 39 ("utilitarian or preventive position" in contrast to
retribution "has considerable appeal").
268. Kadish, supra note 254, at 423. Professor Kadish noted that the lack of progress in
this area is shown by the occupation of the leading place in this field of eighteenth century
works by Jeremy Bentham. See generally JEREMIAS BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

(J.H. Burns ed. 1970) (1st ed. London 1789). The

deterrent aim may be generally regarded as particularly speculative in terms of effectiveness,
for crimes of impulse or passion. FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 414-16; PACKER, supra note
241, at 40-41; Hart, supra note 254, at 409 (referring to the "frequent seeming futility of the
criminal law when it is considered simply as a means of preventing undesired behavior" as
"many crimes ... are undeterrable"); see Andenaes, supra note 256, at 180-81 (noting the lack
of efficacy and measurability of deterrence).
The ability of sanctions to achieve general deterrence is often doubted as a general matter,
although "jurists" seem to regard it favorably, and some are inclined to say that it alone is the
reason for punishment. Id. at 176.-77 (observing that one can "often note great skepticism toward
the belief in general prevention" and relating others' descriptions of it as "a figment of the
imagination" and "essentially fictitious concept"). This belief may be founded on the tendency
of lawyers to treat issues in an overly rational manner, ignoring the "irrational factors" affecting
behavior. Id. at 178. Professor Andenaes wrote that:
The lawyer . . . often has little psychological insight and little acquaintance with
the sort of persons who most frequently come into conflict with the law. So he
can easily lose sight of the irrational factors in human motivation and construct
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Despite the doubts, the theory of deterrence continues to play a
central role in penalty discussions. The "all but universal judgment,
past and present, of manldnd" 26 9 holds that persons who are not disposed ordinarily to commit offenses will be deterred from such acts
by sanctions. Although the deterrent model of punishment does not
cover or explain all cases, it does give "us a hold on a piece of reality"
and offers a logical relation of punishment to a purpose. 0 The various
uses to which the concept of deterrence might be put, however, has
unusual or added difficulties in the tax context.
a. Economic Deterrence
Monetary penalties logically might serve as an economic deterrent
to the commission of an offense. We would have to be able to cause
the offender to bear the burden of the penalty and convince the courts
to impose it for the penalties to be effective.- This basic concept of
economic deterrence is also a familiar and popular one.272
While criminal sanctions might deter tax cheating, civil penalties
offer some advantages. The "cumbersome" process of utilizing criminal
sanctions has discouraged their use and shifted focus on civil penalties
as "enforcement" tools. 3 Law and economics scholars prefer civil
penalties and fines to imprisonment because they are more economically efficient. 2 4 Putting offenders in prison does not produce economic
goods and imposes costs on society; imprisonment is therefore not
desirable from this standpoint. 275

psychologically superficial explanations, based on a view that crime grows out of
conscious, rational consideration as to what is most profitable. Such reasoning leads
naturally to [a] formula of psychological coercion: the risk for the lawbreaker must
be made so great, the punishment so severe, that he knows he has more to lose
than he has to gain from his crime.
Id. at 178-79.

Deterrence is also somewhat unsatisfying since punishing the innocent may achieve the same
results. FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 415.
269. Hart, supra note 254, at 409.
270. PACKER, supra note 241, at 41. "Bentham gave us a hold on a piece of reality. That

hold should not be abandoned simply because it is partial, especially if one concludes that
completed views of reality are unattainable." Id.
271. See Kadish, supra note 254, at 434-35.
272. Diver, supra note 253, at 1463. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF
LAw 201-27 (3d ed. 1986).
273. Diver, supra note 253, at 1436.
274. POSNER, supra note 272, at 209.
275. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.

ECON. 169, 180 (1968). Judge Posner argues that: "From an economic standpoint, the use of
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Economic deterrence applies expected-value analysis. The penalty
amount discourages noncompliant conduct. If an offense is made so
costly, in light of the penalty amount and chances of detection, that
the expected sanction negates the economic benefits of the offense as
well as discourages its commission, the penalty will deter potential
violators. Thus, if the cost of tax cheating or chiseling could be raised
to outweigh the benefits of such activity, a taxpayer motivated by
economic concerns might be less inclined to consider that activity
attractive and would not pursue it in a system with monetary penalties
or fines of a sufficient size to discourage noncompliance in light of the
'
chance of detection. ?76
The overriding limit on economic deterrence as a justifying
rationale for a penalty is whether a measure designed as a deterrent
actually works to discourage the undesirable behavior.27 Since application of a penalty imposes costs on society, those costs must be
balanced by positive effects accruing to society as conduct is altered
in response to the monetary sanction. However, the discouragement
should be "optimal" and should not over-deter, or alter nonobjectionable conduct. 278 In the tax context, this might involve expenditure of
excessive amounts of time and resources in return preparation and
perhaps needless overreporting.
Accordingly, the level of the sanctions must adjust generally to
achieve the regulatory purpose within limits. The existing empirical

fines should be encouraged relative to imprisonment. Not only does imprisonment generate no
revenue for the state, as fines do. but the social costs of imprisonment exceed those of collecting
fines from solvent defendants." POSNER, supra note 272, at 209; see also Ausness, supra note
246, at 72 n.495. This suggestion is made despite the recognition that it is not always possible
to argue for monetary penalties of sufficient severity to deter offenders to the same degree as
would criminal punishment. See POSNER, supra note 272, at 210 ("[substituting fines for jail
terms] might of course require much higher fines than we have been accustomed to - although
times are changing").
276. The expected benefit analysis of a taxpayer contemplating cheating in light of economic
deterrents has been succinctly stated as follows:
The expected benefit to the taxpayer of noncompliance equals the value of failing
to pay tax without detection, minus the chance of being caught times the perceived
costs, if caught. An increase in the probability of detecting noncompliance or an
increase in the level of the potential penalty imposed generally will raise the
incentive for compliance. The deterrent effect of penalties is therefore integrally
related to both the likelihood of detection and the severity of the penalties.
1988 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 17.
277. Ausness, supra note 246, at 71.
278. Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairnessand Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1982); Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of
Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 135 & n.9 (1982).
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evidence suggests that the magnitude of the penalty has high importance in deterrence. 279 If the level is set too low, then the penalty will
not deter the undesirable conduct.28 Generally, elimination of the gain
from cheating will not be sufficient to achieve compliance. The cost
to a detected tax chiseler, including the payment of taxes plus the
penalty must, assuming risk neutrality, be at least that benefit multiplied by the reciprocal of the likelihood of punishment so the expected
value of cheating is either zero or a negative figure.281 This expected
value analysis requires a very severe penalty to deter all offenses.
However, the size of the penalty, as discussed above, may be restricted
out of concerns of overdeterring nonobjectionable conduct since socially
desirable conduct may also be deterred on the margin as persons
attempt to avoid accidently violating the law.2 Thus, the concept of
economic deterrence does not involve a simple or mechanical calculation
of probabilities and penalty amounts. Some slippage in compliance
seems contemplated within that model.
Economic deterrence has long played a role in the system of civil
tax penalties. The Supreme Court in an early case observed that the
civil fraud penalty constituted a "safeguard for the protection of the
revenue. '" In the early 1980s, given the "no-fault" nature of the
overvaluation and substantial understatement penalties, those penalties principally supplied a financial motivation to provide an accurate
tax return. The economic deterrence rationale supported enactment
of these penalty provisions.2 The 1989 Act's platform of encouraging
voluntary compliance naturally drew upon the economic deterrence
theory, and some of the comments in the 1989 hearings acknowledged
this by asserting that the penalty rates in the bill were substantial
deterrents.2
But economic deterrence from civil tax penalties remains subject
to significant question. A large number of recent studies, including

279. Diver, supra note 253, at 1463.
280. Id. at 1458.
281. Id. at 1467. See POSNER, supra note 272, at 204-07. Measuring the costs, benefits,
and chances of detection is probably impossible, even though one can reasonably estimate the

factors to make the economic cost-benefit analysis work out. Diver, supra note 253, at 1467.
282.
283.
284.

See POSNER, supra note 272, at 206-07; Diver, supra note 253, at 1458.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
See Graetz & Wilde, supranote 262, at 355. As Graetz and Wilde observed: "Not only

were the 1981 and 1982 legislative enactments consistent with the basic posture of the economics
literature, but the 1982 committee reports seem also explicitly to embrace the economic model,

describing the tax collection process as a 'tax or audit lottery' where citizens are assumed to
endeavor to optimize outcomes." Id.
285. 1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 250.
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empirical studies, concentrate on the deterrent effect of tax penalties.2 6 This body of work largely analyzes compliance from an economic
perspective. 8 7 Nevertheless, the theoretical modeling has been
adapted inadequately to the problem,- and the results of empirical
studies have not been dispositive.8 9
Very general conclusions, perhaps obvious, seem possible at this
point. The compliance models typically include the size of the sanction
or penalty rate together with the probability of detection. Taxpayers
surveyed also generally affirmed the relevance of these factors. In
overwhelming numbers, those surveyed agreed that a heightened
chance of detection and an increase in penalty amounts discourage
noncompliance. 29 , Thus, these studies suggest that deterrence should
play a part in encouraging compliance through the use of civil penalties.292

Moving beyond these generalities, however, presents difficulties.
The results of empirical studies on the economic effects of penalties
has not been regarded as even approaching the final word on the
subject. 29 3 For example, some empirical research suggested, remarka-

bly, that the likelihood of imposition of the civil fraud penalty negatively affects compliance. 2 m Notwithstanding the voluminous research

286. Kent W. Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, UnderstandingTaxpaying Behavior:A Conceptual
Framework With Implicationsfor Research, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 639, 641 (1987) ("[d]eterrence
theory has been the primary theoretical framework applied to tax cheating").
287. Graetz & Wilde, supra note 262, at 355. The economic analyses of compliance problems
grow chiefly from a single landmark article. Id. at 357. Professor Becker observed generally
that as sanctions and apprehension increase, criminals are discouraged from noncompliant behavior. Becker, supra note 275, at 169.
288. Graetz & Wilde, supra note 262, at 357-59 ("too simple").
289. Karyl A. Kinsey, Theories and Models of Tax Cheating, 18 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS
403 (1986); Smith & Kinsey, supra note 286, at 639.
290. See Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, What We Know About the FactorsAffecting
Compliancewith the Tax Laws, in ABA Compliance ConferenceReport, supranote 4, at 133.
291. ABA Compliance Commission Report, supra note 4, at 348 n.23.
292. Id.; see Graetz & Wilde, supra note 262, at 355; Betty R. Jackson & Valerie C.
Milliron, Tax Compliance Research: Findings, Problems and Prospects, 5 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 125 (1986); Kinsey, supra note 289, at 403; Smith & Kinsey, supra note 286, at 639; Witte
& Woodbury, supra note 290, at 131.
293. Kinsey, supra note 289, at 420.
294. See Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 1,
8 (1985). The authors explain these results by noting that they "suspect that the imposition of
civil fraud penalties are little known by the public at large since, by law the imposition of such
penalties cannot be publicized." Id. at 8. For the pertinent restrictions on Service disclosure of
taxpayer return information, see I.R.C. § 6103(a), (b)(2)(A) (including examinations resulting
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on the subject, the scientific knowledge about tax compliance as a
result of these studies still draws the critical label "primitive."- 5 Thus,
it seems unwise to attempt to build an entire penalty scheme around
economic deterrence, even if we acknowledge that civil penalties must
have some deterrent effect.
Beyond the theoretical uncertainties in the research, application

of the economic deterrence concept to the tax penalty system presents
some practical difficulties. Generally, there is a very low expected
cost to chiseling in the tax context. The number of tax returns received
by the government is tremendous; more than one hundred million
individual returns were filed for 1986.2 The Service can examine only
a minute fraction of such returns given the limited resources devoted

to the audit function.2

The portion of returns audited is generally

near 1% to 2%, and in 1989 dropped below 1%. These low percentages
provide a far too small possibility of detection to give deterrence a

significant chance of making an impact.m Given the remote chance of
exposure coupled with modest penalty rates, deterrence has little substance especially since often the taxpayer's intent or level of care

might not be provable.m

in liabilities for penalties). For a collection of cases including some expressing a surprisingly
broad restriction against Service disclosure of return information even after information can be
found in public records following judicial proceedings, see BI'rKER & MCMAHON, supra note
151,
40.3, at 40-27 n.106.
295. Jackson & Milliron, supra note 292, at 156.
296. ABA Compliance Commission Report, supra note 4, at 334 (stating that 101.8 million
individual returns were filed in 1986).
297. Graetz & Wilde, supra note 262, at 358.
298. Id.; R. Eliot Rosen, Graetz Urges More IRS Audits; PetersonOutlines Justice Dept.
Goals, 48 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 804, 804 (Aug. 13, 1990) (remarks of Deputy Assistant
Treasury Secretary Michael J. Graetz).
299. In addition, economists considering penalties treat intent as irrelevant. See Becker,
supra note 275, at 194. However, tax penalties are keyed to intent or care. This means that
proof of intent must also enter the calculus, and some tax chiselers cannot be penalized. Graetz
& Wilde, supra note 262, at 358. Imposition of the monetary penalties that follow criminal
offenses or a civil fraud depends upon proof of scienter such that mere errors in judgment and
differences of opinion will not result in that penalty. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10,
11-12 (1976); Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943); Stoltzfus v. United States, 398
F.2d 1002, 1004 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1020 (1969); Webb v. Commissioner, 394
F.2d 366, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1968); Olinger v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 823, 824 (5th Cir. 1956);
Mitchell v.. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941). The issues are essentially the same
for a tax evasion offense and the civil fraud penalty. See McGee v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d
1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Estate of Adame v. Commissioner,
320 F.2d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 1963). That proof is further complicated by the taxpayer's potential
defense of reliance on an advisor as to the propriety of the return. United States v. Conforte,
624 F.2d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v. Mitchell,
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Some prominent writers have recommended that monetary sanctions generally should replace the use of imprisonment. 3°° But for the
monetary tax penalties to have a substantial deterrent effect in replacing the criminal sanction of incarceration, the civil penalty amounts
must greatly increase.301 An adequate increase to accomplish that result given the difficulties of detection in the tax context is not socially
or politically possible and the historical range of tax penalty amounts
would probably hinder an increase after some point. The difficulties
noted above cannot be solved by a simple increase in penalty rates
to a level high enough to offset the low audit rate.
And there are futher difficulties. The Service estimated that the
penalty rate needed to achieve deterrence given the low audit rate
would be at least 4900%; the Service declined to pursue a strict
"economic analysis" and recommend such higher rates.30 2 Penalty provisions cannot be structured out of proportion to the nature of the
offense. At some point short of the 4900% rate, a fairness or proportionality constraint would be invoked to limit the size of the penalty.
If the negligence penalty contained a penalty rate of 200% of all the
tax required to be shown on the tax return, some taxpayers might
be more careful, but the enormity of the penalty might also impair
the chance that a court or jury would uphold its application. If it could
not be enforced, its value would be greatly lessened. Thus, the
economists might conclude that the optimal tax penalty rate appears
'
to lie at a level that is too low to deter much tax chiseling,303
at least
if the currently low audit rate remains the same.

495 F.2d 285, 288 (4th Cir. 1974); Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d
435, 442 (7th Cir. 1954); Graetz & Wilde, supra note 262, at 358. The same principle applies in
civil fraud cases. Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491, modified, 693 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1102 (1983); Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1398-1400 (1970),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974).
It is further confounded on occasion by the potential showing that the subject matter at issue
was uncertain or complex so that the taxpayer could not form a wrongful intent. United States
v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984); United
States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc); United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d
1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974); Danenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 370 (1970); Penn v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 18, 20 (9th Cir. 1955); Delone v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 507, 509 (3d Cir. 1938).
300. E.g., POSNER, supra note 272, at 210.
301. Cf. id. (arguing that fines should replace imprisonment for white-collar crimes such
as tax evasion, and in that event, the civil sanctions would need to be greatly increased to
achieve the same deterrent effect as imprisonment).
302. Stark Report, supra note 6, at VIII-29 & n.94.
303. See POSNER, supra note 272, at 206-07; George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement
of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527-29 (1970).
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The current level of audits is not optimal and constitutes an unreasonable restraint on the use of economic deterrence concepts. En3
forcement in the tax field has long been hampered by low funding. 0
But low tax enforcement differs from low levels of enforcing other
laws because the tax enforcement level is not based purely on economic
considerations. Society opts for a low optimal enforcement level and
tolerates large numbers of unpunished offenses for petty crimes, such
as larceny, because of the substantial enforcement costs. 305 The finan-

cially optimum enforcement level for the tax system should be much
higher because each dollar spent on additional enforcement efforts in
audits produces about ten more dollars of revenue. 3 ° And additional

examination of returns may very well induce more compliance than
raising the penalty rates.3 0 7 There is room to increase the tax enforce-

ment effort before reaching the optimum level, if the goal is to ensure
that taxes are broadly collected from the taxpayers intended to bear
them. But even if the Service's budget for examination increases in
the future, any such increases will likely be insufficient to permit a
dramatic increase in the audit level.308
Political or social forces reflecting public sentiment can explain this
situation. Underenforcement as well as nonoptimal penalties may reflect the sentiment of the average citizen to treat the tax laws lightly. 309
A common reason for a general failure of penalties to deter is the
underfunding of enforcement efforts. 310 With respect to matters of

304. Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, Penny-Wise and Pound-Foolish:
New Estimates of the Impact of Audits on Revenue, 35 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 787, 788
(May 25, 1987).
305. See POSNER, supra note 272, at 206-07; Becker, supranote 275, at 205; Stigler, supra
note 303, at 205, 527-29, 534.
306. Dubin, et al., supra note 304, at 787.

307. Examination of returns by agents is crucial to deter the noncompliant. ABA Compliance
Commission Report, supra note 4, at 331, 357-58. This point takes on additional importance
since some believe that the chance of detection is more important to compliance than penalty
amounts. Id. at 348. The ABA Compliance Commission noted: "Audits are time-consuming and

stressful affairs, and it appears that the prospect of an audit, irrespective of its effectiveness
in detecting noncompliance, serves to inhibit tax cheating." Id. at 353.
308. Graetz & Wilde, supra note 262, at 358. In the 1990 Treasury appropriations bill
passed by Congress the appropriation to the IRS for tax enforcement was $3.5 billion. This

figure was to permit an increase in audits to 1.4 million returns, an increase of 107,000 from
1990. TAx NOTES TODAY (TAX ANALYSTS) (Oct. 26, 1990). Although any increase in funding

for additional audits is desirable, it should be obvious that an increase of less than 10% in the
number of audits will not solve the problem when less than 1%of returns were audited previously.
309. See Stigler, supra note 303, at 534.
310.

Kadish, supra note 254, at 435-36.
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economic regulation generally, such underfunding ensures that those
with power will not be too affected by the sanctions. 3 11 The problem
of underenforcement seems present in the tax field and greatly reduces
the chance that a penalty, even though deserved, will be imposed.
The tax system should not ignore economic deterrence. That concept occupies the most prominent position regarding compliance and
theories supporting it.' 2 Even opponents of stronger tax penalties
acknowledge the deterrent effect of such penalties.313 Commentators
who note the flaws in the numerous economic analyses of the compliance problem in the tax context also conclude that "the compliance
problem is largely an economic one. 31 4 We may yet refine our understanding of the problem with further research.
The "little piece of reality" furnished by deterrence should be used
where it can make a difference in some types of cases. In some instances the risk of detection has increased such as by withholding and
information reporting in the wage, interest, and dividend areas. With
increased aid from computers the chance of successful chiseling has
decreased. Moreover, for many taxpayers, it seems likely that the
actual risks of detection are not dispositive. Unknown risks will loom
large in some minds and risk averse taxpayers may not accord the
chance of detection its true slightness.
But the limited general effect of civil penalties must be slight for
those taxpayers not subject to controls such as withholding and reporting mechanisms. In this sense, we do not really have a voluntary
system. Current information indicates that compliance is high on income that is subject to withholding and information reporting.3' 5 Noncompliance is rampant among taxpayers without withholding or information reporting, such as self-employed persons and farmers.316 Tax-

311. Id.
312. Graetz & Wilde, supra note 262, at 355, 359; Smith & Kinsey, supranote 286, at 641.
313. Commentators who apparently identify strongly with their clients and hence criticize
the build-up of strong penalty structures nevertheless recognize that the practical suggestions
for increasing compliance are limited to enhancing information reporting and boosting available
penalties. See Gerald G. Portney & Elizabeth A. Turner, Penalties: A Weapon to Encourage
"Voluntary" Compliance, 11 REV. TAX'N INDIv. 47, 47 (1987). Such criticism does acknowledge
the deterrence from civil penalties. Id. at 58 (penalties "indirectly contribute an undetermined
amount of dollars to the system to the extent that they encourage, by fear, increased compliance").
314. Graetz & Wilde, supra note 262, at 359. Those authorities also state that: "Some of
the people with substantial opportunities to evade are likely to be exactly the sophisticated,
rational actors economic models postulate." Id.
315. ABA Compliance Commission Report, supra note 4, at 342-49.
316. Id. at 343-44 (tbl. 1).
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payers who have no opportunity for tax evasion make up the great
bulk of the body of "voluntary" compliers . 17 Civil penalties cannot
halt tax chiseling without other aids. Information reporting and withholding must be utilized in addition to penaltiess 18 For those taxpayers
not effectively subject to those measures, the practical difficulties of
the tax enforcement system virtually cripple the economic deterrent
force of the civil tax penalties. For those taxpayers we should ask
what other purpose civil tax penalties might serve.
b.

Deterrence as Supporting a Standard of Acceptable Conduct

Another version of deterrence takes a longer term view of compliance. Penalties deter by distinguishing compliant from noncompliant
conduct and establishing standards of behavior, on a conscious basis
or even on a subliminal level. 19 By marking the boundary between
compliant and noncompiant behavior, penalties are said to educate
the public about the division between right and wrong. By affecting
the morals of citizens, the penalties may cause them to change their
behavior2m Nonimposition of a penalty validates behavior in line with
normative standards. Penalties that are triggered when actors do not
meet normative standards uphold those standards as demarking the
limits of acceptable conduct.
This concept supports compliance in the long run because the standards of acceptable behavior generally will be altered toward the goal
at hand. Because the effect of the penalty does not instill fear in the
actor sufficient to discourage the undesirable behavior, its operation
in the sense now used is only indirect. This effect is "secondary"
compared to the "fear of punishment" deterrent effect of sanctions.m 1

317. Id.
318. The ABA Compliance Commission suggested compliance be enhanced by reducing the
chances for cheating and tightening audit operations. Id. at 22.
319. This is a 'moralizing" effect in which punishment is viewed as forming and strengthening "the public's moral code" in order to set up "conscious and unconscious inhibitions against
committing crime" and is a habit-forming effect. Andenaes, supra note 256, at 179; see Andenaes,
supra note 265, at 950 (stating that the "concept of general prevention also includes the moral
or socio-pedagogical influence of punishment"); cf. Fuller, supra note 254, at 629 (stating "[ilt
is possible that the very administration of the law itself, if wisely undertaken, may serve as a
technique of popular education through which to mold opinion in its favor.").
320. PACKER, supra note 241, at 42-43. In this vein, the "existence of a 'threat' helps to
create patterns of conforming behavior and thereby to reduce the number of occasions on which
the choice of a criminal act presents itself." Id. at 42. In this sense, laws may be "fashioned to
establish and defend social norms" and 'modify patterns of behavior." Andenaes, supra note
265, at 952.
321. Andenaes, supra note 256, at 180.
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However, "achievement of inhibition and habit is of greater value than
mere deterrence. For these apply in cases where a person need not
fear detection and punishment, and they can apply without the person
even having knowledge of the legal prohibition. ' '3 Thus, in the long
run this effect of a penalty may have far greater utility than economic
deterrence or other forms of deterrence that rely on the fear of punishment.
This version of deterrence applies to the tax penalty area, as indeed
it seems almost an inevitable part of any penalty system. By reinforcing reporting standards, as the Service stressed in its 1989 penalty
study, 3? penalties can serve a deterrence function and assist in encouraging voluntary compliance. This part of the deterrence theory
could be more persuasive in justifying a civil tax penalty system than
is economic deterrence because it does not depend on directly economically deterring millions of taxpayers but more on generally educating
them.
Many additional comments are impossible without the specifics of
a proposal or system, because only a concrete proposal or system can
be evaluated in certain respects. Selecting a desirable standard obviously is central to this inquiry. In addition, the clarity with which the
particular system communicates its educational message, with a clear
standard and penalty rate, is also important. But some difficulties of
applying this rationale to a civil tax penalty system can be noted
presently.
A civil penalty is not as effective as a criminal penalty in serving
an educational function. A criminal penalty based upon a standard of
great wrongdoing, such as willfulness, potentially has a meaningful
educational effect. The message is forceful in that context, and it is
probably no coincidence that much of the literature discussing this
sort of deterrence focuses on criminal matters. 32 But there is reason
to doubt whether a similar beneficial effect can result from a civil
penalty. Such a sanction more often applies in the tax context to those
acting on some standard involving lesser culpability such as negligence
or absence of substantial authority. Further, such sanctions involve
only a modest monetary penalty that is far less than the tax owed,
and only apply to a very low percentage of taxpayers who happen to
be unlucky enough to be detected. Although the criminal law generally

322.
323.
324.

Id.
Stark Report, supra note 6, at III-1.
See sources cited supra notes 316-20.
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suffers from similar underenforcement,m increasing the level of enforcement would probably increase its educational effect. Whether a
civil penalty could bring home to taxpayers with sufficient force the
educational message to be conveyed is doubtful, even if the underenforcement problem were solved.m
In addition, history raises doubts about the likelihood of success
in this mission. The history of civil tax penalties reveals a long and
inconclusive search for normative reporting standards to be upheld
by tax penalties. It seems that unless a standard at the lower end of
the tax penalty spectrum can be devised that is theoretically desirable,
this form of deterrence will be of little use in justifying a civil penalty
system.
B.

Compensation

Compensation is another potential justification of civil penalty
schemes. 27 The compensatory purpose refers to "making another person whole following the infliction upon him of an actual or threatened
injury." The actor pays in the form of a penalty for the harm caused
by the offense.
In the context of penalties payable to the government, the government receives the penalty as compensation for the injury to it or
society. In many contexts in which penalties are used, someone other
than the government suffers harm. If penalties in those areas are
designed to reimburse the government for its activity in enforcing the
laws, that measure of the penalty can approximate the amount of
damage to society caused by noncompliant behavior, where that damage is otherwise difficult to measure. 329 In the tax penalty area the

325.

Given the small portion of returns audited, criminal sanctions also suffer a loss of

efficacy. As suggested earlier, such underfunding ensures that criminal sanctions will not greatly
affect those with power. See supra text accompanying notes 310-11. Research suggests that the

probability of detection and apprehension must be rather high to achieve deterrence. A level
of 30% has been suggested. See Charles R. Tittle & Alan R. Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and
Crime Rates: A FurtherTest of the DeterrenceHypothesis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455, 459-60 (1974).
326. For a leading author expressing skepticism that law in any event alters attitudes and
behavior and noting the dearth of evidence supporting a positive effect of this sort from law,
see RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 213-14 (1990).

327. Diver, supra note 253, at 1456 ("One might view the payment as compensation to the
government for the costs incurred by it in enforcing the substantive standard.").

328.

PACKER,

supra note 241, at 23. Further, "[i]t is the absence of [the] factor of benefit

to identifiable individuals that serves primarily to distinguish between Compensation and Regulation." Id. at 24.
329. Diver, supra note 253, at 1456.
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injured party is the government (collectively the nation of individuals)
and the harm is roughly the government's expense in enforcing the
tax laws.3 °
Compensation has long helped justify monetary penalties.-, This
general compensatory rationale has been applied to civil penalties supporting the revenue for well over a century.3 2 Even prior to the
advent of the Civil War income tax, the Supreme Court used it to
justify penalties supporting import duties.- Similarly, some more recent income tax penalties have been viewed as compensation for the
government's investigatory expense in uncovering the erroneous return position.Compensation has not been used often in supporting the creation
of civil tax penalties. Only rarely has Congress based tax penalty
enactments on the idea that the government should be compensated

330. In the more general context Professor Diver stated that:
[Expense of enforcement] is "proxy" rather than a "measure" [of harm], because
it is the social harm prevented by regulation - not the harm that occurs despite
regulation - which presumably determines the amount that society is willing to
expend on regulation. There is no necessary relationship between the value of the
harm prevented by regulation and the harm occurring despite regulation. The "cost
of regulation" approach, then, is justified not so much by logic as by expedience.
Id. at 1469 n.198.
331. See People v. Briggs, 20 N.E. 820, 823 (N.Y. 1889) ($500 penalty for sale of artificial
butter not made from milk or cream was "fixed sum.., by way of indemnity to the public").
332. Diver, supra note 253, at 1468 n.197 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401
(1938); Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 547 (1871)).
333. In one such case, the Supreme Court found a penalty, in the amount of twice the
goods' value, was "remedial in its nature," with "[i]ts purpose [being] to secure full compensation
for interference with the rights of the United States." Stockwell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 551. In
addition, the Court noted that the applicable penalty may be less than complete compensation
to the government and in many types of cases a party to a civil case is entitled to recover
double or treble damages. Id. at. 546-47.
The Supreme Court justified another penalty when a customs appraiser valued imported
goods at least 10% greater than the declared value as "discouragements to fraud, and to prevent
efforts by importers to escape the legal rates of duty." Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
263, 274 (1853). The sanction was also justified as "the compensation for a violated law, . . .
designed to operate as checks and restraints upon fraud and injustice." Id. at 292.
334. See Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401 (finding that the civil fraud penalty is intended "to
reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from
the taxpayer's fraud"); Olshausen v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 23, 27 (9th Cir. 1959) (finding that
payment for failure to file estimated tax declarations allows government to recover its "heavy
expense of investigation"); Estate of Briden v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 1095, 1136-37 (1948)
(interpreting Mitchell as holding that the civil fraud income tax penalty is "remedial or civil"
and not "criminal or punitive," such that the penalty survives the taxpayer's death), affd sub
nom. Kirk v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1950).
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for its efforts to collect taxes. This failure to rely upon the compensation rationale in enacting civil tax penalties probably is attributable
to concerns of administrative and judicial burdens in determining the
costs of a particular case.3 In addition, the failure of audit costs to
bear a systematic relationship to bad conduct has discouraged the
enactment of penalties on a compensatory platform.G Compensation
does not by itself allow us to distinguish gradations of fault. Nor will
any compensatory penalty amount necessarily be sufficient to achieve
voluntary compliance . 3 7 Thus, the compensatory rationale has not been
very influential in the legislative enactment of civil tax penalties.
These concerns are not such serious impediments to the use of the
compensatory rationale in the civil tax penalty context as they initially
might appear. In evaluating penalties, the courts have not evidenced
concern over precision of penalty amounts. In addition, suggestions
made in the course of proposing or evaluating compensatory schemes
also show how compensation can play at least some role in a tax
penalty scheme.
Some court cases, arising in a variety of contexts such as double
jeopardy defenses or cruel and unusual punishment claims, have
broadly evaluated penalty provisions that allegedly serve compensatory purposes. The Supreme Court recognized, in a recent case, that
the government's actual loss in such cases is "difficult, if not impossible,
to ascertain."' In describing how large a penalty may become while
still serving a remedial rather than punitive purpose, the Court con-

335. In 1986, Congress strengthened the failure to pay penalty. This increase applied once
the Service gave notice of intent to levy. I.R.C. § 6651(d) (1986). This amendment arose from
the effort to reimburse the government for its collection activities, as indicated by the initial
recommendation in the President's package of suggestions:
In addition, the present penalty for failure to pay taxes would be eliminated and
replaced with a cost of collection charge. Current law does not permit the charging
of collection fees, which is standard practice in the private sector. This proposal
would allow the Internal Revenue Service to recoup its cost of collecting delinquent
amounts and would encourage taxpayers to pay more promptly. Like penalties,
this fee would not be deductible by taxpayers.
The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity 113 (May
1985).
Congress adopted part of this approach by increasing the penalty where the Service had
instituted certain 'more expensive collection" measures but did not require the charge to recover
the "specific costs" of the case. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COaM. ON TAX'N, supra note 138,
at 1272.
336. Stark Report, supra note 6, at 11-3.
337. Diver, supra note 253, at 1461; Stark Report, supra note 6, at 11-4.
338. United States v. Halper, 109A S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989).
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cluded: "the Government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is,
it may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus
double damages .... "-9 This statement of the limits of a compensatory
penalty gives the compensatory rationale a broad reach.340 The amounts
potentially recoverable for remedial purposes have been said to include
not only the amount of error, but also the investigatory expenses and
the cost of prosecution.Y' Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court
upheld the old 50% civil tax fraud penalty as a remedial penalty on
the strength of similar arguments, over the taxpayers assertion that
the penalty was a punitive, and hence criminal, sanction barred by
2
the taxpayer's acquittal on tax evasion charges .-

339. Id. Halper involved the question of whether a monetary penalty following a criminal
prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1901-02. The Court found that in some
circumstances such a monetary penalty may violate that clause:
Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty
sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as 'punishment'
in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting
of the Government's damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact
constitutes a second punishment.
Id. at 1902. The Halper case involved a penalty of more than $130,000 for 65 Medicare reimbursement violations, each of which overcharged the Government by $9 so that the Government's
actual loss totalled $585. Id. at 1-896. The district court found that the statutorily authorized
recovery "bore no 'rational relation' to the sum of the Government's $585 actual loss plus its
costs in investigating and prosecuting Halper's false claims." Id. at 1897. The Supreme Court
called its holding "a rule for the rare case ... where a fixed penalty provision subjects a prolific
but small gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has
caused." Id. at 1902. The Court left for the trial court "the discretion to determine on the basis
of [the required] accounting, the size of the civil sanction the Government may receive without
crossing the line between remedy and punishment." Id. The district court had earlier estimated
that the government had spent $16,000 while the penalty amount was $130,000, and that such
a difference supported the conclusion that the penalty should be characterized as "punishment."
Id. at 1903-04. But because the Government had not directly challenged the amount of those
expenses earlier in the proceeding, the Court remanded to allow the Government to challenge
the expense figure. Id.
340. Professor Packer noted that in cases where restrictions apply because a sanction is
found to be "punishment," such as where a law is an ex post facto punishment in violation of
the constitutional prohibition, the courts may be reluctant to label a sanction as punishment
when it is not criminal punishment. PACKER, supra note 241, at 35-36. Professor Diver noted
with respect to cases such as Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), that "preservation of
the admittedly tenuous constitutional distinction between 'civil' and 'criminal' penalties evidently
requires the exclusion of retributive rhetoric from the 'civil' sphere." Diver, supra note 253, at
1456 n.136. This may explain the wide berth given to the penalties in question.
341. Halper, 109A S. Ct. at 1900 & n.6.
342. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401 (sanction intended "to reimburse the Government for the
heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud").
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The latitude given by this analysis may seem unduly wide as the
sanctions in question are arguably designed to do more than merely
compensate. The old 50% civil tax fraud rate probably would yield a
penalty amount exceeding the expected or anticipated cost in the average case.. 3 The true justification for the full amount of such a penalty, it might be argued, is deterrence rather than compensation.m
Compensation under this view would be simply a convenient rationalization for the penalty provision in question.
These criticisms, however, treat the rationale too narrowly and
insist on too much segregation of the penalty justifications. A penalty

amount which may seem unduly large can be justified by thinking
about compensation more broadly. Rational allocation schemes such
as some of the ad valorem types of penalties discussed in the cases
(in the footnotes to this section) permit a compensatory penalty to be
expressed as a percentage rate, rather than requiring that the particular costs of each case be traced.3 s The cost allocation of government
overhead may justify a large compensatory penalty amount.3 6 The
possibility that an offense will go undetected also has justified penalty
amounts that were set at as much as three times the actual harm in

343. See O'Brien, supra note 253, at 452 n.103 (comparing 50% penalty in Mitchell to
penalties in the Clean Water Act and stating that the penalties in the Clean Water Act were
"much closer to the compensatory nature of liquidated damages").
344. Such rough justice schemes have been criticized as achieving something other than
compensation: "A suit can be viewed as compensatory only if property is transmitted to an
identifiable individual or group of individuals and the value of that property is actually determined
by estimating the value of the interests lost by the recipient as a result of the actions of the
defendant." Charney, supra note 252, at 499. This is based on the writings of Professor Packer
who stated that compensation meant "making another person whole, following the infliction
upon him of an actual or threatened injury" and "the absence of this factor of benefit to identifiable
individuals that serves primarily to distinguish between Compensation and Regulation." PACKER, supra note 241, at 23-24. As discussed infra note 351, it seems accurate to state that
Professor Packer views the tax penalties as being potentially compensatory and also serving
other functions depending on their amounts.
345. The amount of a compensatory penalty must be determined based on "a standard for
allocating [the] aggregate sum [of the government's overall related costs of regulation] among
the individual violators." Diver, supranote 253, at 1469. Aggregate cost of enforcement can be
calculated even if costs of a particular case are difficult to determine. A rough formula, based
on valorem or some other criterion, can be derived. In some cases rather simple methods of
relating the relevant expenses to the monetary sanction can produce a reasonable result, such
as by merely dividing the total costs equally by head to each violator. Charney, supra note
252, at 499 n.122 (damage to United States of $1 billion per year from pollution with 100,000
polluters would justify a penalty of $10,000 per polluter to compensate the public).
346. See Charney, supra note 252, at 499 n.121 (acknowledging, but not liking, this possibility).
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the individual case, because of the otherwise uncompensated cases in
47
which offenses are not detected.
Moreover, the boundaries between compensation and other purposes that penalties might serve are inevitably unclear and the concepts cannot be segregated. Monetary penalties, sanctions or other
charges always will punish to some extent by their very existence.
In other words, "for the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the
sting of punishment."' 8
This mixture may be helpful in justifying a particular penalty in
question. A penalty may serve multiple purposes, for example, both
compensation and punishment purposes. 4 9 The two are not entirely
separate. Authorities commonly cited for the economic deterrence
theory incorporate into their framework the concept of compensation
for the wrong. 350 The two can function simultaneously. Further, the
civil tax fraud penalty has been characterized as serving both the
deterrent and compensatory purposes.31
The functions may not be coextensive, to be sure. It is frequently
believed that the two functions are substantially apart in some respects. Due to the low probability of detection and punishment, a
penalty designed to provide economic deterrence may need a greater
sanction than would a penalty designed only to provide compensation. 2
For example, a wealthy taxpayer might prefer that a penalty consist only of the actual costs of a case rather than a percentage of the
tax at issue. The deficiency might be many millions of dollars (e.g.,
$25 million) and the allocation of the costs might be only in the tens
or hundreds of thousands of dollars (e.g., $150,000). The taxpayer
would be far less deterred by a penalty amount based on actual costs
for the case than a ten or twenty per cent penalty based on the
deficiency (e.g., $2.5 million or $5 million).

347.

See Becker, supra note 275, at 199 n.55.

348. United States v. Halper, 109A S. Ct. 1892, 1901 n.7 (1989).
349. PACKER, supra note 241, at 30. As Professor Diver explained: "[K]nowledge that
certain conduct may trigger a demand, backed by the state's coercive power, for payment of
compensation is itself a powerful incentive not to engage in the conduct. The pursuit of a
compensatory goal, then, must almost invariably imply the simultaneous pursuit of a motivational
objective as well." Diver, supra note 253, at 1461 n.159.
350. See Becker, supra note 275, at 208; Stigler, supra note 303, at 533.
351. It has been observed that the civil fraud penalty is a mixture of compensation and
deterrence. It is "in part... Compensation, to make up to the government the cost of uncovering
the fraud, but it is also Punishment, imposed on account of the fraud and in order to ensure
that others will not commit fraud in the future." PACKER, supra note 241, at 31.
352. Diver, supra note 253, at 1461.
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But the system need not be designed in that fashion. Penalties
have been sustained as compensatory measures even though determined as a percentage or multiple of the amount at issue.m The magnitude of a compensatory penalty can be substantial when. a broad
view of the relevant costs is taken. The penalty amount would in fact
possibly approach the maximum tolerable amount for a lower level
penalty. If in that neighborhood, it would certainly do no more harm
than have prior systems with penalty rates set at arbitrary amounts
deemed to be sufficient deterrents, given the primitive state of our
knowledge on deterrence. But as discussed above and assuming for
the moment that the ad valorem penalty does have economic deterrent
effect, a more-or-less compensatory ad valorem penalty would probably
have far less impact than one calculated to achieve deterrence.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of a penalty scheme based on compensation is its treatment of gradations of fault or culpability. There
may be greater costs attributable to prosecuting claims of fraud than
claims of negligence. But that difference would not be sufficiently
great to comprise an adequate penalty for fraudulent actions. For this
reason the compensation rationale is incapable of supporting a full tax
penalty structure that would satisfy our needs. It can only be one
part of the overall civil tax penalty system.
C.

Summary of Difficulties

Each of the common justifications of penalties suffers difficulties
in the civil tax penalty context. Incompleteness, inappropriateness,
and inefficacy appear at every turn. Retribution cannot be used except
with respect to the relatively few very bad actors. Deterrence is
thwarted by the political, and apparently nonoptimal, constraints on
the audit process. The fruitless struggle for over a century to find an
acceptable normative reporting standard further prevents deterrence
from serving as an effective justification. Compensation suffers from
some imprecision in this context and does not appear to make sufficient
allowances for gradations of fault. These circumstances make design
of an effective tax penalty scheme an exceedingly difficult task.

IV.

A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF THE 1989 ACT

In this light, Congress and others faced a great challenge revising
the civil tax penalty system. Years of indecision and contradictions
had left the existing penalty structure confused.

353.

See supra text accompanying notes 330-41.
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As some reform began to appear certain, many tax-associated
groups such as the Service, the bar, and Congress, began to study
penalties. However, members of the bar struck first and often. A
significant number of suggestions from the tax bar were designed to
cut back on penalties and institute rather lax standards.- The frequent
tax acts in the early to mid-1980s had given the government a remarkable number of penalties to utilize355 The penalty arsenal was criticized
because of the number of penalties, diversity of triggering standards
of conduct, and potential for stacking various sanctions with respect
to one taxpayer action. 56 The common wisdom among vocal leading
practitioners was that the penalty provisions should be trimmed,
rather than simply reorganized or coordinated.
The substantial understatement penalty of section 66613 7 in particular drew sharp criticism from the practitioners as a "potentially chilling" penalty. 35 It was characterized as a 'strict liability' penalty. ''
Given this criticism from the bar, some of the directions taken by bar
leaders making recommendations on the penalty reform should have
been readily foreseeable.
The ABA Section of Taxation Penalties Task Force (Task Force)
was a leading group formulating the tax bar's recommendations. It
recommended numerous helpful cleanup measures such as the elimination of stacking and of interest components of the fault-based penalties. 3 - This group also recommended repeal of the substantial understatement penalty as well as the no-fault valuation penalties.6, The
group criticized the substantial authority standard of the substantial
understatement penalty as unclear, not defined in the statute, and
otherwise difficult for practitioners to measure.3 62 In a transparent

354. See Johnson, supra note 152, at 1527 (stating that ethical standards by ABA "are not
law" but "just represent the degree to which trade groups, whose members benefit from lax
standards are willing to police themselves"); Kurtz, supra note 154, at 1620-23 (describing efforts
by "influential practitioner groups" to repeal § 6661 and "debunking the repeal arguments").
355. See Portney & Turner, supra note 313, at 58 (stating that "[t]he range of weapons in
the IRS arsenal is increasingly described as awesome - and there is more coming").
356. See New York Bar Report, supra note 5, at 511-13.
357. See I.R.C. § 6661(a) (repealed 1989).
358. See Portney & Turner, supra note 313, at 51; Garbis & Fisher, supra note 161, at
496, 504-05.
359. Garbis & Struntz, supra note 210, at 5-12.
360. See, e.g., ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29 (eliminate
interest component and stacking of other penalties on fraud penalty).
361. Id. at 47-48, 56.
362.

Id. at 41-47.
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attempt to rewrite history, e3

the group argued that former section

6661 became law based on the erroneous view that taxpayers reporting

in an unjustified manner typically avoided application of the negligence
penalty. 3r Instances where such avoidance occurred were categorized

as either "development of a standard of conduct," where no penalty
was proper, or as "exceptional cases."' 85
The Task Force recommended a three-tiered system of fault penal-

ties with a "beefed up" negligence penalty at the lower end, an intermediate level for intentional or reckless action and a substantially
unchanged fraud penalty at the highest level. 36 This structure was
similar to the three-tiered approach recommended by the Administrative Conference prior to the advent of the penalty reforms of the early
1980s.

67

The Tax Section, in adopting the Task Force's recommendations,
as a whole made a slightly better showing on the substantial understatement penalty. It deviated from the Task Force's recommendations
and rejected the notion of repealing former section 6661 but at the
same time recommended a reduction in the penalty's rate. 368 The Tax
Section would have applied the penalty only if the taxpayer lacked
"reasonable care and good faith" and subject it to "full judicial review

of penalty impositions."' ' 1 Although restrictive, these recommendations did not call for an outright repeal of former section 6661.

363. The historically very small percentage of returns in which the fraud or negligence
penalties are assessed shows that proof of the requisite intent is difficult and cannot be met in
many cases. See Mansfield, supra note 152, at 217, 225-26 (fewer than 10% of returns).
364. ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 32-35, 48.
365. Id. at 32-35.
366. Id. at 29 (retain and amend fraud penalty which was at 75% penalty rate); id. at 39
(negligence penalty with two rates: 50% for reckless or intentional conduct and 25% to cover
negligent conduct).
367. The concept of a multi-tiered penalty system was suggested by the Administrative
Conference in 1976 with levels of penalties ranging from negligence (5% rate), recklessness or
intentional action (25% rate) and fraud (50% rate). 41 Fed. Reg. 3982, 3984 (1976) (to have been
codified as 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-7); see Asimow, supra note 53, at 638, 655-58, 685. The Task Force did
suggest different penalty rates. ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 39
(proposing rates similar to Administrative Conference with rates of 25%, 50% and 75%).
368. 8 Section of Taxation Newsletter 63 (Summer 1989); Ballot on Section 6661, reprinted
in 1989 House Hearings, supranote 2, at 308 (statement of Merritt). Some notable practitioners
argued for retention of the "objective standard" of substantial authority. Kurtz, supra note 154,
at 1623.
369. See 8 Section of Taxation Newsletter 63 (Summer 1989); Ballot on Section 6661, reprinted in 1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 308 (statement of Merritt).
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The Service shared some of the concerns of the tax bar, but its
recommendations tended to be more theoretically inclined and generally tougher in terms of the standards of care and slightly tougher in
terms of penalty amounts. The Service agreed with the bar on some
cleanup matters, such as the elimination of the stacking of penalties,
but on balance recommended some modest penalty increases.370 As
had the bar, the Service suggested a three-tiered system.3 71 But the
Service would have given more strength to the lowest tier of penalties
beyond just an increase in the penalty rate to 20%. 372 It suggested
anchoring the three tiers with a first tier of a negligence penalty with
an alternative of a fortified substantial understatement penalty that
increased the standard of substantial authority to just below fifty-one
or fifty (perhaps forty-five) percent.373 To avoid this penalty, the taxpayer would have to use reasonable care to determine the facts and
discover issues and would need substantial authority to take a favor4
able position on the return without disclosing the doubtful issue
The Service devoted considerable attention to this matter of determining the theoretically correct normative standard for tax reporting. It
concluded that a taxpayer should be able to take a return position
without flagging the issue if the authority approached 50% likelihood
(45% was suggested) that the position would be upheld if challenged . 5
It would have finished the remaining tiers with an intentional action
penalty and fraud penalty, while generally raising the penalty rates
7
modestly, including a capstone fraud penalty rate of 100%.. ',
All proposals seemed to draw ultimately from limited ranges of
theory. The dominant theoretical theme from both the Service and
the bar was that penalties should encourage voluntary compliance with
the tax laws.377 The government representatives testifying before Congress chiefly called for a penalty structure that was based on a unified

370. Stark Report, supra note 6, at VIII-45 (retain fraud but increase rate to 100% and
eliminate stacking).
371. Id. at VIII-42 to -43. This system would apply a 20% penalty in the first tier of
negligence or lack of substantial authority: 50% in the second tier of intentionally incorrect or
frivolous return; and 100% in the third tier, fraud. Id.
372. Id. at VIII-42 (rate at 20%, and must use reasonable care to file correct returns).
373. Id. at VIII-43 to -44 (51%); id. at VIII-39 (50%, perhaps 45%).
374. Id. at VIII-40 to -43.
375. Id. at VIII-37, -42, -44.
376. Id. at VIII-42 to -43.
377. Id. at 11-1 to -3 ("encouraging voluntary compliance"); ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 12 ("broad purpose of penalties... is to make people act" appropriately
and discourage inappropriate conduct).
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rationale or theme, 378 apparently meaning that penalties should work
toward fulfilling a single justification. In support of this theme, the
concept most often mentioned was some form of deterrence. Other
purposes of penalties, such as compensation and retribution, were
rejected generally by the parties to this process, including the Service.
Even deterrence did not seem to be taken too seriously in light of
the movement to cut back penalties. The implication of the 1988 elimination of the interest components of the fraud and negligence penalties
would seem to have been that tidying up infelicities of the tax law
was closely related to cutting back on the severity of penalties. This
point appeared clear in the 1989 hearings on the comprehensive penalty
act.37 9 Those involved in the final stages of the legislative process

shared a remarkable agreement that the penalty system in effect at
that time was too harsh. The chorus at the 1989 hearings in the House,
which led the way in passage of the legislation on penalty reform,
assailed the severity of the tax penalty structure with references to
various penalty rates as being "too high." Practitioners apparently
caught up in the reverie of the moment asserted without authority
that penalty rates for such penalties as the substantial understatement
penalty would be substantial deterrents if they were set at 10% and
that the already lowered rates in the bill should be reduced further.31
IMPACT 1989,8 which resulted from these efforts, did improve
civil tax penalties in several, largely technical, ways. The Act clarified
and systematized the penalty structure. The principal example of this
is the elimination of stacking of penalties. In the pre-1989 penalty

378.

1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 220 (statement of Dana Trier, Tax Legislative

Counsel); (stating that the purpose is to "encourage voluntary compliance"); id. at 3 (statement
of Michael J. Murphy, Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service).
379. See 1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 219.
380. Id. (statement of Trier); id. at 296 (statement of Michael Saltzman, Chairman, Civil

and Criminal Tax Penalties Committee, ABA Section of Taxation); id. at 308 (statement of
James Merritt); id. at 329 (statement of Gerald G. Portney). See also Statement of J.J. Pickle
introducing H.R. 2528 (June 1, 1989) (noting numerous complaints of large and severe penalties).
381. 1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 296-97 (statement of Saltzman) (advocating
10% rate and stating that substantial understatement rate of 20% was more than just a "miscon-

duct deterrent," it was a "revenue producer"); id. at 329 (statement of Portney) (stating that
a 15% rate of penalty applicable to negligence and substantial understatement would be "sufficiently high to encourage compliant taxpayer behavior").
382. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7711, 103 Stat. 2388. The House Bill, H.R. 3299, contained
the penalty revisions discussed herein. H.R REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1387-94 (1989).
The Senate Bill, S. 1750, contained none, but the House later added the Senate Bill to an
Omnibus package and the Conference Committee agreement followed the House Bill. H.R CONF.
REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 655 (1989).
383. See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 662.
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context, a single taxpayer action resulting in inaccuracy might draw
imposition of more than one penalty.- Under IMPACT 1989, only
one penalty can apply to such conduct3 and the message from the
system is theoretically clearer and arguably more effective. Taxpayers
are now more likely to assess accurately the amount of the penalty
applicable to their actions.
In addition, the Act provided an opportunity for modification of
individual provisions that were out of step with the rest of the structure. The negligence penalty rate was adjusted in this manner. The
old negligence penalty rate of 5%, even though applied to the entire
underpayment rather than just the portion attributable to negligence,
was clearly too low relative to the rates of 25% for substantial understatement and 75% for fraud.3 6 Increasing the negligence penalty rate
to 20%- 7 brought it into line with the other penalty rates. The comparative imbalance had been particularly obvious with respect to the prior
rate of the substantial understatement penalty. Now both were included within the unified accuracy-related penalty with a single rate
set at 20%.3 Moreover, the general use of the amount of the under9
payment attributable to the conduct in question (e.g., negligence)3
rather than the entire underpayment, as was the case with the old
version of the negligence penalty, 310 more accurately measures the
penalty amount and probably improves its efficacy compared to a less
focused penalty with the same rate. The revised negligence penalty
fits better within the overall scheme and more precisely reflects the
culpability of the action involved. As in the case of the elimination of
stacking, these improvements should give a clearer and more consistent message to taxpayers and further their perception and appreciation of the penalties that might apply to their conduct.
But tidying up by generally eliminating the overlap of penalties
also affects more than just simplicity. The Service's proposal eliminating stacking was coupled with penalty rates that would have shown

384. See ABA PENALTIES rASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 10-11, 47; Garbis &
Struntz, supra note 210, at 5-1.
385. See I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652; 1989 JOINT
COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 7.
386. Compare I.R.C. § 6653(a) (1988) (repealed 1989) with id. §8 6653(b), 6661 (1988) (repealed 1989).
387. See I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652.
388. See I.R.C § 6662(a); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652.
389. See I.R.C § 6662(b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652.
390. See I.R.C § 6653(a) (1988) (repealed 1989); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7,
at 652.
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a small increase over those recommended by the bar which did not
recommend adding much real strength to the penalties.391 Indeed,
given the elimination of stacking, the rates in the Act are actually a
modest decrease. 32 For example, the negligence penalty is more focused on the portion of the underpayment due to negligence and its
rate, considered alone, is increased to 20%.39 This change causes the
negligence penalty to be much more focused and might be seen as a
measured increase, if considered alone. But the substantial understatement rate was decreased and the fraud rate remained the same.3 94 On
balance this set of amendments looks like a decrease in rates, particularly with the elimination of stacking. The principles involved, at the
very least, are much more complex than simple overlapping penalties.
Yet the issue was approached largely as one concerning the stacking
of penalties. And in such an environment, the ABA members testifying
in support of the 1989 Act brazenly suggested cutting even futher the
accuracy related penalty's rate as then set in the bill that became the
395
Act.
Moreover, even viewing the elimination of stacking as effecting
merely clarity and accuracy, the Act's failures in other respects are
serious. Tidiness and precision are not the only valuable aspects of a
tax penalty system. The substantive provisions and the principles that
they uphold are more basic and vital. The 1989 Act unfortunately
missed the mark with respect to these broader and more important
issues.
One of the most basic problems with IMPACT 1989 is the limited
set of justifying principles it sought to uphold. From both the bar and
the government proposals, the nearly exclusive focus was on encouraging voluntary compliance through a single justification for penalties,
which is laudable in itself. But this focus resulted from the general
rejection of the independent operation of justifications such as retribution and compensation.29 Since such broader rationales were rejected

391. Stark Report, supranote 6, at VIII-43 to -45 (20% for lower tier, 50% for intentional
actions, 100% for fraud). See supra note 366 for comparison.
392. An attorney involved in the drafting of the § 6661 penalty explained that the stacking
effect was intended and made sense in a system where the negligence penalty (involving greater
culpability) was only 5%. See LeDuc, supra note 204, at 379-80. In this light the elimination of
stacking and the revision of the rate structure in the 1989 Act produce the overall effect of
reducing rates.
393. I.R.C. § 6662(a); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 652.
394. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), 6663(a); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, supra note 7, at 651, 653-54.
395. 1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 296; id. at 329 (statements of Saltzman and
Portney).
396. See Stark Report, supra note 6, at 11-2 to -4.
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at an early point, the Act lacks sufficient breadth. Even though compliance may be a desirable overall goal, other goals such as retribution
and compensation, should inform aspects of a complete tax penalty
system, even if they do not dominate it.
The problem of incompleteness shows in attempts to squeeze some
use out of concepts that are not naturally part of a deterrence or
compliance regime. For example, the Service attempted to import the
concept of "just deserts" into the program of encouraging voluntary
compliance. This attempt mischaracterized the concept of desert. It
also unduly limited its operation. A review of the Service's reports
will illustrate this point.
The Service in its penalty study that led up to the 1989 Act
categorized the goal that the noncompliant receive their "just deserts"
as a deterrence goal297 According to the IRS, "penalties can encourage
• . . taxpayers . . . to comply [by] [p]roviding taxpayers who depart
from the standard their just deserts. 3 98 Compliant taxpayers would
in that case be more secure in the knowledge that compliance is important and the tax system is fair if they knew that noncompliant taxpayers are penalized. But noncompliant, penalized taxpayers would
be more likely to be compliant in the future if they felt their punishment was fair. Therefore, penalties that are disproportionate are unfair
3
and there is good "reason [to] limit the size and reach of penalties." 9
That use of desert disguised a retributive rationale as one of deterrence. Broadly speaking, punishment can achieve deterrence in the
form of a moralizing effect and can relieve society of the "demoralizing
effect" of offenses. 4-° However, that function is distinct from the operation of the concept of desert. "Desert" lies at the very heart of the
retributive rationale.401 And the retributory rationale does not require
any further good to be accomplished by punishment other than the

397. Id. at 111-1.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 111-2.
400. See Andenaes, supra note 265, at 950. "Stated negatively, the penalty neutralizes the
demoralizing consequences that arise when people witness crimes being perpetrated." Id. Professor Andenaes wrote in the context of a discussion of the "moral" influence of the law and
its relation to "general prevention." Id. Professor Andenaes also said that "[plunishment is a
means of expressing social disapproval. In this way the criminal law and its enforcement supplement and enhance the moral influence acquired through education and other nonlegal processes."
Id.
401. See PACKER, supra note 241, at 37. "The retributive view rests on the idea that it
is right for the wicked to be punished: because man is responsible for his actions, he ought to
receive his just deserts." Id.
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offender's receipt of the appropriate sanction, or "just desert." The
offender simply "owes" a "debt" to society for the innocent who com40 Retributive
plied with the applicable legal standard, and must pay it.
arguments are sometimes falsely dressed up with arguments that
punishment builds "moral fiber of the . . . punished" or "constitutes
education for good citizenship." 403 That type of argument is only a
short distance from dressing the concept of desert as a deterrence
theory based on the belief that punishment of the guilty will lead to
compliance.
The Service's version of desert, moreover, is internally inconsistent. By the terms of that formulation, the noncompliant should receive
their "just deserts - no more and no less.' '404 But, having said as
much, the Service's formulation then denies desert as an independent
force. Ultimately, the formulation treats it only as a limit on penalties
by stating that penalties must be proportional to the offense and there
40 5
is reason to "limit . . . the size and reach of penalties." Granting
that proportionality and fairness drawing from the retributive rationale
can serve to limit penalties, the idea that a noncompliant receive "no
less" than his just desert cannot be served by such a limit alone.
This unusual version of the desert concept seeks to have it both
ways. It sounds as if the compliant will be affected by it, but the
offenders will be protected. The Service's version takes back the possibility of real influence on the compliant because it is really only
considering its limitation. If one believes that a system, in order to
be perceived as fair by compliant taxpayers, must give the noncompliant punishment that is no less than the just desert, then one

402. FLETCHER, supra note 242, at 417. Professor Fletcher states:
One way to make out an argument for retributive punishment is to focus on the
criminal act as the source of the offender's obligation to suffer punishment. Writing
in the tradition of Kant and Hegel, Herbert Morris has developed the theory that
the offender is duty-bound to suffer punishment, for his offense creates an imbalance
of benefits and burdens in the society as a whole. Those who obey the law incur
burdens that offenders refuse to take upon themselves. To rectify this imbalance
the offender must suffer an appropriate punishment. His refusal to conform generates the proverbial "debt" that must be paid. This argument makes some sense
with regard to crimes that tempt many of us, such as illegal parking, or even
cheating on our income tax.
Id. at 417.
403. PACKER, supra note 241, at 67 (stating that arguments have "pharisaical ring," and
that 'punishment is not a virtue, only a necessity.").
404. Stark Report, supra note 6, at 111-2 (emphasis added).
405. Id.
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must believe that retribution operates as an independent force. As
discussed above, retribution, including the concept of desert, can serve
an independent role beyond that of a fairness or proportionality limitation in a civil penalty system even within the civil tax penalty system.
This is true even if that role is limited to the extreme cases. But the
important players in formulating IMPACT 1989 did not draw so
broadly from penalty justifications.
This sort of limiting analysis stifled the justificatory inquiry that
preceded the 1989 Act. 4 01' Other parties, such as the ABA Tax Section,
were not likely to be more expansive than the Service, so the Service's
study established the outer limits. The concerns expressed seemed
more focused on whether the taxpayers would like the penalties rather
than whether the force of the penalties would affect the taxpayers.
By narrowing the justifications, the 1989 Act leaves penalty concepts
that, based on our rather limited understanding of deterrence or compliance, might be characterized as aimed at a "sort of' deterrence or
voluntary compliance. Specifically, the concepts are meant to deter
without offending any cheaters who are caught. It makes no attempt
at using compensatory or retributory justifications. Thus, before touching upon more specific issues, it seems that a broader set of goals
should have grounded the revisions.
On a more specific focus, the penalty revisions did not serve two
particular aspects of deterrence. First, the economic deterrents
created appear likely to be at least as ineffective as their predecessors.
Second, the Act failed to resolve the basic issue of the appropriate
normative standard of conduct in tax reporting.
To the extent that economic deterrence is expected of these provisions, the 1989 Act will disappoint. The concept of economic deterrence
is logical, even if its precise operation is not fully verified by empirical
research. Obviously, as the Service recognized, the 20% rate for lower
level penalties will not effect much economic deterrence in the sense
of actually causing taxpayers to comply in order to avoid the monetary
sanctions. 40 7 Thus, although eliminating stacking and focusing the
negligence penalty base on the underpayment attributable to the neg-

406. The treatment of compensatory purposes was also limited. Those were rejected as not
being "synchronized with the severity needed to obtain maximum compliance - it may be too
high or too low." Id. at 11-4. In general, it would seem that compensatory penalties would be
less than or certainly no greater than those needed to achieve economic deterrence or voluntary
compliance. Rather than being too high, they would be too low. The question should be whether
they could serve as a base at the lower end of the structure and serve a compensatory function.
But that question was unanswered by the Service's report.
407. See id. at VIII-29 & n.94.
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ligence may seem more orderly, those changes accentuate the inadequacy of the penalty amount to effect real deterrence. This clear
inadequacy shows the disingenuous nature of practitioners' 1989 testimony that the proposed rate for the accuracy related penalty was a
substantial deterrent and perhaps should have been lowered still
4
further. 08
The inefficacy of the penalties as economic deterrents might not
have been fatal if, as the Service suggested, the penalties imparted
some greater "moral or ethical support for voluntary compliance" apart
from the simple economics. 40 Penalty reform suffered its biggest failure in this context. In this respect, the Act is notable for what it does
not do, or at least does not do directly.
A standard of conduct for tax reporting marks the dividing line
between compliant and noncompliant conduct, and inevitably must be
a part of the tax system. If the tax system is to encourage compliance
through the use of civil penalties, some conduct must be penalized
and other conduct not penalized. Any penalty system designed to
encourage voluntary compliance should center on drawing a line to
separate the two groups.
ABA and Service reports and significant articles by influential tax
lawyers and scholars devoted substantial attention to such an inquiry
in connection with the 1989 legislation. 410 The Service spent considerable effort in attempting to develop a normative standard for tax
reporting. The ABA Task Force made similar efforts by way of its
arguments that the substantial understatement penalty should be repealed. 41 The Act, however, does not attempt to resolve the issue
regarding the correct normative reporting standard. The Act leaves
the substantial understatement and negligence penalties with the same
standards of behavior sufficient to avoid such penalties as existed
before the Act. In connection with the substantial understatement
penalty, the Act expands the definition of authority to be relied upon
and includes for the first time many sources used in practice.412 But
it does nothing to raise the taxpayers' target for return positions.

408.

1989 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 296 (statement of Saltzman); id. at 308 (state-

ment of Merritt); id. at 329 (statement of Portney).
409. Stark Report, supra note 6, at VIII-29.
410. See id.; ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5; Johnson, supra note
152; Kurtz, supra note 154.
411. See ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 40-49; see also supra

text accompanying notes 361-65.
412.

1989 JOINT COMMITTEE PAMPHLET, supranote 2, at 7 (including proposed regulations,

private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda, actions on decision, general counsel
memoranda, information or press releases, notices, and the Blue Book).
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All of these efforts made the 1989 Act in its final form a disappointment for its failure to take a clear stand on the normative standard
of conduct in tax reporting. No innovation or direction was given in
the statute. Moreover, the older standards from the no-fault penalties
and the negligence penalty were retained by simply being lumped
together in a single Code section with no choice made as to the appropriate or desirable standard of conduct. 413 Substantial authority and
negligence now coexist equally there. Virtually alone among the participants in the 1989 hearings, the former Commissioner who had
overseen most of the Service's penalty reform efforts lamented the
failure of the Act to come to grips with the standard of conduct issue
that had long been thought to be one of the central missions of penalty
reform.414
The Act may, however, be thought to have approached the position
of the ABA Task Force, albeit indirectly. The Act substantially follows
the ABA Tax Section's suggested modifications of section 6661 as a
"no-fault" penalty. This is accomplished in the amendment of the "waiver"
provision, which now apparently imports a requirement of fault into the
substantial understatement and valuation penalties. The general
waiver provision now applies to all the accuracy-related penalties and
converts the former no-fault penalties into fault-based penalties by
eliminating the Service's discretion in waiving such penalties. 4 5 Thus,
much of the former usefulness of and the rationale for those penalties
has been significantly undercut. To the extent that they can avoid
penalties by meeting these standards, taxpayers are informed that
such behavior is acceptable.416
V.

DESIGN OF A MODEST CIVIL TAX PENALTY SYSTEM FOR
ACCURACY RELATED PENALTIES

Any civil tax penalty system will be imperfect, because the typical
justifications for penalties suffer weaknesses in translation to the tax
413. I.R.C. § 6662.
414. The former Commissioner expressed his "major disappointment in the bill [in] its
failure to tackle the key question of the nature and extent of the taxpayer's obligation to file
a correct return." 1989 House Hearings,supra note 2, at 275 (statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs).
415. See I.R.C. § 6664(c) (stating that "No penalty shall be imposed" if there was reasonable
cause and the taxpayer acted in good faith).
416. See H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 7, at 1392-93 ("By applying... unified exception
criterion to all accuracy related penalties, the committee believes that taxpayers will more easily
understand the standard of behavior that is required."). Cf. Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer's
PrQfessional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1073 (1987) ("normative significance of
[former] section 6661 is uncertain"); Holden, supra note 161, at 774 (stating that it is "far from
clear that this penalty [former section 6661] establishes a normative standard for taxpayer
conduct" rather than just imposing a charge for certain conduct).
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system. Nevertheless, a better system than that in place after the
1989 Act is possible.
For the last fifteen years, civil tax penalty proposals have been
anchored in the concept of tiers. The Administrative Conference in
the 1970s, 417 the ABA, 418 and the Service 419 in the last two years, all
proposed three-tiered systems. The proposal in this article will also
consist of three tiers. But this proposal will differ from those of the
past in terms of the content in the various tiers and in the purpose
that each tier serves. Each tier in the proposal draws predominantly
from a different penalty justification. Only by drawing from several
justifications can we design provisions that reach different kinds of
conduct and treat them in distinctly different ways. The entire penalty
system can then operate to accomplish more than one subsidiary purpose at the same time, rather than the current half-hearted and confusing attempt of the current system. Rather than the inevitable incoherence of a tax penalty system based on a single theme or goal,
this broad coverage should work generally to encourage voluntary
compliance by providing significant penalties for various levels of culpability.
The proposal will begin by first staking out the low and high ends
of the penalty structure and then defining the middle ground.
A.

Focusing Initially on the Lower Level of Penalties

The lowest level of a penalty system plays a large part in determining the range of the penalty system by establishing the point at which
monetary charges begin. The civil tax system should have a very
modest monetary charge that is paid by all of those who underreport
their taxes.
Commentators have occasionally made brief references to a small
"automatic charge" for an underreporting of taxes 20 These suggestions
have never been incorporated in the Code's penalty structure and they
have not been explored fully. It is somewhat puzzling why the lowest
level of the penalty structure should not consist of a relatively small
automatic toll charge or user fee.

417.
418.
419.
420.

See supra text accompanying note 367.
See supra text accompanying note 366.
See supra text accompanying note 371.
See, e.g., Conference Remarks on Mansfield, The Role of Sanctions in Taxpayer

Compliance, in 1938 ABA SEC. ON TAX., INVITATIONAL CONF. ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE
408 (remarks of William D. Andrews) (small automatic "collection charge"); Johnson, supra note
152, at 1530 (stating that there should be a "small five-to-seven-percent atuomatic penalty to
reinforce the legal standard").
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Such a provision could be grounded on a theory of compensation
that does not turn on fault or intent. Statutory monetary penalties in
the absence of fault exist in other contexts.4 2' Several different compensatory schemes contain versions where the intent or fault of the actor
is irrelevant or the act in question triggers the charge based on strict
liability concepts. 42 In tort cases it has been argued that application
of a strict liability standard is appropriate where the actor's behavior
creates nonreciprocal risks. Nonreciprocal risks occur where the possibility of harm lying within the control of the actor exceeds the harm
the victim could impose on the actor. 4- It is the creation of extra risks
beyond reciprocal risks that generates the right to recover. 4? In the
context of the tax system, the taxpayer's efforts largely control the
likelihood of error in the return and the problem of detection lies
largely with the Service. This relation fits the nonreciprocal risk
analysis. Some charge for compensation would be fair since the taxpayers who are caught underreporting make necessary a detection
4
and enforcement program that drains society's resources. 25

421. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1321 (providing for a
strict liability civil penalty of up to $25,000 per day of violation); United States v. Coastal States
Crude Gathering Co., 643 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); United
States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979); O'Brien, supra note 253, at 452;
see also True v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Wyo. 1985), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990) (sanctioning with respect to oil spills, civil penalties applied
on strict liability basis). The unlawful bringing of aliens into the United States also subjects
the violator to statutory liability without regard to intent. 8 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988); United States
v. Sanchez, 520 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1981). Even though the amount of the penalty
may be mitigated by the actor's diligence, the statutory language gives the authority to impose
the penalty without regard to those actions. 8 U.S.C. § 1323(b)-(c) (1988).
422. The penalty justification of compensation has a ready analogy in tort law which provides
for compensatory damages that internalize the costs of the actor's conduct. In circumstances
where there are no market forces to internalize the costs of adverse behavior, penalties have
been considered as "surrogates" to motivate desired behavior (deterrence). Diver, supra note
253, at 1463-64.
Commentators have favored a negligence or strict liability standard in order that compensatory tort actions provide a balance leading to efficient allocation of resources. A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 39-58, 67-74 74-106 (2d ed. 1989).
Strict liability is seen as supporting such notions of efficiency by encouraging potential defendants
to spend money to take a desirable level of precautions against harm to potential victims and
by causing their activities and products to bear the true cost of their production. Richard
Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Liability in
Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1104-05 (1990).
423. George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538,
542-43 (1972).
424. Id. at 543-51; Ausness, supra note 422, at 1101-02.
425. Cf. Ausness, supra note 422, at 1102 ("paradigm of reciprocity may support the imposition of liability on product manufacturers in cases where they withhold information about a
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The compensatory base for the scheme negates the objection that
this system penalizes taxpayers for nonculpable conduct. No opprobrium attaches to the award of a compensatory amount. Compensation
makes no moral comment and attaches no stigma. It merely allocates
costs. Liability under a compensation model is not a morally based
punishment and ought not cause such feelings in the tax context any
more than in the product liability area. 42 Nor is it a valid criticism
that the compensatory amount bears no relation to the culpability of
the conduct or the amount needed to achieve a goal such as voluntary
compliance. Such a scheme is principally concerned with a different
goal: compensation. The compensation is for the government's examination costs and the taxpayer could avoid liability for this compensatory amount by reporting taxes conservatively on issues of doubt by
resolving uncertainty in favor of the government and seeking an immediate refund.
Determining an amount or rate of the penalty remains. It is possible
to make a cost accounting allocation of expense for each particular
case, as has been done and suggested in other contexts.- But primarily
for administrative ease and simplicity, the measure considered here
should be set at a low percentage of the amount of tax liability underpaid. A figure of 10%, or perhaps up to 20%, could be justified based
on cost figures for the Service in recent years. Audits appear to cost
about 10% of the tax in question as increased examinations have been
estimated as likely to raise an additional ten dollars of revenue for
each dollar expended in additional audits.4 An allocation of some of

known product risk" because "[slubjecting others to such a risk would involve involuntary and
nonreciprocal conduct").
426.

See JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 166-79 (1988).

427. See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 24-25 (D.R.I. 1989),
affd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (allowing Department of Justice in CERCLA action to recover
$185,879.62 for enforcement activities relating to waste site cleanup); 1985 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST.
SEC., A COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO LEGISLATION AND

LITIGATION -

A REPORT OF THE RICO CASES COMMITTEE 66-67 (stating that a criminally

convicted RICO defendant may be required to pay a criminal fine plus investigatory expenses
and cost of prosecution under Model State Legislation set forth in report).
428.

Dubin, et al., supra note 804, at 787; see BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 215, at

266. A recent GAO study has concluded that Internal Revenue Service projections of extra
audit revenues of $1.1 billion by 1995 with 1040 more examination staffs is high. GAO, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS' IMPROVED ESTIMATES OF TAx EXAMINATION YIELD NEED TO BE

REFINED (Sept. 1990). The 1990 Treasury appropriations bill passed by Congress increased
funding for the Service by about $600 million up to a total of $6.1 billion. The total permits

$3.5 billion for tax enforcement and will permit an increase in audits to 1.4 million returns, an
increase of 107,000 from 1990. TAx NOTES TODAY (TAx ANALYSTS) (Oct. 26, 1990).
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the other costs of the Service would produce a percentage somewhat
greater than 10% and may approach 20% as additional items of related
costs are included. 42 Furthermore, some compensatory penalties have
been analogized to liquidated damages.430 Therefore, a penalty rate
between 10% and 20% would be comparable to the liquidated damage
amounts that are found in many private agreements. 43' Moreover, this
percentage amount incidentally would provide a small (actually very
small) incentive for a taxpayer to comply that might otherwise, as
described above, be lost if the actual costs of the individual case
measured the charge. Thus, the charge should be able to do double
duty within reason.
This sort of provision clearly would be well within the compensatory
rationales outlined above .4 Compensatory schemes for penalties often
have turned upon a percentage rate. Furthermore, the distinctions
often made between compensatory and punitive penalties accord sufficient latitude for the scheme proposed to be considered remedial or
compensatory. Indeed, the proposal seems relatively mild considering

429. See I.R.S. COMM'R & CHIEF COUNS. 1986 ANN. REP. 54, 57, 61 (1986). The added
taxes and penalties recommended amounted to $19,278,563,000. Id. at 54. The assessed penalties
were $6,928,265,000. Id. at 57. If the recommended penalties are approximated by the assessed
penalties, the recommended deficiencies would be $12,350,298,000. The potentially most relevant
costs appear to be examination and affects ($1,401,171,000), and tax fraud investigations
($221,304,000). Id. at 61. Other potentially relevant costs were overhead from management
($89,475,000) and processing of tax returns ($1,247,483,000). Id. If some of those costs are also
allocated to the compensation formula, the penalty rate could reasonably result in a figure of
20% for a charge upon each deficiency based on an allocation of the costs referred to above pro
rata across the deficiency amounts.
430. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237
(1972) (citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151-54 (1956)).
431. See United Air Lines v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding
liquidated damages at or in excess of 50% of various future fees, charges and projected revenues
in computer lease agreement); Larson-Hegstrom & Assoc. v. Jeffries, 701 P.2d 587 (Ariz. App.
1985) (upholding liquidated damages of 6% on real estate brokerage contract); Rohauer v. Little,
736 P.2d 403 (Colo. 1987) (upholding liquidated damages of 5% on sale of real estate); Leeber
v. Deltona Corp., 546 A.2d 452 (Me. 1988) (upholding liquidated damages of 15% on sale of real
estate); Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559 (Utah 1985) (upholding liquidated damages of 6%
on real estate brokerage contract); Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 680 P.2d 448 (Wash.
App. 1984) (upholding liquidated damages of 35% of fees collected in breach of noncompetition
agreement). But see Colonial at Lynnfield, Inc. v. Sloan, 870 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1989) (refusing
to uphold liquidated damages of 6% on sale of interest in hotel); Hayes & Swift, Inc. v. Sabia
Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 107 (N.H. 1985) (refusing to uphold liquidated damages of 10% of construction contract); Walter Implement, Inc. v. Focht, 730 P.2d 1340 (Wash. 1987) (refusing to uphold
liquidated damages of 20% of farm equipment rental contract).
432. See supra text accompanying notes 335-53.
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some of the tax penalty provisions that have supported the revenue
over our nation's history.4
This proposal, if made by the Service or other official body, undoub-

tedly would raise a storm of criticism over its strict liability standard.
Imposition of tax penalties on a strict liability basis has been considered
when purposes other than compensation motivated congressional action. The enactment of the substantial understatement penalty was
preceded by a proposal based on a true strict liability penalty. 43 That

proposal lacked sufficient political force to pass as a penalty based on
deterrence theory. The eventual enactment of former section 66614

was not based on a strict liability trigger since the sanction did not
apply if there was substantial authority for the position in question
and the Service could waive that sanction based on the taxpayer's

good faith. 436 More recently, in connection with the study leading up
to the 1989 Act, the Service concluded that a strict liability penalty
designed to serve some form of deterrence would likely cause resent437
ment and perhaps harm voluntary compliance.
This concern should not obstruct the current proposal. The charge

in question is not designed primarily to deter or effect compliance. It
is designed to recover costs that errant taxpayers have imposed on

society, and it represents a relatively small charge that is not unlike

433. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 59-80, 103-06; see also ABA PENALTIES
TASK FORCE REPORT, supranote 5, at 15-21; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 53,
at 113.
434. An early proposal leading to the enactment of former § 6661 was a strict liability
penalty with a 10% penalty rate. See Kenneth W. Gideon, Gideon Discusses the Substantial
Understatement Penalty, 18 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 560 (Feb. 7, 1983). "More likely
than not" was also proposed as another proposed bill allowed a taxpayer to escape a penalty if
"the taxpayer reasonably believed that he was more likely than not to prevail." Id.; see LeDuc,
supra note 204, at 382 n.91. The adoption of the substantial authority standard resulted from
the political process. Gideon, supra, at 530; John LeDuc, An Evaluation of Recent Taxpayer
Compliance Legislation and Future Options, 20 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 115, 120 (July
11, 1983).
435. I.R.C. § 6661 (1982).
436. Cf. Holden, supra note 161, at 774 (noting that "substantial understatement penalty"
may "be viewed as a benefit/charge provision, offering taxpayers the option of disclosure as the
price of a penalty free climate").
437. The Service in its 1989 penalty reform study rejected a strict liability penalty trigger
because it would be perceived as "unfair." The Service reasoned that the penalty would thus
detract from voluntary compliance due to the "unacceptably high" number of instances that it
would be applied to taxpayers striving for compliance in complex fact patterns and complex tax
law. Stark Report, supra note 6, at VIII-36; see also ABA Compliance Commission Report,
supra note 2, at 336, 351 (stating that tax laws must be fair to enhance compliance).
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the other
charges that citizens experience when they deviate from the
"rules. '' 43 Some examples are "cold" check charges, overdue charges
on library books and late charges on mortgage loans. Those unpleasant
"surprises" of life are not welcomed, but they are paid usually in a
business-like fashion. The payors do not generally quit using checks,
borrowing books or living in houses.
A sort of "grumbling acceptance" is the most that can be expected
for the tax system since taxpayers are asked to part with their
money. 4 9 Voluntary compliance has been somewhat exaggerated as
tax evasion in the United States has often flourished when the opportunity arose. 40 Taxpayers resent paying tax, even before the additions.
This negative attitude is consistent with the historical resistance
to taxes. Taxes have never been well supported in this country in the
absence of a crisis like World War I and sometimes not even in such
crises.-' Expecting citizens to perceive the tax penalties as fair and
to comply more readily in the future because they have been penalized
is expecting too much. At some point penalty amounts could become
so large as to prompt fairness concerns, but the currently low rates
for all the accuracy-related penalties and this proposal do not approach
that point. The studies leading to the 1989 Act were overly concerned
about taxpayer perceptions of fairness and whether "fair" penalties
could encourage compliance. With the rare exception of persons such
as Justice Holmes, 44 2 no one really wants to pay taxes. Even the
exceptional citizen would probably be upset about being required to
pay a penalty of any amount. The tax compliance studies clearly show
that most underreporting is intentional rather than the result of mistakes. 443 Those with a real choice, such as the self-employed and farm-

438. See Johnson, supra note 152, at 1530.
439. Ball & Friedman, supra note 256, at 209. ("[S]tudies indicate that 'disapproval' of laws
by the regulated does not necessarily result in defiance and rebellion. Grumbling acceptance of
the income tax laws ... may serve the purposes of the legal order perfectly well; wild enthusiasm
for regulatory measures is not necessary.").
440. Haws, supra note 54, at 128.
441. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 99, at iii; Haws, supra note 54, at 28.
442. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("Taxes are what we pay for civilized society. . . ."). Holmes' statement is frequently
quoted. Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Egger Discusses Tax Reform and Other Issues, 26 TAx NOTES
(TAx ANALYSTS) 1266, 1267 (Mar. 25, 1985) ("Holmes said that 'taxes [sic] are what we pay
for a civilized society."') (remarks of former IRS Commissioner Roscoe Egger). The former
Commissioner should be very familiar with this reference as Holmes' statement is also carved
in stone on the frieze on 1111 Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. where Mr. Egger
served in his time as Commissioner.
443. If 45% of returns show a deficiency and 9% show a refund, the error process is not
random. See ABA Compliance Commission Report, supra note 4, at 335 (noting also that the
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ers, largely fail to comply.- Those who have no real choice, such as
wage earners subject to withholding, predominantly comply."- Perceptions of fairness of penalties will not affect such patterns of compliance.
Rather, penalties borne by those who are deficient and make necessary
the cost of the system would be more likely to mollify those taxpayers
who are not deficient and who otherwise must support the cost of
enforcing the tax laws.
B.

Establishing the Upper Level of Penalties

The proposed civil penalty system has at its lowest level a small
compensatory charge. The other extreme of the proposed system could
be anchored more definitively. Establishing this end of the penalty
system involves fixing a penalty for the truly bad actors. The need
for a firm moral statement should be apparent and to a large extent
the tax system has been on that track for over a century. However,
the message would be clearer and stronger if the capstone of the civil
tax penalty system were to draw upon retributory concepts.
The highest civil tax penalty is, and has been, that applying to
tax fraud. As described above, this civil penalty covers conduct that
the criminal offense of tax evasion also covers. It traces its roots to
the 100% penalty during the Civil War for "false or fraudulent" returns."6 Few recommendations for changing the civil fraud penalty
were made in connection with the 1989 Act and it remained largely
7
unchanged."
Given the high level of culpability required for application of this
penalty and the consensus that it should be part of the system, extensive recommendations might seem unneeded. The recommendations
of this article will begin with some thoughts on tidiness, but will move
quickly to more substantive concerns. First, the civil fraud penalty
rate has fluctuated widely in recent years from 50% to 75%, both with
and without a further interest component.4 The rate is currently at

figures have increased more substantially for understatements from 1965 to 1982 than for overstatements). That Commission concluded that the vast bulk of the tax gap is the result of
intentional action since the number of uncertain issues causing noncompliance is rather small in
comparison to the cases of clearly wrong resolutions of issues for returns. Id. at 339.
444. See id. tbl. 1, at 344.
445. See id. tbl. 1, at 343.
446. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173 § 14, 13 Stat. 223, 226-27.
447. See sources cited supra notes 223-25, 336 & 376.
448. The early 1980s began with the rate at 50%. An interest component was added early
in that decade to give the penalty more bite. In 1986, Congress raised the rate to 75% as part
of a further toughening of penalties. Then, with the prospect of penalty reform close, the interest
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75% without an interest component 449 largely as a result of this historical wandering. Eliminating the interest component increased tidiness
and clarity, because an interest component does not convey as firm a
message as would a simple ad valorem rate to the would-be tax cheater.
But the question that naturally comes to mind is: "Why 75%?" The
Service suggested that as part of the 1989 reform Congress should
increase the fraud penalty rate to 100%. 450 The ABA studied penalties
at length and made no recommendation about the 75% rate. Reform
ultimately bypassed the issue.
The statement made by the capstone of civil tax penalties is very
important. It should be emphatic. On that ground the Service's proposal had merit in selecting a clear, round, substantial figure for the
penalty rate. A 100% rate would be a more effective economic deterrent than lesser figures. The Service's approach based on encouraging
voluntary compliance would have put the fraud penalty rate at a
reasonable figure of 100% of the underpayment.
Nevertheless, quite apart from the Service's recommendation and
the probability that such an amendment of the fraud penalty would
affect compliance, a substantial increase in the fraud penalty rate is
justified by retributory concepts. Because the civil fraud penalty
covers conduct that is equivalent to the capstone tax crime of tax
evasion, use of retributory concepts is appropriate. If any taxpayer
behavior is morally reprehensible, it is tax evasion. Furthermore,
additional procedural safeguards exist in application of the civil fraud
penalty, as the Service bears the burden of proving civil fraud 451 and
the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence.452 These aspects
make the resemblance to the criminal offense close and the use of

component of the fraud penalty was eliminated in 1988. See supra text accompanying notes
219-20.
449. I.R.C. § 6663(a).
450. See Stark Report, sulyra note 6, at VIII-43. The Service barely discussed its reasons.
It observed that: "The [rate] reflect[s] an attempt to achieve proportionality, and yet not be so
severe as to encourage neutralization of the sanction by administrators." Id. at VII-41. There
appears to have been no consideration of the possibility of a higher rate beyond the 100%
"round" figure. Of course, that may simply reflect the political possibilities since the rate remained at 75% in the legislation.
451. I.R.C. § 6663(b) ("If the Secretary establishes.
...
); I.R.C. § 7454(a); Webb v.
Commissioner, 394 F.2d 366, 378 (5th Cir. 1968); Estate of Spruill, 88 T.C. 1197, 1242 (1987);
BITTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 151,
45.3, at 45-17.
452. See Webb, 394 F.2d at 378; Spruill, 88 T.C. at 1242; see also BITTKER & MCMAHON,
supra note 151, 45.3, at 45-17; MORGAN, supra note 204, at 162 ("Although I.R.C. § 7454(a)
is frequently cited as the source of this standard, neither the statute nor its legislative history
recite the clear and convincing evidence standard.").

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss5/1

88

Winslow: Tax Penalties--"They Shoot Dogs, Don't They?"
1991]

TAX PENALTIES

retributory support appropriate. Accordingly, a penalty rate of 100%,
or even 200%, of the underpayment would seem appropriate consider-

ing the seriousness of tax evasion.
Such an increase would be within the fairness guidelines of retributory concepts. There are quite a number of civil penalties enforced
under federal law. 4- The sanction amounts provided by the tax laws
generally lie well below civil penalties for other offenses 5 4 In contexts
other than tax, it is not uncommon to see criminal penalties of two
4

and three times the amount at issue for offenses of high culpability.'

5
57

Treble damage or penalty civil provisions exist for antitrust, 456 RICO
insider trading, 4 8 and other acts of wrongdoing. 459 In addition, the
penalties derived from the old customs forfeiture provisions provide
a set of penalties comparable to the tax penalties but the modern
rates are greatly in excess of the tax penalties under discussion. 460 A

fraud penalty rate of such ranges would be consistent with the more
punitive sanctions in other areas of the law. It is difficult to explain

453. For an extensive listing of such penalties taken from a report in the early 1970s, see
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990, 1003-09 n.43
(5th Cir. 1975), affd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
454. Jonathan Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38
NAT'L TAX J. 345, 348 (1985).
455. See POSNER, supra note 272, at 210 n.5 (noting recently increased fines in the criminal
code up to the largest of $250,000, or two times the perpetrator's gain or the victim's loss).
456. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (allowing treble damages).
457. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988) (allowing treble damages).
458. 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (allowing treble profit penalty).
459. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988) (allowing treble damages for patent infringement);
19 U.S.C. § 1590 (1988) (assessing a double value penalty for airplane smuggling).
460. The modern penalty provisions supporting the import duties include a penalty for fraud
up to the value of the merchandise (rather than the amount of the duty at issue), a penalty for
gross negligence up to the lesser of the value of the merchandise or four times the duties at
issue, and a penalty for negligence up to the lesser of the value of the merchandise or two
times the duties at issue. See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c) (1988). Courts and commentators have compared
these provisions to the income tax penalties. See United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d
741, 758-59 (1st Cir. 1985) (construing prior version and using income tax negligence penalty
as illustrative that the Customs Act could penalize negligence even though it did not then clearly
state as much); Robert E. Herzstein, The Need to Reform Section 592 of the TariffAct of 1930,
10 INT'L LAW. 285, 294 & n.16 (1976) (describing a call by the ABA for reform of the old
section and suggesting that tax penalties available to Internal Revenue Service be used as a
guide in part because they are "reasonable in amount"); Note, Anachronism Laid to Rest:
Customs Reform Act Accomplishes Long Overdue Reform of Section 592 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 10 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1305, 1320-21 (1978) (describing objections to the harshness
of the penalties, in particular the negligence penalty 'in a legal system that generally punishes
a negligent wrongdoer by requiring him to restore the status quo" with reference to the 5%
negligence penalty of old I.R.C. § 6653(b)).
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why the most serious of civil tax offenses has been treated lightly for
decades. Thus, proportionality and fairness would seem to require a
461
similar civil tax fraud rate.
In addition, a civil tax fraud penalty of 100% to 200% of the underpayment attributable to fraud would be consistent with the historical
magnitude of that fraud penalty. A fraud penalty rate of 100% would
also not be out of line with recent penalty amounts in terms of dollar
penalty amounts, since recent versions have included an interest component and a penalty based on the entire underpayment. Moreover,
penalty rates from earlier in history are even more supportive. The
Civil War fraud penalty rate was 100% of the entire tax and for a
brief time during World War I there was a penalty rate of 200% of
the tax evaded.462 Either of those provisions would yield a greater
penalty than one providing for a charge in the amount of 100% of the
underpayment due to fraud.
The reason for these firmer stances in the past was the more
resolute determination of those times. Tax cheating has existed in all
periods. But the war efforts produced a degree of unity of purpose
that is absent today. It was probably not coincidental that Congress
greatly reduced the penalty rate in the first Revenue Act just after
' '4
the end of World War I, as the nation began its "return to normalcy. 6
The present fiscal crises, such as the growing government budget
deficit, call for similar resolve. However, the current Congress and
administration appear incapable of leading and acting for the good of

461. It has been suggested that as the amount of a civil tax penalty increases it will become
a "punitive" or "criminal" sanction. See Mark Bernsley, An Alternative Approach to Compliance,
44 TAX NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 103, 105 (July 3, 1989). Presumably the classification of such
a penalty as criminal would give rise to the procedural protections accorded criminal proceedings
generally. See generally Charney, supra note 252, at 478. There may be some technical problems
with the use of a retributive feature for a civil fraud penalty. At some point, the double jeopardy
clause may exclude its applicability where the taxpayer has been criminally prosecuted. See
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1903 & 1903 n.10 (1989). The current civil fraud
penalty has been found not to pose such a problem as it has been characterized as remedial.
See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). In the event that a tax penalty is found to be
retributive, the system may lose the ability to penalize again one convicted or the ability to
apply the fraud penalty at all to one acquitted. However, this is a relatively minor, almost
technical, problem. The monetary sanctions accompanying a tax fraud conviction could be adjusted. Additionally, those acquitted will be in the minority and, further, subject to the intermediate penalty proposed here. Moreover, assertions of the civil fraud penalty occur at roughly
four or five times the number of criminal tax prosecutions. See I.R.S. COMM'R & CHIEF COUNS.
1986 ANN. REP. 35, 37.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 79-138.
463. See Revenue Act of 1918, § 1317, 40 Stat. 1057, 1147-48.
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the nation in determining in a business-like manner such basic governmental matters as a budget. 46 The tax system could now benefit
from a firm resoluteness as in the past, including a commitment to
take taxes seriously by maintaining a tax fraud rate of at least 100%.
C.

Defining the Middle Ground -

"Do the Right Thing"

The large area between the upper and lower levels of the penalty
system just described leaves ample room for a middle tier. The penalty
in this tier should set and enforce concretely a theoretically desirable
normative standard incorporated as a requirement in tax reporting
conduct. This issue, which inevitably arises in devising a penalty
scheme, is the major one that IMPACT 1989 failed to address affirmatively. This article concludes that this tier should be occupied by a
form of negligence penalty that sets a high target for taxpayer resolution of uncertain issues in the taxpayer's favor in terms of likelihood
of taxpayer success on such issues to avoid the penalty.
1. Inevitable Uncertainties in Reporting and Accommodation in Prior
Targets
A penalty of the kind considered here must recognize some inevitable realities. Among the first is that legal issues and factual matters
are often uncertain. A penalty turning upon fault or care of the taxpayer must account for this reality.4 In taking a position on a tax
return, the taxpayers and even advisors may not be certain about the
position's correctness. Among the uncertain items, some will be more
doubtful than others. This uncertainty should be reflected somehow
in any penalty provision that is not entirely automatic. The system
should attempt to take into account differences between (1) good faith
resolutions of issues involving some doubt and (2) bad faith resolutions
of doubtful issues, including "wishful thinking" resolutions.
Justice Holmes's famous statement that law is "but a prediction"
of the consequences following a given act 46 seems to be a favorite
cited authority for the inevitable uncertainties in the application of

464. See, e.g., Lane Davenport, Deficit May Hit $250 Billion In Fiscal 1991, Darman
Warns, 48 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 1335 (Sept. 10, 1990); Lane Davenport, Bush Blames
Congress For Budget Stalemate, 48 TAx NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 943 (Aug. 20, 1990); David
E. Rosenbaum, Bush Rejects Stopgap Bill After Budget Pact Defeat; FederalShutdown Begins,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, § 1, at 1.
465. See Johnson, supra note 152, at 1523 (stating that the "dominant view of 'law' within
the legal profession is that law is a process that can produce a possible range of outcomes").
466. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457-58 (1897).
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the tax laws.467 This seems fitting since the description of law as a
prediction is "probably the most influential passage" in American legal
literature.4 - The characterization of law as a prediction recognized
that a judicial outcome is not "determined by mechanical application
of doctrine. '' 469 That observation comports with the Justice's view that
law cannot be reduced to mathematical precision.
Justice Holmes did not intend to suggest that the application of
legal doctrine presented great difficulties or even that it created much
uncertainty. Rather, his point was that law was predictable and that
the law admitted discernable, if not mechanical, answers. 470 The vast
majority of legal questions are simply not indeterminate.471 Neither
the law in general nor the tax law in particular is overwhelmed by
uncertainty. 472 The observation should not, however, be overstated.

467. See Gwen T. Handelnan, Counseling Ordered Liberty: Reply to a Commentary, 9
TAX REV. 781, 784 & n.11 (1990) [hereinafter Handelman I]; Gwen T. Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 77, 94 (1989) [hereinafter Handelman II];
Johnson, supra note 152, at 1523.
468. Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American
Legal Thought - A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and
VA.

Its Use, 66

CORNELL

L.

REV.

861, 904-05 (1981).

469. Handelman I, supra note 467, at 784 n.11.
470. He emphasized that the task of making the predictions was manageable. Holmes,
supra note 466, at 458. "The number of our predictions when generalized and reduced to a
system is not unmanageably large. They present themselves as a finite body of dogma which
may be mastered within a reasonable time. It is a great mistake to be frightened by the ever
increasing number of reports. The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation
take up pretty much the whole body of the law, and restate it from the present point of view."
Id. His point was simply that "a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the
court.
...
Id. (emphasis added). He offered the example that one can generally predict or
assume that a contract breach will lead to a damage award. Id. at 462. To him the "lawyer is
predicting not some particular outcome, but a precept that is likely to prevail in the generality
of cases .... [T]he lawyer appears to be doing no more than identifying and applying the law."
Summers, supra note 468, at 905. Even though Holmes' view of the law as a prediction was
limited, he also recognized that. law is not a science and sometimes admits of more than one
answer, and is subject to change. Holmes, supra note 466, at 465-66. Still, it is likely that he
would not seriously disagree that the vast majority of cases can be easily decided.
471. See Summers, supra note 468, at 907-08. "[F]ar more often the law is relatively
determinate and determinable in light of relevant standards of validity and accepted interpreta-

tional technique ... "Id.; see also RICHARD A.

POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE

77-78 (1990); Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics"of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 630-38 (1985); Harry
T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practicein
Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 388-92 (1984).
472. The ABA Commission on Compliance concluded that the uncertain issues in the tax
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A fault-based penalty must accommodate the Justice's recognition that
law is not a mechanical science while also recognizing that in the vast
majority of cases there are "right" answers.
Penalties of the past, and even the present, all have incorporated
some target level of certainty for the return position. If the taxpayer
did not exercise a specified degree of care to report a position with
at least that target level of certainty, the sanction was triggered. For
decades, the negligence penalty was thought to establish a standard
of reasonable care to achieve at least a reasonable basis for positions
taken on the return. 473 The substantial understatement penalty was
based primarily, outside the tax shelter context, upon the objective
existence of substantial authority. 474 The substantial authority standard
was adopted in part because of the inevitability of some uncertain
items. The 1989 revision of the waiver provision to the effect that the
taxpayer cannot be penalized if acting with reasonable care and in
good faith would seem to add a subjective overlay to this standard.
The targets set by all the existing or previous penalties have been
rather modest. "Reasonable basis" has been estimated to have approximately a 10% to 20% chance of success if litigated; this is a position
that is at least better than frivolous. 475 "Substantial authority" has
been viewed as being equal to or greater than approximately 30% to
40% chance of success in litigation. 476 None of these standards require
that the taxpayer report according to the most probable outcome.
2. Difficulties with Prior Targets and Selection of a Desirable
Target Standard
The "reasonable basis" and "substantial authority" targets are too
low for a normative standard. Upon signing a tax return, the taxpayer
affirms that the return is "true," "correct," and "complete." Based on
common usage of those words, the taxpayer should believe upon signing that the return is in some sense "right." The affirmation commonly
might be taken to mean belief that the position was at least "as likely

laws generate relatively few cases and 'their importance relative to the size of the tax gap, is
probably relatively small." ABA Compliance Commission Report, supra note 4, at 339.
473. See supra text accompanying notes 147-64.
474. See supra text accompanying notes 197-208.
475. MORGAN, supranote 204, at 348 (stating that the chance of success might also be up
to about 29%); Banoff, supra note 164, at 1127-28 (stating that some might say the chance of
success is as low as 5%).
476. MORGAN, supra note 204, at 348 (stating that the chance of success could be as low
as 30%); Banoff, supra note 164, at 1127-28; Johnson, supra note 152, at 1525 (the chance of
success is between 30% and 35%).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

93

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 5 [1991], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

as not to prevail. '' 4 - Even in what might be the ultimate resolution
of a case or type of case, the standards of substantial authority and
reasonable basis cannot be thought to comport with a belief that the
return is in any sense "right." "Right" should at least mean that the
position on the return would be sustained more probably than not if
litigated. "More likely than not correct" should translate into a likelihood of 50% plus.478 "Right" cannot mean a position that is more likely
than not to be defeated if litigated, a definition which the reasonable
basis and substantial authority standards each allow.
The inadequacy of the existing standards motivated the Service
and others to search for a better normative standard based on the
novel idea that the taxpayer should, in order to avoid a penalty, make
a reasonable attempt to do what is, or at least appears to be, right.479
A fault-based penalty based on that ideal was considered in an early
draft of the Service's Stark Report. 480 That provision would have required that, to avoid a penalty for each position, the taxpayer must
have used reasonable care to see that such position was more likely
than not to prevail.481 But the Service ultimately settled for recommending an enhanced probability for substantial authority, approaching but not equalling 50% (45% was suggested).4 - The search was for
naught as the 1989 Act did not affirmatively change the existing
targets.
Beyond the flaw of not requiring correctness, a substantial authority standard has further difficulties. It is an artificial standard. At the
time of its invention in the early 1980s, its newness was seen as a
virtue, because it would not carry the baggage of the older standards.
But it is not a standard that the human mind easily grasps. As it is
pegged to a position with a 30% to 40% chance of success, it is unreal.
The human mind cannot make the fine distinctions required to place
such a position in the spectrum of standards. Between those points
representing reasonable basis and equipoise lies one standard of proof
or probability capable of human conceptualization. That point has been

477.
478.

Johnson, supra note 152, at 1523-24; Rowen, supra note 133, at 250-51.
Banoff, supra note 164, at 1127-28 (over 50%). See MORGAN, supra note 204, at 348

(51%).
479. Johnson, supra note 152, at 1522.
480. Id. at 1523 & n.15.
481. Id. (citing Executive Task Force, IRS Comm'r Penalty Study, Working Draft of Chapters of Civil Penalties Study, ch. 8, pt. VI.1).
482. Stark Report, supra note 6, at VIII-39.
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termed "substantial possibility,"
which might at first glance seem
very close to the substantial authority concept given the similar wording. But the "substantial possibility" concept clings more closely to
equipoise as it is essentially a "mirror-image" of a preponderance or
more-likely-than-not test,4 4 which is viewed as being slightly beyond
equipoise or 50%.4 The current version of substantial authority occupies a much more ill-defined middle ground between reasonable
basis and equipoise.
The amendments suggested for the substantial authority definition
in the 1989 reforms were similarly deficient. The Service in its final
Report suggested that the authority required should approach a 50%
likelihood of success on the return position and that perhaps 45%
would suffice. 48 This would seem to push the content of substantial
authority closer to, but not into line with, that of the recognized
concept of a "substantial possibility."
Other standards commonly used in the law have some basis in
probabilities. For example, "reasonable basis" means a significant position, beyond frivolous; "equipoise" means a 50% probability, or as
likely as not; and "more probably than not" means a more than 50%
likelihood of success. "Substantial authority," as defined under the
versions above, is just an intermediate standard loosely placed between
reasonable basis and equipoise. The Service's proposal in connection
with the 1989 reforms seemed to call for an even more refined choice
of probabilities. 48 7 No one, not even an attorney, has the refined sense
to be able to distinguish between a 45% and 35% chance of success
in filing a tax return. 48 It would be entertaining beyond words to
489
listen to a lawyer explain these standards to a lay taxpayer.

483. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 34 (1970); Kevin M.
Clermont, Procedure'sMagical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1123-26 (1987); Donald A. Winslow, Note, Harmful Use of Harmless
Errorin Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 538, 550 n.48 (1979).
484. Clermont, supra note 483, at 1122-23. Cf. Rowen, supra note 133, at 242-43 (agreeing
with Clermont generally, but not recognizing a potential standard between equipoise and reasonable basis).
485. Clermont, supra note 483, at 1119 n.13.
486. Stark Report, supra note 6, at VIII-39.
487. See id. at VIII-44 (standard stated). CompareABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 47 (quoted infra note 488).
488. The ABA Penalties Task Force stated that:
Of [the standards used for return preparation under the prior law], the substantial
authority standard appears to require the most refined analysis of the outcome of
a hypothetical case in court. Thus, the committee reports indicate that a position
supported by substantial authority will be "less stringent than a 'more likely than
not standard' and more stringent than a 'reasonable basis' standard." If probability
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Substantial authority standards, suggested and extant, are also
very difficult to conceptualize and vexing to apply in the context of
an actual case. 490 It may seem similarly troubling to distinguish between a 45% and 50% plus probability of success. However, lawyers
and judges must commonly decide which is the better of two views,
and the use of the standard "fifty percent plus" requires only that

decision.

491

From among the choices that can be conceptualized adequately,
only the "more likely than not" standard makes complete sense as a
normative standard. As it represents a standard requiring at least a
choice that appears better than the rest, it can be said to require that
a taxpayer adopt for reporting purposes what appears to be the right
position. 4 - Moreover, if the taxpayer's position must conform to the
law as a real prediction, rather than a mere adversarial "litigating
position" or wishful thinking, 493 it would seem that this condition is
only fulfilled once a position has at least this chance of success in
litigation. Substantial authority, because it fails to require authority
that is more likely than not to support the return position, permits
4
adoption of positions that are probably wrong. 9
Equipoise might also yield a position that could be called right,
but such refined analysis of probabilities is nearly impossible to apply
in real cases.4 95 In evaluating a case, a judge is unlikely to be paralyzed

of success would mean a gTeater than 50 percent chance of success in court, then
a return preparer is left with attempting to calculate the odds on some lesser
chance of success. Trial lawyers cannot calculate chances of success on such a
refined basis. It follows that, as a practical matter, tax lawyers who may not try
cases at all would have difficulty in applying such a standard. A standard of conduct
that cannot even be ascertained simply is inappropriate to use in imposing a penalty.
ABA PENALTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 47.
489. For a hypothetical discussion between an attorney and a client over a return position,
but omitting a description of how to determine whether a case meets the required chance of
success on the merits for substantial authority to exist, see Holden, supra note 161, at 775-76.
490. See id. at 772 ("One must quickly concede the limited utility of constructing such a
continuum as well as the inherently uncertain terms used within it.").
491. It has been argued that this standard would in practice become very close to, or
essentially the same as, absolutely correct. Kurtz, supra note 154, at 1621. This is not a
formidable obstacle. The standard itself recognizes uncertainty which is usually apparent to
some degree.
492. See Holden, supra note 161, at 771.
493. See Handelman II, supra note 467, at 94-99; Handelman I, supranote 467, at 783-85.
494. Cf. Johnson, supra note 152, at 1523-24 ("Standards lower than 'as likely as not' are
not consistent with the meaning of 'correct and true' tax required by the current felony provisions
and tax return affirmation.").
495. The recommendation to which this line of thought is heading resembles the ethical
standard recommended by a commentator some time ago. See Rowen, supra note 133, at 262.
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with indecision, as an equipoise standard seems to suggest. The normative standard should not suggest that will happen. Moreover, one
position in equipoise with another is no more right than the other,
and to allow the taxpayer to resolve such doubts (assuming for the
moment that such a situation should actually arise) against the Service
gives the taxpayer undue latitude since only a small fraction of returns
can be examined. A form of a negligence penalty with a target certainty
of more probable than not should be the intermediate taxpayer accuracy-related penalty.
The penalty suggested recognizes uncertainty in tax positions. It
does not require that a position taken be a sure thing. The target set
for the taxpayers requires only that the taxpayers based their decisions
on a determination that positions taken are more probably than not
correct. That standard does not require that the taxpayer only take
certain positions; it allows for doubt as to resolution of an issue.
In addition, the overlay of an objectively reasonable belief in the
correctness of the reported position can address further ambiguities.
At that point residual uncertainties should be addressed rather than
in the target. If the evidence shows that the taxpayer had an objectively reasonable belief that the return position was more likely than
not correct, the penalty should not apply. To fulfill that standard, the
taxpayer should use diligence in marshalling all relevant facts and
identifying issues, as well as using the same degree of care in resolving
issues for the return, such that research or advice from others might
be needed for less common issues prior to preparing the return.
Uncertainty should not give the taxpayers license to resolve issues
silently against the government. Taxpayers should file returns that
resolve doubts (on fifty-fifty questions) in favor of the Service and
pay taxes on those amounts. The challenge on such uncertain issues
should take place in the refund action. If the taxpayer desires to
mount a challenge, that should proceed expressly through a refund
action with the matter affirmatively at issue, rather than being resolved silently and without notice.

Rowen suggested that the proper ethical standard for undisclosed positions was that "an adviser
may only advise a client to take a position on a tax return if . . . the adviser believes the
position to be correct." Id. In a position that differs from that recommended here by an infinitesimally small percentage, Professor Johnson advocated that the standard should be "as likely as

not to prevail," so that "ties go to the taxpayer." Johnson, supra note 152, at 1523-24. As
Rowen observed, ties really do not exist. Rowen, supranote 133, at 242. "[T]he possibility that

one will alight on the exact mid-point of the line (theoretically an infinitesimal point) is mathematically insignificant. The judges never alight on this point; let us follow their example." Id.
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Avoidance of this penalty by disclosure is not feasible. If disclosure
were a generally available exception to the penalty, the taxpayer could
shift to the government the burden of resolving the issue through
administrative or judicial correction. 4 - For doubtful return positions
this would seem to produce some clear inefficiencies in creating a need
to undo positions that were probably wrong when taken.4- For purposes of the negligence penalty suggested here, disclosure is not a
9s
possibility4
The recommended standard should not be subject to a condition

such as a substantial understatement of tax liability, that is, a discrepancy of a particular dollar amount or a percentage of tax liability.
These sorts of exceptions create unnecessary complications in adminis-

tering the penalty or avoiding it. Furthermore, the force of the normative message suggested here would be more clear and credible

without such exceptions.
The clarity of the compliance message also would be enhanced by
a penalty rate that is beyond the compensatory rate. The current 20%

penalty rate for negligence and accuracy penalties is not negligible

496. It has been suggested that disclosure based on a tax attorney's judgment that an issue
would not be more likely than not resolved in favor of the taxpayer would "constitute a damning
admission . . . , amounting to a virtual concession on the merits." Handelman II, supra note
467, at 98.
497. Disclosure is a process that necessarily entails costs. Even good faith disclosure is
costly. If one is to disclose positions that are less likely than not to prevail, the taxpayer may
bear costs of disclosure but achieves a gain by taking the desirable position on the return. The
government's system would be unduly burdened by the disclosure rule. Assuming that the
disclosure is fairly made and informs the Service of the position taken, the rule puts the burden
on the Service to establish what was the "more correct" position and to cause the taxpayer to
pay accordingly. Efficiency would counsel against the wasteful use of resources to correct the
"wrong" position initially adopted. See Johnson, supra note 152, at 1528-29. In practice, disclosure
as a possibility created the potential for the imposition on society of other costs. Attorneys have
sometimes devoted an undue amount of time searching for a sufficiently obscure way to disclose
without revealing the true nature of the issue. See id. These excessive costs that taxpayers
may incur to conceal provide further evidence that disclosure can overburden the system and
not fully relieve the audit lottery problem. About all that can be said in favor of such a rule is
that it is better than one in which doubtful positions were adopted without even a disclosure
requirement.
498. On the other hand, disclosure of that sort might be a possible exception to the audit
charge suggested above. In that case the taxpayer might avoid liability for that charge, despite
failing to prevail as to that issue, at least for items that might have been seen as more likely
than not to prevail at the time of the return, if the taxpayer disclosed the presence of the issue
on the return. The return might call for an additional schedule with the question: "Have you
omitted any receipts from your income or claimed a deduction for any items that you believe
the Internal Revenue Service would question on audit? If so, list the items below."
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but it only puts the penalty amounts in the range expected of compensatory penalties. If, as is usually assumed, effective deterrence requires a rate above the compensatory rate, the 20% rate is too low.
It is a remarkable inconsistency of the current system that this rate
is set at a level that is not really coordinated with its purpose of
encouraging voluntary compliance. The rate for the negligence penalty
suggested here should be set higher in order to deter or to accomplish
more effectively its educational mission in developing normative standards. Considering the intermediate position of this penalty, a penalty
rate in the range of approximately 30% to 50% of the underpayment
would seem appropriate.49
3.

Coordination with Preparer Penalty Standard

The negligence penalty also should be coordinated with the tax
return preparer penalty standard under section 6694 so that the taxpayer and the taxpayer's lawyer or accountant are shooting for the
same target.5 Otherwise, as is the case with the substantial understatement penalty, the taxpayer may not be affected by the penalty
provision (because of a lack of substantial understatement) but the
advisor could still be penalized. Conversely, the taxpayer with a possible substantial understatement may not have had substantial authority to take the position, but the advisor covered by a lesser (perhaps)
standard would not be penalized. The latter situation prompted reconsideration of Treasury Circular 230501 and resulted in the still-pending
amendments (pending since 1986) to make the advisor subject to discipline under Treasury practice standards for giving advice in the
taking of return positions without substantial authority. 50
In order to handle this matter insofar as penalties are concerned,
the standard in section 6694 should be higher. After the 1989 Act,
that section provided that the advisor can be penalized if there is an
understatement of tax liability "due to a position for which there was

499.

The ABA Commission on Compliance suggested that in order to enhance compliance

the system should try 'to communicate deterrence messages to taxpayers more effectively."
ABA Compliance Commission Report, supra note 4, at 354.
500. For views of commentators expressing agreement that the taxpayer's and tax counsel's
responsibilities should be linked, without agreement on what standard should govern, see Handelman II, supra note 467, at 89; Holden, supra note 161, at 774.
501. 31 C.F.R. § 10 (1990).
502. To find the amendments as proposed, see 51 Fed. Reg. 29, 113 (Aug. 14, 1986),
reprinted in Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCI-)
49,134, 44,546, 44,590. For exposition of these
proposed amendments, see Handelman II, supranote 467, at 83; Holden, supranote 161, at 775.
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not a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits" and the
preparer "knew (or reasonably should have known) of such position."This standard was intended to conform to the existing ethical standards
governing attorneys and accountants and was seen as being stricter
than negligence, the former standard.- °0 The Service quickly has interpreted this standard to mean that there will be no penalty "if a reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax
law would lead such a person to conclude that the position has approximately a one-in-three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained on its
merits. 5 5 The standard in section 6694, as amended, still represents
an adversarial litigating standard rather than a tax reporting standard
for a system in which taxpayers are expected to report the correct
tax.- If the taxpayer is required to shoot for a position that is a
better than 50% proposition, so should the advisor who is more competent to analyze tax issues and who should encourage behavior that
the Congress deems to be compliant conduct. M7
4.

Elimination of Remaining No-Fault Penalties

If the penalty structure suggested above were adopted, the other
accuracy related penalties, such as the substantial understatement and
valuation penalties, could be eliminated. The intermediate penalty
suggested here indirectly turns upon the taxpayer's objectively reasonable belief in the correctness of the return position. An abandonment

503. I.R.C. § 6694(a).
504. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 7, at 1396.
505. I.R.S. Notice 90-20, 1990-1 C.B. 328; Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1), 56 Fed. Reg.
67,509 (Dec. 31, 1991); see also Banoff, supra note 164, at 1128 (meeting a 30-35% chance of
success). Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) with Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1). One can read
quality descriptions in these regulations to the effect that substantial authority may come to be
applied as a one and three chance of success as derived from the realist possibility of success
45.3A. Others can read the standard of
standard. Bittker & McMahon, supra note 141,
legislative history to the effect that substantial authority standard is higher. Michael I. Saltzman,
The PreparerPenalty's Realistic Possibility of Success Standard:Its Meaning and Application,
43 FLA L. REV. 915 (1991) (33% versus something less than 50% plus).
506. See Letter from Professor Calvin H. Johnson to Kenneth Gideon, Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy, in 89 TAX NOTES TODAY (TAX ANALYSTS) 156-25 (July 31, 1989).
507. Furthermore, there should not be such exceptions as the requirement of a substantial
understatement that produce such a discrepancy of standards that subject the taxpayer to a
lesser standard. Tax attorneys, since the 1989 Act, find it uncomfortable to tell clients that the
clients can take a position but the attorney cannot advise it without a penalty. Although it
sometimes slips one's mind when considering such dilemmas of practitioners, the 1989 Act did
not purport to change the standard governing attorney conduct as it allegedly merely matched
the ethical standards extant, so this should not have been a new problem created by the 1989
revision of § 6694.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss5/1

100

Winslow: Tax Penalties--"They Shoot Dogs, Don't They?"
TAX PENALTIES

of such no-fault penalties may seem hasty at first glance. Under the
old fault-based system, large errors in valuation, for example, produced no penalty. But valuation as a reporting matter is not really
different from numerous other factual issues involving ranges of opinion or possibilities. What is different about valuation is the manner
in which such issues burden the administrative and judicial processes.
The parties become immovably convinced of the correctness of their
positions and refuse to budge in settlement.8 This is not a matter
for a taxpayer penalty, but perhaps a problem best dealt with by
methods such as allocation of litigation and other costs or alternative
modes of dispute resolution.ue Moreover, in the scheme suggested
here such errors would at least produce a small compensatory charge.
That is appropriate for taxpayers who sometimes really have no substantial culpability and who do not deserve to be stigmatized. If they
really undertook to resolve correctly the valuation issue, that is as
far as a penalty system should go; it should not seek to inflict further
charges as some form of punishment. The compensatory charge,
moreover, would be appropriate for those taxpayers whose intent or
negligence simply cannot be proved. Even if such taxpayers escape
the intermediate tier of penalties, they will pay more than the taxpayers who succeeded in correctly reporting their taxes.
As has been noted repeatedly in the past, there are numerous
problems with proving taxpayer intent or negligence.510 The taxpayers
have the best access to the facts concerning their intent.511 The utility
of a negligence penalty bottomed on a reasonable basis is greatly
reduced by the need to litigate each position fully until the taxpayer
claiming such position can be deemed at fault. 512 Obviously, some positions taken in subjective good faith with no chance of success would
be subject to the negligence penalty suggested here, such as a return

508. See Morris M. Messing, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967) ("Too often in valuation disputes the
parties have convinced themselves of the unalterable correctness of their positions and have

consequently failed successfully to conclude settlement negotiations. ..

").

509. See Bruce Kogan, The Price Is Right -- Or Else: Congress' Efforts to Eliminate Tax
Cheating in Appraisals of Value, 5 VA. TAX REV. 59, 86-88 (1985).
510. Professor Johnson, in advocating a similar accuracy penalty, also proposed a "small
five-to-seven percent automatic penalty to reinforce the legal standard," because a fault-based

standard alone may not sufficiently encourage accuracy and "[1litigation about the taxpayer's
good faith effort always is inherently unsatisfactory." Johnson, supra note 152, at 1530.
511. With the best evidence on that issue with the taxpayer, the Service's difficulties of
proof led it to reject a proposal to rely solely on a negligence penalty and hence recommended
a continuation of a form of the substantial understatement penalty. Stark Report, supra note

6, at VIII-38.
512.

Kurtz, supra note 154, at 1622.
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position based on the proposition that only gold is income, because one
cannot objectively believe that such a proposition is more likely than not
correct. But given the inevitable slippage in terms of adequately identifying and dispositively proving a penalty case, some such tax chiselers will escape. Where a standard is based on the state of mind or
care of a taxpayer, slippage always is possible, particularly for those
who are well-advised.513 Such difficulties undoubtedly also lay behind
the Service's frequent failure to press for the old negligence and fraud
penalties.514
In addition, the ability of lawyers to inject further uncertainty into
such issues would also be troubling without a small charge as a backstop. Given that law is not mechanical and leaves some room for
judgment and application, the amount of such uncertainty seems sometimes to be distressingly large, if the writings of recent years are to
be believed. The perceived uncertainty appears to be increasing
beyond that which has been recognized in the past. The observed
uncertainties and possible avoidance of broad statutory515 and case
law5l 6 principles are pronounced in recent writings. This ability of
lawyers to create an issue, or perhaps obfuscate a situation, has caused
one commentator to suggest that, in considering acceptable behavior
by tax attorneys advising with respect to return positions, the standard must be as objectively determinable as possible with little room
for judgment or weighing of authorities. 51 7 This skeptical view finds
provisions such as the more likely than not standard to be inadequate,
because they involve a "subjective" legal analytical endeavor. Under

513.

See id.

514. See generally STAFF

OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N,

supra note 138, at 1275 (noting

that Congress felt that negligence and fraud penalties had not been asserted in many appropriate
cases).
515. See, e.g., Louis S. Freeman, Some Early Strategiesfor the MethodicalDisincorporation
of America After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Grafting Partnerships Onto C Corporations,
Running Amok with the Master Limited PartnershipConcept, and Generally Endeavoring to
Defeat the Intention of the Draftsmen of the Repeal of General Utilities, 64 TAXES 962 (1986).
516. James Warren, Richard Posner Shakes Up the Bench, AM. LAW., Sept. 1983, at 76
("Posner says that when he reads old cases, he finds that 'what seemed like a precedent was
not really important. It dealt with different facts. I've been amazed by the number of cases
which I've heard which seem to me to raise novel issues. Judges have always pretended the
law is more settled than it is."'). Judge Posner's formal writings reveal similar patterns of
thought, even though they do not appear so stark as his informal comments to reporters. See
Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 844-48 (1988).
517. Handelman II, supra note 467, at 102-03 ("Lawyers are trained to perceive (create?)
and exploit ambiguities and are subject to mortal self-deception when self-interest or the interest
of a client is implicated.").
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this view, the lawyers' identification with client interests will cloud
unduly the lawyers' analysis.518
This difficulty, which probably cannot be eliminated completely
under any fault-based penalty, may be diminished greatly in the system proposed in this article. With a small compensatory penalty serving as a backstop, the system can be assured that these taxpayers
with cunning tax counsel will not escape freely. The presence of a
small, but not trivial, charge for a return position ultimately determined to be incorrect should cause lawyers to see the law more clearly.
While a lawyer might be willing otherwise to argue that an issue is
uncertain and hence play the audit lottery, the knowledge that an
extra cost will be borne by the client should prompt disclosure of the
problem, at least to the client. One might even predict that some of
the more recently perceived uncertainty in the tax law will vanish
overnight.
With that small charge as a backstop, the skepticism of all, including the Service, might lessen. Increased skepticism causes a general
lack of respect for the system. This can adversely affect voluntary
compliance if only the good-hearted pay their fair share of taxes.5 1 9 It
also can cause the Service occasionally to break out of its usual self-restraint and attempt to shoehorn a group of innocents into an intentbased penalty with unfortunate results.2 0 With a generally firm penalty structure, and a compensatory backstop at the lower level, these
tendencies should be curbed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The tax penalty system has been overly concerned with the taxpayer's state of mind and, at the same time, not sufficiently concerned
about it.
The system should recognize that not all justifications for additions
to tax necessarily hinge on intent. Particularly for the lower level of
sanction, a compensatory penalty would relieve the system of this

518. Id.
519. Unlike a strictly negligence-based scheme, the suggested system here would not have
the "effect of rewarding the most aggressive practitioners at the expense of the more cautious,
to the detriment of the tax system." Kurtz, supra note 154, at 1622.
520. See Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193 (1990); Estate of Spruill v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1197 (1987). In referring to the attempts of the Service to make the
Spruill case fit into the fraud doctrine, including use of inconsistent views of the facts, Judge
Featherston rejected the last of those attempts as not consistent with the facts shown at trial
and remarked that it came 'inthe wake of damaged reputations, untold expense, and months
of anguish. . . ." Spruill, 88 T.C. at 1246.
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overconcern with intent and provide a simple provision that gives the
lower level a clearer mission that it can accomplish.
The system also should have a greater concern about the taxpayer's
state of mind or level of care. The system should provide for a civil
tax penalty embodying a normative standard of conduct in tax reporting. A negligence penalty that validates taxpayer reporting of items
in accord with what is probably the correct position is one example.
IMPACT 1989's failure to determine such a normative standard was
a major disappointment.
At the same time, the civil tax penalty system also should pursue
other goals. In fact, the overall penalty structure would benefit from
a broader comparison of the strength of current tax penalties to those
that have existed in the past as well as penalties in other contexts.
In connection with the pursuit of economic deterrence, any reform
should recognize that monetary sanctions will likely have only a small
effect on actual behavior in light of the overall tax system with its
low audit rate. But if we want to make more than a symbolic attempt
at deterrence, we should recognize that civil tax penalties have for
decades been weak in terms of the magnitude of punishment they
provide. The relatively low level of civil tax penalties appears most
clearly with respect to the civil fraud penalty. It seems appropriate
to draw upon retributory concepts in strengthening this civil tax penalty. The punishment should be emphatic, and therefore increased, to
make it more comparable to the punishment of other offenses of a
similar magnitude.
In general, we could do some very simple things in order to make
the tax system one that is taken more seriously by tax chiselers who
may not easily be exposed to criminal sanctions. These suggestions
also should encourage those taxpayers, who are inclined to compliance,
that their honesty will be rewarded.
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